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Pablo Moriano Salazar
ANOMALY DETECTION IN REAL-WORLD TEMPORAL NETWORKS
Detection of anomalous events relies on the collection, filtration, and analysis of diverse types of
temporal data. Interactions derived from such data can be modeled as networks to provide a better
understanding of the structure and dynamics of the underlying systems. This dissertation examines
the temporal evolution of Internet-scale phenomena to provide a more nuanced characterization of
normal functionality and anomalous behavior—usually undesired and often malicious.
Characterizing regular behavior is often a prerequisite for identifying these anomalies. However,
the volume and patterns of interactions during a system’s evolution under particular circumstances
may be highly variant. In security, I create hypotheses about the nature of attacks as a core compo-
nent of detection. In the insider threat, I hypothesized that malicious insiders would require access
to identifiably more diverse repositories than the non-malicious. In routing, my first hypothesis
was that the role of nation-state actors could be identified using traditional macroeconomic analy-
ses. My second hypothesis, that control plane hijacking could be identified by leveraging k-shell
decomposition of Autonomous System level graphs, could not be validated. In contrast, the anal-
ysis of inter-arrival times of route announcements provided clear identification and early warning
of large-scale incidents.
This dissertation contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of security threats using data
and network science methods. Specifically, I use (i) Graph mining to show that surprising pat-
terns about community structure and k-shell decomposition of graphs can be leveraged to detect
classes of anomalies. Leveraging (ii) Graph robustness, I show how community detection-based
methods are less biased against the density of edges in the system, providing a robust approach to
detect anomalous behavior. Finally, I illustrate the potential of (iii) Graph anomaly detection for
identifying anomalies in different real-world scenarios, including (a) email interactions, (b) social
media, (c) code repositories, and (d) Internet control-plane updates.
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1 Introduction
“The beginning of knowledge is the discovery of something we do not understand.”
— Frank Herbert
1.1 Motivation
Real-world relational data is omnipresent in today’s world. Interactions derived from such data
can be modeled as networks. (Throughout this dissertation I will use the terms network and graph
interchangeably.) The resulting network view can provide a better understanding of the structure
and dynamics of the underlying systems. Study of the temporal evolution of these networks is
crucial to provide a more detailed characterization of the system’s function. Irregularities, i.e.,
anomalies, in the general evolution of these networks are usually associated with undesired and
often critical behavior, in particular, in computer security [Chandola et al., 2009]. Thus, there is
a need to test the ability of temporal graph-based methods to contribute to the understanding and
mitigation of anomalies in these time-varying scenarios [Akoglu et al., 2015].
Collecting and analyzing large amounts of data has been of great utility in different fields
ranging from physics [Vespignani, 2009] to sociology [Lazer et al., 2009], including computer
security [Sommer and Paxson, 2010]. Structured analysis using methods from other fields—from
economics to complex systems—is only now being widely leveraged in computer security. This
dissertation analyzes large-scale relational data in computer security for anomaly detection.
In particular, I develop data-mining and temporal graph-based methods to detect anomalies
in time-varying, real-world computer security systems—a field in which anomalies are constantly
evolving as intelligent attackers respond to the models of defenders. Temporal graph-based anal-
ysis combines the strengths of time series and the power of social network analysis, and has the
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potential for automating the detection of previously hidden attacks [Ide and Kashima, 2004, Neil
et al., 2013].
The use of temporal graph-based methods as opposed to traditional time series of data points for
anomaly detection has numerous advantages. First, graphs allow natural labeling of their elements,
e.g., domain names, IP addresses, or port numbers for the nodes; and latency, throughput, or
bandwidth for the edges; which is useful to understand long-term correlations. Second, graphs
capture the interdependencies between elements, which provides a better understanding of the
structure and dynamics of the underlying systems. This is useful to track the interaction between
groups of elements. Finally, graphs generate new features that might not be robust in response
to normal changes in the system. Graph-based analysis allows us to identify stationary trends
in the design of reliable anomaly detection algorithms. In the field of security analytics, temporal
graph-based anomaly detection methods can be directly applied to problems of intrusion detection,
classification of network traffic, and understanding of massive network outages.
Characterizing regular behavior is often a prerequisite for the identification of anomalies. This
is made more difficult because variations in the volume of interactions during a system’s evolution
may be the norm, or may be normal only under particular circumstances. Identifying stationary
trends that enable us to design reliable detection algorithms remains an open challenge. Extensive
yet careful data compilation, rigorous analysis, and iterative modeling are all necessary to secure
our interconnected society.
For example, consider the problem of detecting large-scale events derived from email commu-
nications inside a particular organization or from society using Twitter data. One might expect
that during a certain event, the volume of communications tends to increase, e.g., when a specific
deadline approaches or when there is an incident of global interest. Based on the nature of these in-
teractions, the events should not be labeled as anomalous, but how can we derive clearer detection
signatures for event detection in these types of systems? The analysis of the community inter-
action between members of communication graphs offers a complementary explanation to detect
particular events that is not biased toward the volume of interactions.
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In the context of software development, how can we ensure the protection of the integrity
of organizational assets? In this example, the complex set of interactions between developers
and code repositories again can be captured by time-varying graphs. A particularly important
observation is that there are observable external events (precipitating events) that might influence
potential risk behavior of employees toward organization assets. Such precipitating events are well
documented in organizational literature. As in the previous case, the development of a method that
leverages the notion of the community structure in the interactions between developers and code
repositories produces a new signature for detection that allows quantitatively verification.
In the Internet control-plane, are there any macroeconomics factors that propitiate the gener-
ation of a greater number of routing anomalies1 from some countries as opposed to others? The
use of macroeconomic analysis provides a theoretical grounding to identify those differences. In
particular and, in conjunction with multiple linear regression and cluster analysis, it is possible to
illustrate that there are key macroeconomic variables that are consistently identifiable as different
between countries that produce a disproportionate number of such anomalies. This first analysis
provided a foundation for understanding the dynamics and patterns of hijacks, which enabled a
hypothesis-driven evaluation of control-plane attacks from a graph-theoretical perspectives.
Internet control-plane large-scale outages due to routing anomalies have been increasing over
the last several years [Vervier et al., 2015]. From the technical computer security point of view,
there are many proposed cryptographic solutions to mitigate them. Ultimately, they would imply
dramatic changes to the Internet infrastructure. Although technically correct, their applicability
seems to be infeasible. Spatio temporal analysis of routing anomalies, on the other hand, provides
key insights that elucidate the motivation behind the potentially benign increase in these types of
incidents. In particular, the use of graph mining to study the structure of Autonomous System
(AS)-level graphs reveals the challenges of studying whether anomalies impact the structure of
those graphs and its differentiation with regular changes. However, by studying the dynamics
1Routing anomalies are those incidents that happen on the control-plane at the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) level.
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of the system instead of its topology, we ask a different question: Are there any changes in the
dynamics of route updates when a large-scale BGP incident is incipient? In this case, a quantitative
characterization of the system update dynamics based on burstiness allows us to extract a clear
distinction between incident and non-incident scenarios.
This type of rigorous analysis provides quantitative validation of apparent common sense ex-
planations. Now, I provide the thesis statement and the problems I address as a part of the contri-
bution of this dissertation.
1.2 Thesis Statement
This dissertation aims to develop data-driven and network science methods to understand the emer-
gence of anomalies in longitudinal security data. In particular, I demonstrate:
1. the use of graph mining methods to better characterize and identify anomalous events in
email, social media, and user-system interactions;
2. the potential of spatio temporal analysis for the understanding of hidden factors behind In-
ternet control-plane events; and
3. that such data-intensive hypothesis-driven analyses offer new insights to solve real-world
computer security challenges.
I discuss below my main contributions to the anomaly detection problem in the security domain
using using data and network-science methods.
1.3 Research Questions and Overview
In Part I, we2 propose a method for detection of large events in temporal communication networks.
In doing so, we analyzed data from email communications in Enron during its collapse and tweets
2In this dissertation, I use the pronoun “we” as none of this work could have been successfully completed
without collaboration with others.
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during the Boston Marathon bombing event. We characterized the interaction between users in
both systems using temporal graphs. We show that by leveraging changes in the proportion of
inter- and intra-links in the structure of these graphs, it is possible to identify a detection signature
around the events of interest.
In Part II, we turn our attention to the complex interactions happening in the process of software
development in an organization. In particular, we extrapolate the previous method to provide a
signature for anomaly detection in the case of the committing behavior of developers in proprietary
code. The main idea relies on capturing committing interactions between developers and code
repositories using a bipartite graph. We then use this bipartite graph as a substrate to extract the
developer projection and analyze deviation patterns of commits to identify deviations with respect
to the commonly contributed repositories. We show that known precipitating events within the
organization are correlated with these anomalous distributions of commits.
In Part III, we focus our attention on the Internet—one of the most beautiful complex systems
humanity has constructed. We use data about route updates in BGP to model a dynamic system
based on the topology of the AS-level graph. We also use metadata about the timestamps of updates
to propose an anomaly detection method based on the burstiness of these updates.
The next subsections introduce general research questions and specific contributions in each
part and chapters of this dissertation.
1.3.1 Part I: Anomaly Detection in the Society
Beginning with email and Twitter data surrounding specific events, we can ask the following ques-
tions:
• Do important events change communication patterns?
• Is the community structure of communication networks robust against external events?
• Can we leverage the distribution of links in the community partition for event detec-
tion?
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1.3.1.1 Chapter 3: Community-Based Event Detection in Temporal Networks
We propose a method for detecting large events based on the structure of temporal communication
networks. Our method is motivated by previous findings that show that patterns of information
diffusion with respect to network community structure can reveal the viral nature of contagion.
Namely, we hypothesize that large events trigger viral information cascades that cross community
boundaries. By comparing the amount of communication within and across communities, we
show that it is possible to detect events, even when these events do not trigger significantly larger
communication volume. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method using two examples—
the email communication network of Enron and the Twitter communication network during the
Boston Marathon bombing.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the key idea of the proposed method. When there is no global event,
the communication happens mostly within each community (see Fig. 1.1(A)). However, when an
global event occurs, it spreads virally, crossing community boundaries. If the event is relevant
to most people, then usual community boundaries shaped based on topics do not constrain the
communication anymore.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of the proposed event detection method. Both networks have
the same communities but different patterns of communication within and across them. (A) When
there is no global event, most communication occurs within communities. (B) When a global event
occurs, more communication may happen across communities because of the global relevance of
the event and because of its virality.
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The results of this project were initially presented as a conference abstract [Moriano et al.,
2017a] and then were published as a journal article [Moriano et al., 2019a] in collaboration with
Jorge Finke and Yong-Yeol Ahn. Pablo Moriano is the primary researcher on both works and
contibuted all the analysis and figures therein.
1.3.2 Part II: Anomaly Detection in an Organization
Internal events in an organization may influence behaviors in their employees. Research from
sociology suggests that the motivation to attack from insiders is associated with internal circulating
and often negative information known as precipitating events. Our work on insider threat addresses
the following questions:
• Can we detect the effect of precipitating events in the commit behavior of developers?
• What topological properties in the contributions graphs change with the announcement
of precipitating events?
• Are changes in the commit behavior of developers closely correlated with precipitating
events?
• Can we leverage the distribution of commits in the community partition for event de-
tection?
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Protecting Organizational Assets Through Graph Mining
We developed an innovative approach that captures the temporal evolution of user-system inter-
actions to create an unsupervised learning framework to detect high-risk insider behaviors. Our
method is based on the analysis of a bipartite graph of user and system interactions. The graph
mining method detects increases in potential insider threat events following precipitating events.
Specifically, I identify events that have been shown to increase the incidence of insider threats and
then leverage a graph-based method to show the increase of detection of insider events at the time
of these events. Events such as mass layoffs or restructuring have been shown in the literature
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outside of computer science to increase incidents of insider threat activity, and I use that fact to
evaluate the graph theoretical approach. We apply our method to a dataset that comprises interac-
tions between engineers and components in a software version control system spanning 22 years
and automatically detects statistically significant events. We find that there is statistically signifi-
cant evidence for increasing anomalies in the committing behavior following precipitating events.
Although these findings do not constitute detection of insider threat events per se, they reinforce
the idea that insider operations can be motivated by the insiders’ environment and detected with the
proposed method. We compare our results with algorithms based on volume-dependent statistics
showing that our proposed framework outperforms those measures. This graph mining method has
potential for early detection of insider threat behavior from user-system interactions, which could
enable quicker mitigation.
Figure 1.2 shows the abstraction that we used for characterizing interactions between develop-
ers and repositories using bipartite graphs (above). We rely on the developer projection (below)
to measure the proportion of commits that permeate different groups of developers. We show that
after a precipitating event is announced there is a diversification of commits.
The results of this project were initially published as a conference paper [Moriano et al., 2017b]
where the work received a Best Paper award, and an extended version of it was published as a
journal article [Moriano et al., 2018a] in collaboration with Jared Pendleton, Steven Rich, and L.
Jean Camp. Pablo Moriano is the primary researcher on both works. The initial research question,
the analysis, the figures, and the discussion were all contributed by Pablo Moriano.
1.3.4 Part III: Anomaly Detection on the Internet
The Internet, although extremely robust, is notoriously susceptible to attack by means of BGP.
Incipient attacks can be detected by analyzing anomalies in the expected behavior of announce-
ments in the BGP protocol. Here we analyze the variation in the generation of BGP anomalies, the
topology of the AS-level graphs, and the dynamics of inter-arrival times of updates to address this
challenge. We also ask the following questions and make the following contributions:
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Figure 1.2: Malicious activity in the bipartite graph. The top panel represents an unusual interac-
tion between Bob and Eve with component “E.” The bottom panel represents the corresponding
one mode projection graph with the anomalous edge crossing communities. Please refer to Fig-
ure 1.1 for a more abstract schematic illustrating the method.
• Can variations in the generation of routing anomalies be explained by macroeconomic
indicators?
• Are routing anomalies only the result of limited technical capacity?
• Are routing anomalies potentially associated with ecrime activities and national intelli-
gence operations?
• Is the AS-level graph structure impacted by large-scale routing events?
• Are the path lengths in the crust of the AS-level graphs changing during large-scale
routing events?
• Can we distinguish between large-scale incidents and no incidents by analyzing AS-
level graphs?
9
• Do the inter-arrival times of BGP updates change when an large-scale event is incipi-
ent?
• Can we leverage changes in the inter-arrival times of updates to generate signatures of
anticipated detection?
1.3.5 Chapter 5: Macroeconomic Analysis of Routing Anomalies
We perform a longitudinal study of routing anomalies to investigate the factors that motivate, or
at least correlate with, them. We use macroeconomics to examine anomalies as possibly due to
incompetence, ecrime, or intelligence operations. Our hypotheses are derived by leveraging three
theories from criminology and global measures of technology adoption. We found that exports in
technology were not statistically significant, undermining the argument for incompetence. We also
found support for the possibility that anomalies are driven by crime, specifically for the guardian-
ship and relative deprivation theories of crime. In addition to these findings from regression analy-
sis, clustering indicates that civil conflict and surveillance are associated with the disproportionate
origination of routing anomalies. This supports the possibility of use of routing anomalies for
national intelligence.
Figure 1.3 shows the geographic location of the countries that generate a significant number of
routing anomalies and poor governmental practices (highlighted in red). Note that countries de-
picted with higher intensity (darkness) are evaluated by consistent global measures as having lower
integrity of governmental institutions. Interestingly, most of these countries have been involved in
civil protests and threats of civil war as has been reported in [Dainotti et al., 2011]. In particular,
Syria has been (during the observation period) constantly categorized as a country with a high ratio
of anomaly/ASes. Other countries in the Middle East that appear on this chart, Iraq and Yemen,
also have been embroiled in conflict. The analysis highlights other countries in Africa including
Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Guinea, and Liberia, as well as Timor-Leste3 in Asia. Please note the
3Timor-Leste was previously known as East Timor until winning independence from Indonesia and then
being established as a sovereign state in 2002.
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Figure 1.3: Geographic location of the countries with considerable high number of anomaly/ASes
and poor governmental practices during the observation period.
The results of this project were initially published as a conference abstract [Moriano et al.,
2016] where the work received a Best Poster award. It was then extended into a journal arti-
cle [Moriano et al., 2017c] in collaboration with Soumya Achar and L. Jean Camp. Pablo Moriano
is the primary researcher on both works, defined the method, completed the analysis, and created
the figures therein.
1.3.6 Chapter 6: Characterization of Internet Routing Anomalies Through Graph Mining
We explore the idea of reconstructing the AS-level graph for three large-scale routing incidents
and evaluate the topological properties of the graphs before, during, and after these events. Using
the AS graph topology, we aim to illustrate that the incidents were visible as anomalies before they
were widely diffused. The three incidents we examined were the Indosat hijack in April 2014,
the Telecom Malaysia leak in June 2015, and the Bharti Airtel Ltd. hijack in November 2015.
There were immediate changes in the topological features in the subgraphs, but not the graph as a
whole, during the course of these events. Specifically, when the AS-level graph is examined using
k-shell decomposition, there are topological changes in the crust in path length and clustering
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measurements. The k-shell decomposition distinguishes between the core and periphery graphs.
In this k-shell decomposition, the core consists of ASes with at least connectivity k, with the crust
consisting of those ASes which have less than k connectivity. Although anomalous behavior was
not observable in the core graph, the events are immediately apparent on the crust. However,
these changes were not statistically significant. Our hypothesis is that, in graph-theoretical terms,
these incidents require the initiators to move closer to the core, away from the periphery, and the
concentric impacts of the disturbances are visible as these move across the crust.
Figure 1.4 shows the intuition behind our hypothesis. Under the assumption that the core of
the AS-level graphs do not change much and that the attacker is at lower shell levels, malicious
updates will tend to change the topology of the graphs. In particular, by analyzing k-crust graphs
(generated by aggregating all the previous k-shells), we study whether there are significant changes
in the topology of this graphs under the presence of large-scale incidents. We found however that
is challenge to capture this behavior based on the busier dynamics of BGP updates (that hinder to
find the difference between regular and anomalous).
Figure 1.4: A schematic representation of the graph under k-shell decomposition for different
values of shell ks. The AS-level graph under normal conditions is on the left and the same topology
when a BGP hijack is committed is on the right. The hijacker is highlighted with the black hat.
The results of this project were initially published as a technical report [Moriano et al., 2017d]
then presented as a conference abstract [Moriano et al., 2018b] in collaboration with Raquel Hill
12
and L. Jean Camp. Pablo Moriano was the primary researcher on both works, implemented the
method, completed the analysis, and created the figures therein.
1.3.7 Chapter 7: Bursty Announcements for Early Detection of BGP Routing Anomalies
In this work we propose a method for early detection of large-scale disruptions based on the anal-
ysis of bursty BGP announcements. We hypothesize that the occurrence of large-scale disruptions
are preceded by bursty announcements. Our method is grounded in analysis of changes in the inter-
arrival times of announcements. BGP announcements that are associated with disruptive updates
tend to occur in groups of relatively high frequency, followed by periods of infrequent activity. To
test our hypothesis, we quantify the burstiness of inter-arrival times around the date and times of
three large-scale incidents: the Indosat hijacking event in April 2014, the Telecom Malaysia leak in
June 2015, and the Bharti Airtel Ltd. hijack in November 2015. We show that we can detect these
events several hours prior to when they were originally detected. We propose an algorithm that
leverages the burstiness of disruptive updates to provide early detection of large-scale malicious
incidents using local collector data. We describe limitations, open challenges, and how this method
can be used for large-scale routing anomaly detection. This detection leverages the fact that for a
large-scale event to be implemented effectively, the attacker must send out announcements widely
and quickly.
Figure 1.5 shows the the differences in terms of inter-arrival times for two different random
processes X1 and X2. In X1, events follow each other at relatively regular time intervals. In contrast,
X2 shows a bursty sequence of events in which there are a burst of events followed for period of
relatively long inactivity. We relied on this last observation to hypothesize that for incipient large-
scale routing events, the sequence of route updates from ASes involved in the incidents follow a
bursty pattern. We then quantify this burstness to propose an event detection algorithm by relaying
on measuring the inter-arrival times of route updates.
This manuscript is under revision at SIGCOMM 2019 in collaboration with Raquel Hill and L.
Jean Camp. Pablo Moriano was the primary researcher on both works, implemented the method,
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Figure 1.5: Difference between events produced a non-bursty sequence (above) and a bursty one
(below).
completed the analysis, and created the figures therein.
1.4 Research Impact
Many computer security challenges today occur at a large-scale. Moreover, security data is intrin-
sically dynamic meaning that the threat usually rapidly evolves between analysis and the use of
countermeasures in detection. The proposed research lays the foundation for extracting meaning-
ful signatures from longitudinal security to detect anomalies using data-driven and network science
methods. With insights about the mechanisms that underlie the generation of computer security
anomalies, the proposed methods aim to elucidate the creation of countermeasure tools for iden-
tification of anomalies in the context of Internet control-plane, email and social media networks,
and the insider threat.
1.5 Outline
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant
literature on Internet control-plane functioning, graph-based anomaly detection, and its intersec-
tion with computer security challenges such as the insider threat. In the next five chapters—from
Chapters 3 through 7—this dissertation shows the work toward data-intensive hypothesis-driven
analysis, including (i) the development of a graph mining method to identify large events in email
and social media datasets (in Chapter 3); (ii) an extension of the previous method to take into
account the intrinsic interaction between developers and code repositories in a bipartite graph
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scenario to identify highly-risky behavior (as the one posed by insiders) (in Chapter 4); (iii) a
spatio temporal clustering analysis to understand the country-level behavior of BGP control-plane
incidents (in Chapter 5); (iv) the application of k-core decomposition analysis to understand large-
scale routing anomalies leveraging AS-level temporal graphs (in Chapter 6); and finally, (v) the
development of a method for early detection of large-scale disruptions based on the analysis of
bursty BGP announcements (in Chapter 7). Chapter 8 revisits the thesis statement, presents con-
cluding remarks, and suggests areas for future research.
Beyond the specific hypotheses, the nuanced understanding enabled by a temporal graph-based
approach also enables an analysis of ground truth. By definition, security data record only those
incidents which are detected. The creation of novel graph-based indicators enables the security
community to characterize the scope and scale of possible false negatives. The hypothesis-driven
temporal graph theory approach here makes it feasible to ground the Internet-scale anomalies in
the social and political context, leveraging communities and geography without suffering from
over-fitting or spurious correlations while leveraging vast amounts of data.
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2 Related Work
“If you cannot explain something in simple terms, you don’t understand it well enough.”
— Richard P. Feynman
In this chapter, I review previous work related to the topics presented in this dissertation proposal.
The related work section has been grouped into sections where I 1) discuss the intersection be-
tween anomaly detection and security data; 2) give an overview of graph based anomaly detection
with a particular emphasis on event detection in temporal graphs; 3) cover the basis of BGP func-
tioning, including traditional approaches to secure the Internet control-plane and its manipulation
for ecrime and political operation purposes; and 4) explain how insider threat has been framed as
an anomaly detection problem by characterizing their actors and the use of graph based methods
to perform event detection of high risky behavior.
2.1 Security as Anomaly Detection
The ability to discover irregular behavior in networked systems depends on our understanding of
how regular mechanisms lead to observable outcomes. Identifying such behavior is usually ref-
ereed to as the problem of anomaly detection. Anomaly detection algorithms often prevent the
occurrence of critical events or undesired system conditions [Chandola et al., 2009]. Applications
range from network intrusion [Ding et al., 2012], credit card fraud [Bolton and Hand, 2001], tax
evasion [Bolton and Hand, 2001], malware detection [Invernizzi et al., 2012], and route hijack-
ing [Shi et al., 2012].
In a number of applications, an anomaly is viewed as an “observation that differs so much from
other observations as to arouse suspicion that it was generated by a different mechanism” [Hawkins,
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1980]. Detection techniques define the regular behavior of a system, against which unusual patterns
are evaluated. Characterizing regular behavior is often a prerequisite to identify these anomalies.
Consider for example the case of email exchanges in an organization. On the one hand, receiving
huge volumes of emails may represent an anomalous event, e.g., a DDoS attack in an attempt to
overflow a mailbox. On the other hand, an increase in emails, as a particular deadline approaches,
may not represent an anomaly. Variations in the transmission of information during certain dates
under particular circumstances may be the norm [Fond et al., 2014a]. Identifying which stationary
trends allow us to design reliable detection algorithms remains an open challenge.
Traditional anomaly detection methods deal with unstructured data, i.e., data where samples
are not explicitly interrelated. A sample generally represents a multidimensional vector of features
or attributes. Most detection methods are based on (i) classification, which trains a classifier
from labeled training samples; anomalies are distinguished based on inherited knowledge [Abe
et al., 2006, Janssens et al., 2009]; (ii) distance measures, which calculate the similarity between
samples; anomalies are samples far from their closest neighbors [Aggarwal and Yu, 2001]; (iii)
clustering measures, which verify whether samples belong to emerging centroids; anomalies are
samples far from any centroid [Wang and Wilkes, 2012]; (iv) statistical methods which analyzes
whether samples occur in high probability regions of a stochastic model; anomalies occur in the
low probability regions of the model; (v) information measures, which estimate the information
content; anomalies are samples that induce irregularities into that content [Smets and Vreeken,
2011]; and (vi) spectral measures, which find locally sparse lower dimensional projections of the
samples; anomalies differ from regular samples on the projected space [Shyu et al., 2006].
2.2 Graph-Based Anomaly Detection
Classical approaches for anomaly detection assume that samples are unstructured. However, in a
number of situations, samples are explicitly interrelated. Network representations are a natural way
to model the relationships between samples, providing an abstraction that captures the structure of
these relationships [Akoglu et al., 2015, Newman, 2003].
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In general, the problem of anomaly detection in structured data has been tied to a three-tiered
taxonomy [Ranshous et al., 2015]. Algorithms are classified based on (i) the temporal framework;
(ii) the type of anomaly; and (iii) the method underlying the approach. Classification based on
the temporal framework takes into account two approaches. The first approach focuses on static
graphs, that is, on a snapshot of the network at a specific time. The second approach focuses on
a sequence of graphs, that is, on the evolution of a network over time. Classification based on the
type of anomaly focus on identifying anomalies on the topology (i.e., anomalous nodes, edges, or
subgraphs) or on the occurrence of events that affect the topology [Ranshous et al., 2015]. Finally,
the classification by the method has a similar sub-classification as for unstructured data, based on
the mathematical framework used for detection.
2.2.1 Graph-Based Event Detection
Temporal networks are represented by an ordered set of graphs, called a graph stream. Subsets
of this stream are referred to as graph segments [Sun et al., 2007]. There are five general ap-
proaches to design event detection algorithms in temporal networks [Ranshous et al., 2015]. First,
compression methods use the minimum description length principle to achieve a compact graph
representation [Rissanen, 1978]. The idea behind this principle is to find regularities in a data set
and to reduce the graph to a compressed representation. An anomalous event is reported based on
the difficulty of achieving compressed representations. The goal is to reduce the entropy of the
binary representation of the adjacency matrix so as to minimize the cost of encoding [Sun et al.,
2007]. An event is detected when the change in the encoding cost of adding a new graph to a
graph segment is greater than the cost of the newly aggregated graph. In other words, if the newly
aggregated graph inhibits compressibility (because the vertex partition is different from the other
graphs in the segment) the algorithm reports the occurrence of an anomalous event. Compression-
based methods do not make an assumption or any assumption about the underlying distribution of
the data. Their performance is highly dependent on the information theoretic measure, performing
well when a significant number of anomalies occur [Chandola et al., 2009]. The average rankings
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of detected anomalous events drops notably as the regularity of the normal records increases [No-
ble and Cook, 2003].
Second, decomposition methods analyze the spectral properties of a matrix or tensor represen-
tation of a graph stream. This approach studies regular patterns in selected eigenvectors, eigen-
values, and singular values. For example, the work in [Akoglu and Faloutsos, 2010] analyzes the
texting behavior of a mobile network, where nodes represent users and edges represent sent mes-
sages. It builds a correlation matrix of the behavior between all pairs of nodes over a fixed time
frame, aiming to extract a sequence of features. The algorithm reports an anomalous event based
on deviations (i.e., a low similarity) between the principal eigenvector of the current graph and the
aggregated graph during the past time frame.
In a closely related work, nodes that share similar structural properties are associated with
different so-called structural roles [Rossi et al., 2013]. The degree of membership of a node to
a group is estimated through non-negative matrix factorization and maximum description length,
which defines the roles of nodes [Henderson et al., 2012]. To detect anomalous events, the algo-
rithm identifies nodes that have unusual structural transition patterns (i.e., mixed membership). In
particular, a large number of role changes over time suggests the occurrence of anomalous events.
These decomposition-based methods are suitable for handling high dimensional data sets (e.g.,
when multiple type of interactions are present). They generally perform well when regular and
anomalous behavior are separable in lower dimensional spaces.
Third, distance measure methods evaluate distance between graphs as a metric to identify
anomalous events. The distance between two graphs is generally calculated either based on the
maximum common subgraph or the graph edit distance (GED), i.e., the number of operations
needed to convert one graph into another [Shoubridge et al., 2002]. Two consecutive graphs with
a significant distance between them raises an alarm. Variations in these algorithms are usually
reflected in the function used to calculated the distance. These methods have been used to extract
time series representations of the distance between topological features, which are modeled as an
autoregressive–moving-average (ARMA) processes, i.e., by autoregression and moving average
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factors, used to create a statistical model of the differences. The algorithm detects an anomalous
event if the residuals between the expected and empirical output differences are greater than a
certain threshold [Pincombe, 2005].
Along these lines, the work in [Koutra et al., 2013] proposes a similarity score to compare
pairwise node affinities, i.e., the influence between corresponding nodes of consecutive graphs.
Affinities are calculated using a variation of Belief Propagation [Koutra et al., 2011]. Pairwise sim-
ilarity matrices are compared using a variation of the Euclidean distance. Distance-based methods
do not make any assumption regarding the generative distribution of the data. Their performance
generally depends on the particular function used to compute the distance measure.
Fourth, statistical methods are based on constructing statistical (parametric or non-parametric)
models (e.g., graph likelihood or the distribution of the eigenvalues) to identify deviations from
models. Variations in these algorithms usually consider types of models, different techniques
to construct the model, different network properties, and different criteria for defining anoma-
lies [Ranshous et al., 2015]. In particular, the work in [Aggarwal et al., 2011] proposes a reservoir
sampling method that maintains structural summaries of the graph stream. Anomalies represent
edges between subgraphs that rarely occur. Every time a new graph is added to the stream, the
algorithm calculates the likelihood of appearance of particular graph objects that contain unusual
edges. A single score is associated for each graph added to the sequence, based on the likelihood
of individual edges.
Similarly, the work in [Hirose et al., 2009] introduces an algorithm that aims to detect anoma-
lous events in the distribution of the largest eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of the vertex-to-
vertex correlation matrix, i.e., based on local-vertex features. The algorithm identifies an event
if the incoming graph generates a correlation matrix whose largest eigenvalue deviates from the
expected distribution. Probabilistic methods propose a solution for anomaly detection when as-
sumptions about the underlying data distribution hold true. Computational complexity becomes a
limitation when more robust models are used to analyze the data.
The last category comprises community-based methods. These methods propose algorithms
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that focus on analyzing the formation of community structures. The idea behind these approaches
is to report an anomalous event whenever there is a significant change in any of the communities.
For example, the work in [Duan et al., 2009] quantifies the similarity (using the Jaccard coefficient)
among partitions (a division into clusters, such that every vertex belongs to one cluster) between
the current graph and past graph segments. A similarity below a certain threshold indicates the
occurrence of an anomalous event, i.e., the current graph is not similar to the graphs that are present
in the existing graph segment. Similarly, a model-based approach for event detection is introduced
in [Peel and Clauset, 2015], in which the community structure is captured using a generalized
hierarchical random graph model (GHRG). The model infers a dendrogram of the community
structure at different scales. To detect anomalous events, the algorithm identifies changes in the
parameters of a fitted model using a likelihood ratio test. Community-based methods are flexible
with respect to the type of community detection algorithm.
One of the main advantages of community-based methods is that they mitigate topological
biases, i.e., are less dependent on the density of links. For example, in an email or Twitter commu-
nication network, new users and interactions are constantly being added and sent. Communication
traffic tends to increase or drop based on the time of the time of the day or date. Despite this behav-
ior, there is no anomalous event. It might be a regular pattern of the system [Fond et al., 2014a].
In a different scenario, consider a hypothetical network with a predefined community structure,
i.e., a network in which every node has been assigned to a specific group that is defined through a
partition. If a fixed number of edges is added randomly to this network, this might not necessarily
change the community structure. This does not hold for density dependent measures, including,
GED, degree distribution, and clustering coefficient [Fond et al., 2014b]. Of all the methods de-
scribed above, community-based methods are more robust against pinpointing anomalous events
that can be identified by measuring the density on links. However, the computational complexity
of the community algorithms is often a challenge. An overview of community detection is offered
to the reader below.
21
2.2.2 Community Structure
Communities are groups of densely connected nodes in a graph. The community structure of a
graph captures the interaction between nodes belonging to clusters (also known as modules) that
are connected internally but not externally. Such clusters might be derived from different types
of interactions between nodes, e.g., common interests, homophily, geographical distance among
others [Girvan and Newman, 2002, Newman and Park, 2003, Moriano and Finke, 2014]. Figure 2.1
shows a schematic representation of a graph with three communities.
Figure 2.1: A graph with three communities enclosed by the dashed circles.
The problem of detecting communities in graphs is of extremely importance across multiple
domains. They include applications that span the analysis of social interactions on the Web [Klein-
berg and Lawrence, 2001], the understanding of functional modules in the brain [Bullmore and
Sporns, 2009], and in the optimization of routes in large road networks [Song and Wang, 2011].
The challenge of detecting communities, however, is nontrivial [Radicchi et al., 2004]. Different
methods for detecting communities have been proposed, including, modularity optimization [New-
man, 2006], the Louvain method [Blondel et al., 2008], Infomap [Rosvall and Bergstrom, 2008],
clique percolation [Palla et al., 2005], and link clustering [Ahn et al., 2010]. The interested reader
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in more details about community detection methods is referred to the extensive review in [Fortu-
nato, 2010]. In this dissertation, the Infomap method was used to compute the community structure
of graphs. Details about the Infomap method are discussed below.
Infomap
The Infomap community detection method is based on the notion of codifying the paths of
a random walker in a graph. In particular, it assumes that a random walker is more likely to be
contained inside communities than to travel between them. The purpose of the method is then
to minimize the description length of the random walker’s movements in the graph. This notion
is captured through the map equation (equation (2.1)) that serves as the objective function in the
optimization problem [Rosvall and Bergstrom, 2008].
Specifically, let M be a module partition of n nodes and m modules. It is assumed that each
node is assigned to a single module. The map equation L(M) provides an estimate of—given an
infinite random walk on a graph partitioned according to M—the average number of bits per step
required to describe that walk.





In equation (2.1), q is the probability that the random walker switches modules per step and
H(Q) represents the entropy of modules names. Note that these two terms capture the movement
between nodes. In addition, pi captures the sum of probabilities of movements inside the module
along with the probability of exiting i and H(Pi) captures the entropy of intra-module movements.
Note that the last two terms characterize the movements within the modules.
Overall, the optimization process ensures that the partition with the shortest description length
is the one that better describes the community structure of the graph with respect to the dynamics
occurring on it [Bohlin et al., 2014].
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2.3 BGP
The Internet is composed of over 60,000 computers networks, also know as Autonomosus Systems
(ASes) [Huston, 2019]. ASes interconnect globally millions of end systems by means of the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP was introduced for the first time in 1989 in [Lougheed and Rekhter,
1989] allowing the exchange of reachability information between ASes. The current Internet still
relies on BGP to route traffic, although on its fourth version [Rekhter et al., 2006]. Because of the
inherent concept of trust derived for the first developments of the Internet, ASes route traffic to
certain destinations derived a continuous process of diffusion of routes, i.e., update messages, that
do not verify authenticity of claims. This makes BGP a simple to protocol but still unsecured. The
operation of the Internet at the BGP-level is also referred as the control-plane.
2.3.1 IP Prefixes
Since the last version of BGP, Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) IP Prefixes are exchanged
between ASes to route global Internet traffic [Fuller and Li, 2006]. In CIDR, the range of addresses
that a particular network owns are represented by an IP prefix. An IP prefix has two parts separated
by an slash, for example, in the IPv4 block
192.168.100.0/22
the more significant bits represent the network prefix that characterize a network or subnet, i.e.,
this IP prefix spans 222 IP adresses, from 192.168.100.0 to 192.168.103.255. The least significant
bits form a host identifier.
IP address space assignation is an administrative process carried out by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) which is a department of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). The IANA distributes the pool of IP addresses between Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs) which are responsible for different geographical location. Currently, there are
five RIRs worldwide, including, AFRINIC (responsible for the African continent), APNIC (re-
sponsible for the Asia/Pacific region), ARIN (responsible for the U.S., Canada, and some regions
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in the Caribbean), LACNIC (responsible for South and Central America as well as the remaining
portions in the Caribbean), and RIPE NCC (responsible for Europe and the Middle East).
2.3.2 AS Numbers
As in the case of IP address assignation, AS numbers (ASNs) are assigned to ASes for their identifi-
cation by RIRs. Originally, ASNs were two bytes long [Mitchell, 2013]. However, a new proposal
to extend this representation to a four byte representation was presented in [Vohra and Chen, 2012]
due to number exhaustion.
2.3.3 Prefix Hijacking
Prefix hijacking is the act of rerouting Internet traffic intended to be delivered to another AS
through the propagation of erroneous BGP routes. This is the result of the lack of authentication of
BGP update messages. It might be because the results of router misconfigurations [Mahajan et al.,
2002] or malicious intent [Ballani et al., 2007]. The AS whose route was hijacked is referred as
the victim AS. Different attacks can leverage hijacks. [Zheng et al., 2007] describes the purposes
of hijacks as observed in the wild as being to (i) create a black hole in the network, (ii) steal the
victim AS’s identity, (iii) intercept traffic for eavesdropping, or (iv) to conduct any illegal activity
such as sending spam.
2.3.4 Detection of BGP Anomalies
BGP anomaly detection approaches are usually classified based on the type of data that is used for
the task. In that respect, there are: (i) control-plane, (ii) data-plane, and (iii) hybrid approaches.
Control-plane approaches passively monitor BGP updates or routing tables from a distributed set
of BGP monitors [Lad et al., 2006, Khare et al., 2012, Sermpezis et al., 2018a]. These approaches
look for inconsistencies in the origin of prefixes announced by ASes or unexpected path changes.
In particular, the work in [Lad et al., 2006] proposes a Prefix Hijack Alert System (PHAS). PHAS
relies on the idea of finding unique prefixes simultaneously originating from multiple ASes—also
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referred as Multiple Origin AS conflicts. Once these conflicts are detected, this method filters false
positives using additional information from the network operators, e.g., checking announcements
of similar prefixes from different ASes that belong to the same organization. In contrast, the work
in [Khare et al., 2012] focuses on correlating suspicious route announcements with past network
announcements. This method can detect anomalies that have a huge impact, i.e., announcements
that pollute a considerable number of paths. Control-plane methods are usually designed to be
implemented as a third-party services such as BGPmon [Toonk]. They have been effective in de-
tecting large-scale events but tend to report a large number of false positives [Zhao et al., 2001,
Sermpezis et al., 2018b]. To deal with these shortcomings, the work in [Sermpezis et al., 2018a]
proposes ARTEMIS (Automatic and Real-Time dEtection and MItigation System). ARTEMIS
is an AS self-operated detection system that exploits local configuration and real-time BGP data
from public monitoring services. In contrast with previous control-plane approaches, ARTEMIS
provides protection among different types of attacks, including man-in-the-middle traffic manipu-
lation, within a minute of detection delay. All the previously mentioned methods are reactive and
notify routing anomalies after the incident occurred. The proposed method belongs to the control-
plane category. In contrast with previous methods, it relies on analyzing real-time BGP updates
from the route collector perspective and is able to anticipate when a large-scale event is going to
occur with several hours of anticipation. Our method is able to detect in advance a wide variety of
attacks including traffic interception and route leaks.
Data-plane approaches use ping/traceroute to detect anomalies in the route of data [Zheng et al.,
2007, Zhang et al., 2010]. These approaches rely on monitoring the reachability of routes from the
victim to detect anomalies. The work in [Zheng et al., 2007] proposed a distributed scheme for
detecting BGP anomalies based on departures of hop count stability and AS path similarity. Fol-
lowing this methodology, the work in [Zhang et al., 2010] proposed iSPY. iSPY generates an alarm
every time the reachability of a predefined prefix is not observable from multiple vantage points.
Data-plane approaches are able to pinpoint suspicious path changes in the traffic which results in
higher detection accuracy. However, they do not scale well since they require a considerable num-
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ber of active measurements for characterizing regular paths and have large latency [Xiang et al.,
2011]. Data-plane approaches are complementary to the proposed method, but they are reactive in
terms of being able to detect anomalies once they are widely spread and do not allow the ability to
anticipate when an event is incipient.
Hybrid approaches have been developed to address the limitations of exclusively control- and
data-plane methods [Shi et al., 2012, Hu and Mao, 2007]. The main idea behind hybrid approaches
is to use control-plane inconsistencies to inform data-plane measurements, i.e., by exploring the
reachability of packets in a particular network. The work in [Hu and Mao, 2007] explored this idea
by proposing a framework that launches data-plane probes only when anomalous update messages
are received. This system was intended to be used as customized software installed in the routers.
Following this idea, the work in [Shi et al., 2012] introduced Argus. Argus is an automated system
that detects prefix hijacking and deduces the origin of the anomaly. Argus is based on pervasively
correlating control- and data-plane data during a given time period to detect anomalies including
sub-prefix hijacks. Following Argus, the work in [Schlamp et al., 2016] introduces HEAP. HEAP
relies on the idea of processing update messages to find malicious hijacked prefixes and then scan-
ning the network to find SSL/TLS-enabled hosts. These enabled hosts allow the comparison of
public keys prior and during an event, which is the basis for detection of subprefix hijacks.
2.3.5 Mitigation of BGP Anomalies
Several proposals to secure BGP are based on the use of public-key cryptography for the au-
thentication of route announcements [Kent et al., 2000, Ng, 2004, Lepinski and Sriram, 2017].
Cryptographic-signed messages allow the verification of the identity of ASes that claim a certain
route. They are based on RPKI for assignment and distribution of public keys [Lepinski and Kent,
2012]. RPKI designates a hierarchy of authorities based on RIRs (regional Internet registries)
to allocate and authorize IP space in BGP through the use of digital signatures and public key
certificates. RPKI allows secure origin authentication.
The use of RPKI alone does not require changes in the BGP protocol. RPKI is an out-of-band
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mechanism in which routers download information for decision making and does not require the
use of online cryptography. However, there are reasons that limit the scope of RPKI for securing
BGP. Researchers have debated the agreement of a trusted Certificate Authority [Cooper et al.,
2013], difficulties to correctly configure RPKI [Wählisch et al., 2012], a general lack of commit-
ment and incentives to lead their implementation [Gill et al., 2011], and its inefficacy in the face of
certain types of attacks, e.g., path shortening attacks [Goldberg, 2014].
To remedy limitations with respect to the type of attacks that can be undetectable with only
origin validation, path validation proposals have been proposed. As opposed to origin validation,
path validation proposals authenticate every AS in the path of a corresponding announcement.
The work in [Kent et al., 2000] proposed secure BGP (S-BGP) to validate path attributes in BGP
updates messages. Information in S-BGP is validated in RPKI. This is done through the use of
attestations, i.e., signed messages that verify the authenticity of route announcements. Address
attestations are statements signed by known authorities that map Autonomous System Numbers
(ASNs) to prefixes to verify that the ASes originating the route were eligible to do so. Route at-
testations are statements signed by ASes and operationalized in the AS-PATH attribute. They are
used for each AS in the path attribute to confirm that the next AS in the path has received the an-
nouncement and was the right to forward it. S-BGP provides full authentication of origin and path
through attestations. Along the same lines, another proposal is secure origin BGP (soBGP) [Ng,
2004]. soBGP relies on RPKI for handling public keys to soBGP speaking routers, maintaining
certificates of routing policies, and authentication of IP space and ASes. soBGP relies on a graph
topology database to validate policy interactions between ASes. Update messages violating AS
topology policies are dropped. Note that the graph topology database used in soBGP is relatively
static given that the topology will only change when there is a change in the policy agreements. In
contrast, S-BGP performs attestations every time there is a new update.
Another proposed standard is BGPSec [Lepinski and Sriram, 2017]. BGPSec builds on RPKI
to distribute and manage cryptographic keys that are used to sign and authenticate every AS on
the path of a corresponding announcement. In contrast to S-BGP and soBGP, BGPSec is an in-
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tegral part of the BGP protocol requiring online cryptography in which routers sign and verify
every message that they sent. This creates computational overheads and requires routers hardware
upgrades. This economic incentive, for network operators, makes it difficult to think of in its fully
implementation [Goldberg, 2014]. In the context of partial deployment, the work in [Lychev et al.,
2013] shows that BGPSec alone does not offer a significant security improvement when compared
with only RPKI usage under certain routing policy scenarios.
Although RPKI and path validation proposals are able to protect BGP against a wide variety of
attacks, they fail when trying to avoid the adoption of leaked routes. A route leak occurs when an
AS announces valid routes beyond their intended scope, i.e., the AS announces a route that is in
violation of the receiver, the sender and/or one of the ASes along the preceding AS path [Sriram
et al., 2016]. These types of anomalies still can generate blackholes and are even prone to traffic
interception [Goldberg et al., 2010]. Our proposed method is lightweight and able to detect in
advance malicious route manipulation and route leaks.
For a comprehensive surveys on BGP anomaly detection and mitigation methods, we refer the
reader to the works in [Butler et al., 2010, Al-Musawi et al., 2017, Mitseva et al., 2018].
2.3.6 Macroeconomics of Security
Much of the research on ecrime has been strictly empirical. For example, Kanich et al. examined
the value chain in pharmaceutical spam, where the payment services processors were identified as
the weakest link [Kanich et al., 2008]. This technical analysis enabled an effective policy response,
significantly decreasing the prevalence of pharmaceutical spam. Christin focused on monetary re-
turns rather than the mechanics of the attacks [Christin, 2013]. That analysis of underground mar-
kets illustrated the stability of these markets using the example of online narcotics and estimated
the revenue of the market operators.
Nation and region of origin have been found to be relevant in analyses of spam, both by indus-
try researchers [Microsoft, 2011] and academics [Garg et al., 2013]. Macroeconomic analysis of
malware illustrates the significance of state-level variables, including the economic variables that
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we use in the proposed research [van Eeten and Bauer, 2008, Garg and Camp, 2013]. Our analysis
also draws on three different criminology theories that have been correlated with the production of
spam using macroeconomic techniques [Garg et al., 2013].
Afroz et al. provided a window into the geographic and political distribution of online crime
by analyzing linguistic groupings in online criminal marketplaces [Afroz et al., 2013]. Moore
et al. examined temporal patterns and value chains in phishing and theft, providing guidance
for coordinated law enforcement responses [Moore et al., 2009]. Later work by van Eeten et al.
considered the role of industry and national policies in the spam ecosystem [van Eeten et al., 2010].
van Eeten et al. also found adoption of the guidance in Moore et al. to be correlated with a decrease
in infected machines for ISPs in Europe.
Other related research investigates the relationship between short-lived BGP hijacks and ma-
licious activities such as spamming and denial of service (DoS) attacks. Specifically, Clayton
described pollution of registry databases by attackers [Clayton, 2015]. This attack enabled miscre-
ants to claim official ownership of IP space in order to subvert automatic filtering of invalid route
announcements. These misidentified IP addresses were then used in spam and malware campaigns.
Additional empirical analysis had shown that a significant amount of spam is received from IP
addresses that correspond to short-lived, possibly hijacked IP prefixes [Ramachandran and Feam-
ster, 2006]. Hu and Mao also discussed the possible use of BGP hijacks for conducting DoS
attacks [Hu and Mao, 2007]. The analysis of these types of attacks provides an interesting indi-
rect link among the causal factors that are related to the origin of hijacks. More importantly, these
findings suggested that BGP hijacks may be becoming part of the commoditized ecrime ecosystem.
2.3.7 Political Operations
There is evidence of the manipulation of the Internet control-plane with political intent. Earlier
work analyzed the technical signatures around particular Internet censorship events, which can
be considered political attacks on the Internet. In particular, Dainotti et al. presented evidence
on how Internet communications were disrupted—through BGP-based disconnection—in several
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North African countries in response to civilian protests and threats of insurrection [Dainotti et al.,
2011].
Similarly, the use of deep packet inspection (DPI) has been examined as a political and tech-
nical phenomenon across different ASes. In particular, Asghari et al. identified the economic
and political drivers that have a significant correlation with DPI [Asghari et al., 2012]. This work
found that high levels of governmental censorship and weak privacy protections are associated
with a pervasive use of DPI.
Hiran et al. analyzed the impact of the China Telecom incident in terms of the origin of prefixes
that were announced [Hiran et al., 2013]. In this incident, China Telecom claimed a significant
percentage of the the IPv4 address space [Toonk, 2010]. Their results suggest that most of the
hijacked prefixes correspond to organizations in the U.S., followed by organizations in China,
South Korea, Australia, and Mexico. After detailed inspection, they found that the U.S. shows a
lower rate of hijacked prefixes based on the global distribution of Internet prefixes across the globe.
Conversely, countries in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g., China, South Korea, Australia) were more
affected by the incident based on the global distribution of prefixes.
Arnbak and Goldberg reported on the manipulation of BGP and DNS protocols to divert U.S.
traffic abroad—where it can be collected under a different and more permissive jurisdiction [Arn-
bak and Goldberg, 2015]. In addition, the manipulation of the BGP protocol to route traffic through
unusual paths which result in crossing new and different jurisdictions was also studied in [Benton
and Camp, 2016]. For example, Cowie described how traffic intended to be delivered from one
Denver ISP to another Denver ISP was subject to a detour (through Iceland) and possibly intercep-
tion or manipulation [Dyn Guest Blogs, 2013]. It is certainly difficult to believe such a detour was
optimal when the endpoints were located in the same city.
These cases identify possible causal factors relating to political intentions in traffic redirection.
More importantly, this previous research suggests that BGP hijacks may be becoming an attack
vector for intelligence operations.
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2.4 Insider Threats as Anomalies
The analysis of the insider threat using temporal graph mining is informed by past research in the
characterization of insider threats and detection of insider threat using graph-based approaches.
Here, we provide an overview of related works in these two areas.
2.4.1 Characterization of Insider Threats
Much of the research on insider threats have been on the characterization of insiders. In general,
two different categorizations have been proposed to classify insiders. The first one focuses on the
intention of the attack [Cappelli et al., 2012]. Under this categorization, insiders are classified
as (i) malicious, where the insider intentionally causes a negative impact on the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the information system; and (ii) non-malicious (accidental), where an
insider, through action or inaction but no malicious intent, causes harm.
The second categorization is given with respect to the purpose of the attack [Bishop et al.,
2014]. With that definition in mind, two types of attacks are defined more precisely, including
(i) a sabotage attack in which the insider is able to change the value of an artifact used in the
computation of a process; and (ii) a data exfiltration attack in which the insider provides access to
artifacts for entities that are not entitled to that access.
In addition to the previous two-tiered categorization, Nurse et al. proposed a unifying frame-
work to characterize insiders based on the motivation behind malicious threats and the human
factors related to the unintentional cases [Nurse et al., 2014]. This framework is of particular
importance not only because it leverages previous insider threat case studies, but also due to its
analysis of behaviors that may lead to attacks and the types of attacks that may be executed. The
factors that are proposed to this end encompass precipitating events and the motivation to attack.
Similarly the works in [Liu et al., 2008, 2009] provide support for the understanding of malicious
insiders’ motives and their decision-making process using game theory.
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2.4.2 Insider Threat Detection Using Graph-Based Methods
Graph mining techniques have also been used as a tool to understand and identify malicious actions
by insiders. Eberle et al. proposed an approach to detect anomalous subgraphs with respect to the
number of transformations that a subgraph will need in order to be a reference—the normative
or best—subgraph [Eberle et al., 2010]. The approach relies on MDL to quantify the number of
required transformations as a criterion of decision [Noble and Cook, 2003]. The authors validated
their approach using empirical data on a passport processing scenario. In particular, they were
able to identify some bypassable steps in the process of getting a passport, which represents an
anomalous structure of unseen edges.
To address the dynamic nature of empirical data, in a recent work, Eberle et al. introduced
a method for pattern learning and anomaly detection in streams using parallel processing [Eberle
and Holder, 2015]. This work offers a considerable improvement on speedup compared to the
previous approach by allowing the processing of dynamic data. The authors validate their approach
on empirical data of embassy employee activity in which the threat was information leakage by
employees.
Kent et al. used the notion of bipartite graphs—by capturing interactions through authentication
logs between users and computers—for assessing network authentication trust risk and cyber attack
mitigation [Kent et al., 2015]. In particular, they examined the number of connected components
(i.e. a subgraph in which any two nodes are connected to each other by a path) in the bipartite graph
to assess potential risk of credential stealing and compromise within an enterprise network. They
found that the increase in the number of connected components in the bipartite is associated with a
reduction in the risk associated with credential theft and subsequent credential hopping within the
network.
Of similar nature, Chen et al. proposed an unsupervised learning model based on social net-
work analysis for detecting anomalous access in collaborative information systems [Chen et al.,
2012]. Their approach relied on the quantification of pairwise similarities of nodes in a graph
based on their interactions with particular subjects when interactions are made between users and
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subjects in a bipartite graph setting. The authors validated their results with patient record access
data and Wikipedia edit logs.
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3 Community-Based Event Detection in Temporal Networks1
“The more original a discovery, the more obvious it seems afterwards.”
— Arthur Koestler
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a method for detection of large events in temporal communication
networks. Our method is based on the the idea that large events initiate information cascades that
spread through the inter communication links of the underlying community structure. Our study
is based on the email communication network of Enron and the Twitter communication network
during the Boston Marathon bombing.
3.2 Problem
Event detection is of crucial importance in many socio-technical networks [Hawkins, 1980]. Events
often represent the occurrence of anomalies or undesired outcomes [Chandola et al., 2009] in appli-
cations that range from network intrusion [Ding et al., 2012], credit card fraud [Bolton and Hand,
2001], disease outbreak [Wong et al., 2003], fault detection [Basu and Meckesheimer, 2007], and
criminal analysis [Lin and Brown, 2003]. However, little attention has been given to the challenge
of how to differentiate the effects of anomalies when the “normal” status of the system allows for
high variations.
1The content of this chapter was initially presented as a conference abstract [Moriano et al., 2017a] and
then published as a journal article [Moriano et al., 2019a] in collaboration with Jorge Finke and Yong-Yeol
Ahn. Pablo Moriano is the primary researcher on both works and made all the analysis and figures therein.
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Consider the case of email exchanges in an organization. An unusual volume of incoming
emails does not necessarily mean an attack to the organization’s email system. For instance, an
increase in the volume of emails, may reflect regular behavior if there is an important deadline. In
other words, even large variations in the communication patterns may be normal under particular
circumstances [Fond et al., 2014a]. This chapter focuses on identifying topological features that
enable the design of reliable detection algorithms.
Traditional anomaly detection methods use multidimensional feature vectors [Abe et al., 2006,
Janssens et al., 2009, Aggarwal and Yu, 2001, Wang and Wilkes, 2012, Smets and Vreeken, 2011,
Shyu et al., 2006]. However, these methods do not account for the structure in graph data, which
can significantly impact the detection task [Akoglu and Faloutsos, 2010, Rossi et al., 2013, Pin-
combe, 2005]. Here, we propose a new method for detecting events by examining communication
patterns based on the theory of information diffusion.
Our method is closely related to existing methods that monitor community structures. For
example, the work in [Duan et al., 2009] uses the Jaccard coefficient to quantify the similarity
among non-overlapping communities (i.e., network partitions such that every vertex belongs to
only one community) between the current and past networks. A similarity value below a given
threshold indicates the occurrence of an event, that is, that the current community structure of the
network differs significantly from past structures. Similarly, a model-based approach for event
detection is introduced in [Peel and Clauset, 2015], in which a hierarchical community structure
of the graph is captured using a generalized hierarchical random model. To detect anomalies, the
algorithm identifies significant changes in the parameters of a fitted model using a likelihood ratio
test.
An advantage of community-based detection methods is their robustness to small topological
changes, specifically to fluctuations in the link density [Karrer et al., 2008, Yang et al., 2015]. For
example, in email or Twitter networks, users constantly establish new links. Communication traffic
tends to vary based on particular times of the day and dates. Such variations represent a regular
pattern of the network and should not be consider an anomaly [Fond et al., 2014a].
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Our method focuses on communications patterns with respect to community structure. Instead
of monitoring changes in the community structure itself, we suggest that the difference between
the ratio of inter-community communication and the intra-community communication captures
the normal dynamics of information spreading in a network. Deviations from the expected ratio
indicate the occurrence of large events [Weng et al., 2013]. The proposed method is less com-
putationally expensive compared to other community-based methods because it does not require
computing the similarity between communities of two networks each time. That is, it does not
need to calculate the similarity between the community of the current graph and the community
that characterizes the growing segment as a detection signature. This makes the proposed method
independent of similarity metrics issues and overheads. The proposed method is also independent
of generative models that capture the community structure embedded in the data.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Data
We use two datasets: the email communication network from Enron and the mention and retweet
network from Twitter.
3.3.1.1 Enron Email Communication Network
Enron was of the largest U.S. businesses in the late 90s [Diesner et al., 2005] when it filed for
bankruptcy in 2001. The company omitted negative balances and reported inflated profits by al-
locating losses into fraudulent special purpose entities. The Federal Regulatory Commission pub-
lished a corpus of Enron’s corporate emails [Wilson and Banzhaf, 2009], consisting of 125 153
emails sent by 184 employees2. The data is represented by a directed network in which a node is
an employee and a link is an email between two employees. The network describes patterns of
interaction from January 1999 to June 2002.
2Available at http://cis.jhu.edu/~parky/Enron/
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3.3.1.2 Twitter Interaction Networks During the Boston Marathon Bombing
On April 15th 2013, deadly explosions took place during the Boston Marathon [Sutton et al., 2014].
One of two suspects was shot dead on April 18th and the other suspect was captured on April 19th
[Starbird et al., 2014]. We use over 456 million English tweets, posted from April 1st to April
30th, to create a mention and a retweet network.
3.3.2 Network Representation
Consider the sequence of n equal-sized intervals A = {A1,A2, . . . ,An} = {Ak}nk=1. Let H =
{1, 2, . . . ,N} be the set of nodes (e.g., the set of Enron employees or Twitter users). Let V(k) ⊆ H
be the subset of nodes that interact during interval Ak = [ak,a ′k). Let W(k) = {ωij(k) : i, j ∈
V(k)} be a weighted adjacency matrix in which ωij(k) captures the number of interactions between
nodes i and j. Let G(k) = (V(k),W(k)) represent a directed network that takes account of all
interactions within interval Ak. The networks comprise reciprocal communications within the
largest connected component. Note that G(k) neglects interval dynamics. Finally, let G = {G(k)}nk=1
denote the sequence of the temporal graph slices.
3.3.2.1 Detection Problem
The series G captures the dynamics of the network across time and defines the basis for detec-
tion. Let m (1  m < n) represents the resolution of detection in terms of the number of in-
tervals Ak,k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}. For instance, if m = 2, then the detection problem is concerned
with identifying whether an event occurs within the detection interval (ak−m+1,a ′k] = (ak−1,a
′
k],





be the number of times an algorithm (with resolution m) assesses
detection. Let E ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n̄} represent the intervals at which at least one event occurs (based
on the ground truth information). Define e ∈ E as the index of a detection interval containing an
event. Let Ê ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n̄} represent the set of intervals at which the occurrence of at least one
event is reported by the detection method. Similarly ê ∈ Ê represents the index at which an event
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is reported. The detection problem is defined as follows: Given a series of networks G = {G(k)}nk=1
and a detection resolution m, identify the set of intervals Ê containing at least one event.
3.3.3 Algorithm Evaluation
The performance of the algorithm is measured based on identifying the intervals containing events.
Specifically, performance is based on the set of time intervals Ê in which an event is reported and
the set of intervals E in which events occur (ground truth).
Let Ô be an indicator vector that characterizes the intervals containing an event as per the de-
tection algorithm, i.e., the distribution of events over the set of the n̄ detection intervals. Similarly,
let O be a vector that indicates the intervals containing an event (or the ground truth). We com-
pare the performance of detection based on true positives (TP), false positives (FP), false negatives
(FN), and true negatives (TN) rates. In particular, TP = O · Ô, FP = O ′ · Ô, FN = O · Ô ′, and
TN = O ′ · Ô ′ where “·” represents the dot product between vectors, and O ′ and Ô ′ represent the
complement of O and Ô. The detailed pseudo-code for the performance measure is presented in
Algorithm 1, which is used to calculate the performance measures of accuracy, precision, recall,
and F1 score.
The measure of accuracy is defined as TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN and quantifies the proportion of accurately
reported positive and negative events (i.e., time intervals classified as positives or not that were
correctly classified).
Precision is defined as TPTP+FP and represents the proportion of positive predictions that have
been correctly classified. This means that if a considerable number of intervals are erroneously
classified, then detection has low precision.
Recall defines the proportion of actual intervals that have been predicted as positive, defined
by TPTP+FN . If an insignificant number of time intervals are classified containing events but they do
not, then the algorithm has low recall.
Finally, the F1 score is defined as 2precision×recallprecision+recall and conveys a balance between precision and
recall.
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Algorithm 1 Performance (Ê, E, n̄)
1: Ô ← zeros(n̄)
2: for ê ∈ Ê do
3: Ôê ← {}
4: for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n̄} do
5: end for
6: Ô ← Ô OR Ôê (element wise)
7: end for
8: O ← zeros(n̄)
9: for e ∈ E do
10: Oe ← {}
11: for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n̄} do
12: Oe ← Oe ∪1Bt (e)
13: end for
14: O ← O OR Oe (element wise)
15: end for
16: O ′ ← NOT (O)
17: Ô ′ ← NOT (Ô)
18: TP ← O · Ô
19: FP ← O ′ · Ô
20: FN ← O · Ô ′
21: TN ← O ′ · Ô ′
22: return (TP, FP, FN, TN)
Next, we introduce a detection criterion based on the dynamics of the interaction across and
within communities.
3.3.4 The Proposed Detection Algorithm
The proposed algorithm aims to define detection signatures based on deviations from the regular
process of interactions. In particular, we explore whether variations in the proportion of links
across communities are indicators of events. To evaluate the evolution of community structures,
the detection algorithm constructs graph segments based on the detection resolutions.
Let the cumulative graph segment of length m be defined as
Gm(k) = (Vm(k),Wm(k)) =
k⊕
k ′=k−m+1








Let T = {m, 2m, . . . , n̄m} capture the time intervals at which detection must be assesed. Note
that for k ∈ T , the series {Gm(k)} forms a set of non-overlapping cumulative graph segments. Now,
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consider an initial graph segment of length m0, defined by












Consider the following assumption:
(A1) The initial graph segment Gm0 can be divided in non-overlapping communities, i.e., the set
of nodes that can be grouped into subsets such that nodes belonging to the same subset are
densely interconnected [Newman, 2004].
The proposed algorithm reports events based on the proportion of inter- and intra-community
links of the graph Gm(k) with respect to Gm0 . For the Enron network, the community partition
used as a reference corresponds to a period of m0 = 91 weeks. For the Twitter networks, m0
corresponds to seven days of user interactions.
To define the set Ê, let C(Gm0) = {0, 1, . . . , c} be a set of unique community identifiers, where
c + 1 is the number of communities in Gm0 . The community to which node i ∈ Vm(k) ∩ Vm0
belongs (based on Gm0) is given by ci : i → C(Gm0). We compute the community partition of
Gm0using the Infomap algorithm [Rosvall and Bergstrom, 2008]. Following similar ideas as in
[Weng et al., 2013], let I(Gm(k)) = {(i, j) : ωij(k) > 0∧ (ci ∩ cj) = ∅} represent the set on inter-
community links and I(Gm(k)) = {(i, j) : ωij(k) > 0∧ (ci ∩ cj) = ∅} the set of intra-community











Detection focuses on identifying the intervals k, for which cm

(k) − cm (k) exceeds a threshold
that is a function of the mean and the standard deviation. We use the sample mean (over the
entire period of the study) as the mean estimator because observations seem to resemble a normal
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distribution—since hypothesis testing demonstrates that the normal distribution is a good candidate
to model the generation of the empirical observations. Moreover, we use the sample standard
deviation as the estimator of the standard deviation. The pseudo-code for the detection algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 2. The parameter δ controls how many standard deviations are considered
to report an interval with an event.
Algorithm 2 Event-Detection (G, m0, m, δ)
1: Compute community partition of Gm0
2: Y ← {}  Array of intra-inter community ratio samples
3: for k in {m0 +m,m0 + 2m, . . . , n̄m} do








(k) and cm (k) using eqs. 3.2 and 3.3
8: Y ← Y ∪ {cm

(k) − cm (k)}
9: end for








12: Ê ← {}
13: for k in {m0 +m,m0 + 2m, . . . , n̄m} do
14: if Y(k) >= (μ+ δσ) then




To measure performance, we compare the measure of cm

(k) − cm (k) with the respective topo-
logical measure derived from Gm(k), e.g., the volume of interactions—number of links of the
cumulative graph segment.
3.3.5 Performance Benchmark
Next, consider the performance of a random algorithm. The output of the random algorithm is
given by
R̂ = (R̂1, . . . , R̂n̄)
i.i.d.
∼ Bernoulli(0.5) (3.4)
As for the proposed algorithm, the performance of the random algorithm R̂ takes into account




Using the email data from Enron, we test our method in comparison with other baselines. Fig-
ure 3.1 reports the results measured on the email time series between 2000-09-30 and 2002-04-30.
First, we evaluate whether the volume of emails correlates with the events associated to Enron’s
collapse (depicted by the black dashed vertical lines and numbers). These events are described in
Table 3.1 and have been identified in [Marks, 2010, Darst et al., 2016]. Figure 3.1(a) shows the
weekly volume of emails. The horizontal solid line represents the moving average of emails during
the observation period using a window length equivalent to a year of data (52 weeks). Each hori-
zontal red band represents one moving standard deviation from the moving average using the same
window length (more intense bands indicate observations that are further away from the mean,
based on Algorithm 2). Note that events 1, 4, 5 and 6 lie more than one standard deviation away
from the moving average and their occurrence coincides with a burst of emails. However, this
relationship does not hold for events 2, 3 and 7.
Event ID Date Description
1 2001-05-17 Schwarzenegger, Lay, Milken meeting.
2 2001-07-12 Quarterly conference call.
3 2001-08-03 Skilling makes a bullish speech on Enron Energy Services. That af-
ternoon, he lays off 300 employees.
4 2001-10-16 Enron reports a 618 million third-quarter loss and declares a 1.01 bil-
lion non-recurring charge against its balance sheet, partly related to
“structured finance” operations run by chief financial officer Andrew
Fastow. In the analyst conference call that day, Lay also announces a
1.2 billion cut in shareholder equity.
5 2001-12-02 Enron files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, at the time the
largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.
6 2002-02-14 Sherron Watkins, the Enron whistleblower, testifies before a Congres-
sional panel against Skilling and Lay.
7 2002-04-09 David Duncan, Arthur Andersen’s former top Enron auditor, pleads
guilty to obstruction.
Table 3.1: Enron’s event description.
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We measure the difference between inter- and intra-community link ratios detailed in Eqs. (3.2)-
(3.3). For the Enron dataset, the community partition results from a period of m0 = 91 weeks.
Fig. 3.1(b) shows that the occurrence of events, 1 through 7, coincide with peaks in the proposed
measure. Even events that do not occur during periods of elevated volume of emails are associated
with increased inter-community communication. This result supports our hypothesis that there is
a considerable transmission of information through inter-community links when events take place.
Note that the activity signal may occur before or after the events. It is natural to expect heightened
activity before the “event” in many cases. The “events” in the Enron’s case are the public release
of certain information. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that, in some cases, such information
had been circulating internally, preceding the actual “event.”
Figure 3.1(c) shows the volume classified into six topics [Berry and Browne, 2010]. One topic
represents contents associated to daily activities; the remaining ones are associated to Enron’s
bankruptcy. Most emails are classified into day-to-day activities. For the categories not related to
Enron’s bankruptcy, there is no association between events and topics, suggesting that the volume
of emails does not help us to characterize a detection pattern.
Figure 3.1(d) shows the difference between inter- and intra-community link ratios distinguished
by topics. Note the association between events and topics. In particular, emails about day-to-day
activities have a similar inter- and intra-community diffusion pattern during the entire observation
period, depicted by the flat curve. For topics related to “utility companies difficulties,” “Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission” and “wire stories about Enron’s demise,” there is a positive as-
sociation. In other words, topics that are sensitive to bankruptcy diffuse across communities. The
co-occurrence of peaks and events in Fig. 3.1(b) shows that the proposed criterion can be used as
a signature for detection.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the performance of detecting events using the proposed criterion
against the volume of emails (for different detection resolutions). The detection resolution, denoted
by m, describes the number of weeks within which we compute the output of the detection algo-
rithm. We compare detection algorithms using the ROC [Fawcett, 2006] and the PRC [Gordon and
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Figure 3.1: Time series of Enron events. (a) Time series of the number of emails. (b) Time
series of the difference between the inter- and intra-community link ratios. (c) Time series of the
number of emails classified by topics. (d) Time series of the difference between the inter- and
intra-community link ratio classified by topics.
Kochen, 1989] to take into account that the dataset is unbalanced [Saito and Rehmsmeier, 2015].
The proposed approach performs generally better than volume-based detection, with noticeable
improvements at lower resolutions. For m = 7, the proposed method has a perfect performance.
3.4.2 Boston Marathon
3.4.2.1 Mention Network
As in the previous section, we evaluate whether the communication volume relates to events as-
sociated with the Boston Marathon bombing (depicted by the dashed vertical lines and numbers).
These events are described in Table 3.2 and have been referenced in [Sutton et al., 2014, Starbird
et al., 2014]. Figure 3.4(a) shows the hourly number of English mentions during April 2013.
We use the same visualization conventions as in Figure 3.1(a)-(b). Here the window length of the
moving average is equivalent to four days of data (96 samples). Note that on 2013-04-08 at 07:00
45
Figure 3.2: Performance comparison for the Enron case when m = 2 weeks. (a) ROC. (b) PRC.
Figure 3.3: Performance comparison for the Enron case when m = 7 weeks. (a) ROC. (b) PRC.
Event ID Date Time Description
1 2013-04-15 14:49 (UTC) Bombing
2 2013-04-19 20:42 (UTC) Firefight and manhunt
Table 3.2: Boston Marathon bombing event description.
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UTC, there are some observations that fall three standard deviations beyond the mean. However,
these observations are not associated with the events of interest. Similarly, on 2013-04-18, there is
a significant decrease in the number of mentions due to missing data. Note also that around events
1 and 2 the number of mentions is comparable to the one in other hours during the observation
period, i.e., these data points are statistically insignificant.
Figure 3.4(b) shows the difference between inter- and intra-community link ratios which demon-
strates significant deviation at the time of the events (for m0 = 7 days). For event 1, the difference
moves beyond four standard deviations—suggesting a significant increased in inter- compared to
intra-community communications. For event 2, the difference between the ratios is three standard
deviations, which is still noticeable compared to other times during the observation period. Fig-
ure 3.4(b) also shows other significant deviations. In particular, on 2013-04-21 at 17:00 UTC and
18:00 UTC, the proposed measure falls three standard deviations from the average. This behavior
coincides with the hacking of the Associated Press Twitter account on 2013-04-21 around 17:00
UTC. A fake message reported that there had been “two explosions in the white house and Barack
Obama [was] injured,” which caused financial markets to panic for a few minutes [Jackson, 2013].
We also analyze the contents of the mentions. Figures 3.4(c)-(e) show the distribution of the
activity of each hashtag mentioned on 2013-04-15 at different time intervals after the bombing
(in EST). In particular, we measure the total number of communications and the difference of the
two modalities of communication (inter- and intra communication links). The red cells around the
origin indicate that most hashtags are not frequently used. Note also that hashtags tend to be con-
fined inside communities. This is evidenced by the absence of observations with large difference
between inter- and intra-communication. Right after the bombing (at 15:00 EST) there are no hash-
tags with significant difference in the inter- and intra-community level in Fig. 3.4(c). However, in
the two subsequent two hour intervals, hashtags related to the bombing emerged distinguished by
lots of inter-community communications (see Figs. 3.4(d)-(e)). The highlighted cells correspond
to the bombing related hashtags #prayforboston, #BostonMarathon, #PrayForBoston, #Boston and
#BostonMararthon. These results demonstrate that the increase in the difference between inter-
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and intra-community communication is indeed triggered and driven by the bombing event.
Figure 3.4: Time series analysis of the mention network. (a) Time series of the number of men-
tions. (b) Time series of the difference between the inter- and intra-community link ratios. (c)
Distribution of the number of hashtags based on the total number of links (horizontal axis) and the
difference of inter- and intra-community links (vertical axis) during the interval 14:00-16:00 EST
on 2013-04-15. (d) Same as (c) during the interval 16:00-18:00 EST. (e) Same as (c) during the
interval 18:00-20:00 EST. Hashtags related to the Boston Marathon bombing are highlighted.
3.4.2.2 Retweet Network
Figure 3.5(a) shows the hourly number of English retweets. Note that on 2013-04-08 at 07:00
UTC, there are observations that lay up to three standard deviations from the mean, but are not
associated with the events of interest. The spike in the retweet activity is before the bombing,
which does not relate to the bombing event.
Figure 3.5(b) shows the difference between inter- and intra-community link ratios (m0 = 7
days). For event 1, the difference between community ratios spiked up to four standard deviations,
in accordance with Fig. 3.4(b). For event 2, the difference between community ratios is not as
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significant as for the case of mentions in Fig. 3.4(b). Other relevant deviations are not observed
during the period.
We also explore the content diffused in the retweet network during the hours of the bombing.
We measure the distribution of the number of links for each hashtag retweeted on 2013-04-15 at the
same time intervals used for Fig. 3.4(c)-(e) and reported them in Fig. 3.5(c)-(e). For the retweet
network, we do not observe a significant distribution of hashtags in the vertical axis after the
bombing event (see Fig. 3.5(c)). However, Figs. 3.4(d)-(e), Figs. 3.5(d)-(e) show that the bombing
related hashtags are placed in regions of low density but with significant difference in inter- and
intra-communication links. These hashtags correspond to #prayforboston, #PrayForBoston and
#BostonMarathon.
Figure 3.5: Time series analysis of the retweet network. We perform the same analysis as for
the mention network and report the number of retweets in (a), the difference between inter- and
intra-community link ratios in (b), the distribution of the number of hashtags based on the total
number of links (horizontal axis); and the difference of inter- and intra-community links (vertical
axis) during the interval 14:00-16:00 EST on 2013-04-15 in (c). (d) Same as (c) during the interval
16:00-18:00 EST. (e) Same as (c) during the interval 18:00-20:00 EST. Hashtags related to the
Boston Marathon bombing are highlighted.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a community-based method to detect the occurrence of global events in
temporal networks. We use the proposed method to detect global events related to the Enron
bankruptcy case and the Boston Marathon bombing. In particular, we analyze how the proportion
of inter-community links compared to the proportion of intra-community links is a useful signature
for identifying the previous described events in each case. Furthermore, we compare the proposed
approach with random and volume dependent statistics showing that our method favors precision
and recall, that is, we identify the time intervals containing an event, without overlooking their
occurrence. Our results suggest that the proposed method filters rich information about the dy-
namic behavior of temporal networks, which is impossible to observe by measuring the volume
of communications. More importantly, patterns of communication across communities are better
indicators of the occurrence of events.
Our work has the following limitations. First, the proposed method depends on the definition
of an initial community partition. The initial community partition is defined by aggregating the
network activity during a fixed period of time (i.e., controlled through m0). By relying on this
strategy, we guarantee that the majority of the users are going to be identified with a community
partition and that subsequent interactions in the communication networks can be classified with
respect to inter- or intra-community links. However, there is a lot of freedom on the strategy to
prepare and update this “normal” community structure. Second, to make the decision on whether a
particular data sample includes an event, our reasoning is based on the distance of the observation
with respect the moving average of the measure. We implement this criterion by accounting for
the number of moving standard deviations (i.e., controlled through δ in Algorithm 1). Clearly,
defining how many standard deviations are needed to establish a detection threshold depends on
many factors. In the two case studies, the frequency of the formation of the networks is one
week for Enron and one hour for the Twitter datasets. Third, in evaluating the performance of
the algorithms, the detection intervals are assumed to be proportional to the network formation
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intervals. This means that even when an interval is reported to contain an event, there is no notion
of temporality with respect to the closeness of the occurrence of the event within that interval. This
might be balanced by increasing the length of detection intervals. However, given the length of the
observation periods, a limited detection resolution will decrease the performance of the proposed
method.
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4 Insider Threat Modeling1
“If you want to do evil, science provides the most powerful weapons to do evil; but




In this chapter, we propose a method for analyzing insider threat actions as anomalies. To that end,
we model user-system interactions as a bipartite graph. Our method is based is based on capturing
the regular committing behavior of developer’s inside communities. In particular, we quantitatively
show that the committing behavior of developers changes after an external (precipitating) event is
announced. We capture this signature by quantifying the proportion of commits inside as opposed
to outside a community. Our study is based on analyzing the committing behavior of developers
into code repositories using a Cisco codebase and verified internal events.
4.2 Problem
Insiders are employees that must be trusted with access to sensitive information, and because of
that trust can be a major threat. Insiders have compromised organizations in multiple domains
including manufacturing [Reuters, 2011], finance [FBI, 2010], government [Edwards and Hoosen-
ball, 2016], and even scientific research [Culp, 2013]. Even worse, insiders attacks are consistently
1The content of this chapter was initially published as a conference paper [Moriano et al., 2017b] and
then an extended version of it was published as a journal article [Moriano et al., 2018a] in collaboration with
Jared Pendleton, Steven Rich, and L. Jean Camp. Pablo Moriano is the primary researcher on both works
and made all the analysis and figures therein.
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catalogued as the most costly given the elevated privilege that insiders have in terms of trust and ac-
cess [Ponemon Institute, 2016]. This makes the insider issue one of the most challenging problems
in computer security [Bishop et al., 2014].
As with many other complex systems (e.g., the Internet, online social networks, and the brain),
information systems consist of a large number of interacting elements (e.g., users, services, de-
vices, files) in which the aggregate activity of the system cannot be derived by analyzing individual
contributions, i.e., their aggregate behavior is nonlinear. Graphs, where nodes represent the ele-
ments and edges capture the interactions between the elements of the system, have been used across
multiple domains to capture the interactions between the elements of complex systems [Vespig-
nani, 2009, Newman, 2010]. The use of graphs to study the structure of complex systems has
revealed some plausible explanations for the emergence of collective behavior in these systems
such as the understanding of regular and anomalous behavior [Akoglu et al., 2015]. In this work,
we treat the malicious insider as an anomaly and use bipartite graphs to detect their anomalous
behaviors.
The resulting focus on malicious patterns, as opposed to malicious nodes, implements an as-
sumption that the malicious insider is not intrinsically hostile. Rather, malicious behaviors can
emerge over time or in respect to specific conditions. Static graphical analysis is based on the anal-
ysis of graph snapshots and cannot integrate temporal patterns. In contrast, the study of temporal
graphs, where information of single graph snapshots is aggregated, tends to reflect more accurately
the evolution of the system as nodes and edges appear and disappear over time [Ranshous et al.,
2015, Holme and Saramäki, 2012]. The focus of this work is to understand the malicious behaviors
over time rather than identifying the static malicious nodes.
To understand such complex systems, empirical data with detailed temporal information is a
prerequisite. Correct temporal information is much more readily available as a source of ground
truth than correctly labeled insider threat datasets. In the context of information systems, tempo-
rally annotated datasets are widely available thanks to the presence of user-system interaction logs.
This enables the use of graph mining analytics for the understanding of anomalous behavior such
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as the one that insiders might pose [Eberle et al., 2010, Parveen et al., 2011].
In this chapter, we characterize and detect anomalous events in an information system based on
a centralized version control system2. We identify time intervals during which significant changes
in the structure of the temporal graphs may correspond to functional change points, e.g., a pre-
cipitating event3. This problem has also been referred to as change point detection [Barnett and
Onnela, 2016].
We model user-system interactions in a version control system as a temporal bipartite graph
where interactions occur exclusively between two types of nodes, (i) users and (ii) software com-
ponents4. Note that the edges in this graph are only between these two types of nodes [Heymann
and Le Grand, 2013]. A one-mode projection of this graph is the user graph in which two nodes
(users) are connected if they have interacted at least once with the same component [Zhou et al.,
2007]. Our methodology includes studying the evolution of the one-mode user graph to identify
topological properties that characterize the system’s normal behavior. Among these observed prop-
erties, those that do not follow the norm of the regular pattern are assumed to indicate the presence
of an anomalous event. Such an event may indicate a potential insider incident or, at least, an event
that requires further investigation [Rashid et al., 2016].
In particular, the user graph allows us to explore the impact of precipitating events in user-
system interactions [Nurse et al., 2014]. Precipitating events are key events that have the potential
to trigger insiders to become a threat to their employer. We hypothesized that precipitating events
impact the behavior of interactions between users and components in the version control system
2A centralized version control system keeps the history of changes on a central server from which ev-
eryone requests the latest version of the work and pushes the latest changes to, e.g., Concurrent Versions
System and IBM Rational ClearCase.
3A precipitating event corresponds to a large-scale event that causes concerning behaviors in employees
and may result in otherwise trustworthy employees becoming threats or taking risks that increase the insider
threat. In this category, we include layoffs, significant restructuring, and plant or facility closure. The term
was first used in the insider threat literature in Moore et al. [Moore et al., 2008].
4A software component is a software module that encapsulates a set of related functions or data, and it
is part of a larger software system. For example, the TCP/IP software component of an operative system.
Hereafter, we refer to software components as simply components.
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by changing patterns of committing behavior. To test this hypothesis, we model and compare the
volume of interactions between users over similar or related components as opposed to non-related
components over time. To capture sets of users with similar patterns of interaction, we rely on the
notion of community structure to identify communities, or clusters, i.e., groups of nodes having
higher probability of being connected to each other than to members of other groups [Fortunato
and Hric, 2016]. We show that the volume of interactions between users that contribute to unre-
lated components increases when precipitating events are announced. This indicates the impact of
precipitating events in increasing the likelihood of a change in the interacting behavior between
users and components, which might be a signal to monitor before an insider attack is committed.
4.3 Methods
Our method builds graphs of user-system interactions and uses these to identify anomalous pat-
terns. Anomalies are identified when engineers interact with multiple components where there is
no history of interaction, particularly where none of their team members are interacting or have
a history of interaction with those components. Performance is measured by the ability of the
algorithm to detect increases in anomalous behavior after precipitating events.
4.3.1 Temporal Abstraction
Consider the sequence of n intervals A = {A1,A2, . . . ,An} = {Ak}nk=1, where
1. Ak = [ak,a ′k) for all k < n and An = [an,a
′
n] for k = n;
2. ak < a ′k = ak+1 for all k; and
3. a ′k − ak = a
′
 − a for all k, 
An interval represents a fixed-length unit of time, e.g., a day of data. Condition (1) implies that all
intervals are left-closed and right-open (except the last one which includes a ′n). It guarantees that
the sequence of intervals is disjoint. Condition (2) implies that intervals are non-empty. Note that
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a ′k and ak+1 represent the time instants of a transition between intervals. For any interval Ak, the
right endpoint a ′k corresponds to the left endpoint of the interval Ak+1. Together with Condition
(1), Condition (2) guarantees that the union of all intervals
⋃n
k=1 Ak = [a1,a ′n] is a closed interval.
Finally, Condition (3) requires that any two intervals are of equal length.
4.3.2 Bipartite Graph Abstraction
A bipartite graph is a graph with two types of nodes. One type of node represents the original nodes
(top nodes), while the other represents the groups with which they interact (bottom nodes) [Guil-
laume and Latapy, 2004].
Let H be the set of top nodes (e.g., the set of engineers). Similarly, let H⊥ be the set of bottom
nodes (e.g., the set of components). Note that H and H⊥ are disjoint sets of nodes. Furthermore,
let V(k) ⊆ H ∪H⊥ be the subset of nodes that interact (i.e., engineers and components) during
interval Ak = [ak,a ′k). Let W(k) = {Ωij(k) : (i, j) ⊆ H ×H⊥} be the incidence matrix of weights
Ωij(k) that captures the number of interactions between node i and node j during interval Ak. Let
G(k) = (V(k),W(k)) represent a weighted bipartite graph that captures all interactions that occur
from endpoints ak to a ′k, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}. Note that we do not differentiate between dynamics
within an interval. The sequence {G(k)}nk=1 denotes the bipartite graph series G.
4.3.3 One-Mode Projection Abstraction
Bipartite graphs can be projected to one-mode projection graphs (with nodes of just one type). Let
G(k) = (H(k),W(k)) be the top projection of G(k). Two nodes of H(k) are connected if they




The sequence {G(k)}nk=1 denotes the top one-mode projection graph series G. Correspondingly,
the bottom projection G⊥(k) = (H⊥(k),W⊥(k)) is defined dually as it is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The sequence {G⊥(k)}nk=1 denotes the bottom one-mode projection graph series G⊥. In the rest
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of this chapter, we devote our study in terms of G which is the one-mode projection graph of
user-system interactions, i.e., the projection in which nodes are exclusively engineers.
Alice Bob Carol Dave Eve Frank










Figure 4.1: Bipartite graph abstraction. The top panel represents the engineer projection. The
middle panel represents the original bipartite graph. The bottom panel represents the component
projection.
4.3.4 Detection Problem
We use G, which captures the dynamics across intervals Ak, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}, as the basis for
defining the anomaly event detection problem. In doing so, we evaluate the outcomes of anomaly
detection by measuring structural properties with respect to the cumulative one-mode graph seg-
ment of length m ∈ Z+ defined as


















For example, if m = 7, we aggregate data to form weekly graph segments.
Let lm, where l ∈ Z+ represents the smallest interval at which we evaluate the outcomes of
anomalous detection (called the detection resolution). Note that if l > 1, then the intervals at which
the graph segments are evaluated are not the same as the ones at which they are formed. The finest
detection granularity satisfies l = 1, i.e., when the detection resolution is the same as the graph
segment formation intervals. A larger value of l reflects that anomalous events are captured by the
aggregation of consecutive graph segments. For instance, if l = 2, then an algorithm for detection
aims to determine whether such an event occurs within intervals (ak−lm+1,a ′k] = (ak−2m+1,a
′
k],
k ∈ {2m, . . . ,n}. Let n̄ = ⌊ nlm⌋ be the total number of times the algorithm with resolution lm has
to decide whether an event occurs. Let the set E ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n̄} represent the intervals at which at
least one event occurs. The detection problem is specified as follows.
Given:
(i) A one-mode projection graph series G = {G(k)}nk=1; and
(ii) A detection resolution 1  lm < n.
We want to:
(ii) Design a detection algorithm that identifies the subset of intervals Ê ⊆ E in which at
least one anomalous event occurs.
Condition (i) requires that the dataset can be modeled as a series of one-mode projection graphs
that aggregate the interactions occurring during each interval. Condition (ii) assumes that a pa-
rameter can be selected to enable detection of anomalies at a desired timescale.
58
4.3.5 Algorithm Performance Abstraction





t=1. To measure performance, the output of the detection algorithm Ê is mapped into the
sequence of intervals B. Let ê ∈ Ê be the index of a detection interval that is denoted as anomalous
by the detection algorithm (i.e., the algorithm indicates the occurrence of at least one anomalous
event within the interval). The set Ê can be represented by the indicator vector
Ô =
∨
{1Bt(lmê), ∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n̄}} , ∀ê ∈ Ê
where
∨




1 if lmê ∈ Bt
0 if lmê /∈ Bt
In other words, if 1Bt(lmê) = 1, the algorithm identifies an anomalous event in the detection
interval (a(t−1)lm+1,a ′tlm] and labels it as an anomalous interval. The indicator vector Ô describes
the interval indices, i.e., t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n̄} that contain an anomalous event.
Moreover, to characterize the occurrence of actual events during an interval, we define e ∈ E
as the index of a detection interval that is anomalous based on the ground truth. Let the indicator
vector O =
∨
{1Bt(lme), ∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n̄}} , ∀e ∈ E represents the intervals that are anomalous
based on the ground truth, i.e., the distribution of the anomalous events over the set of the n̄
detection intervals. Figure 4.2 illustrates the proposed modeling framework. For example, suppose
that E = {s, n̄} (represented by the horizontal arrows) and Ê = {s} (represented by the horizontal
crossed arrow). To pinpoint the detection interval s, there might exist a time index r = ms such
that 1Bs(r) = 1. This is represented by the vertical arrows in Figure 4.2. This is also illustrated in
Figure 4.3. Here it is possible to see the correspondence between the intervals of formation of the
















Figure 4.2: Abstraction of the detection problem. The top panel refers to the sequence of intervals
that are used to build the graphs (here the graph formation interval m = 1). The bottom panel
illustrates the aggregation of intervals to evaluate the performance of the detection algorithm (here
detection resolution lm = 2). The vertical arrows represent the location of an anomalous event in
both temporal representations. The horizontal arrows illustrate the sets E and Ê.
4.3.6 Algorithm Performance Measure
The performance of a detection algorithm is measured based on identifying the anomalous detec-
tion intervals. Specifically, the performance of an algorithm is specified based on the set of time
intervals Ê reported as anomalous by the detection algorithm and the set of time intervals E in
which anomalies occur (ground truth).
We compare the performance of the detection algorithms using the true positives (TP), false
positives (FP), false negatives (FN), and true negatives (TN) of the detection results. In particular,
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Figure 4.3: Correspondence between the graph formation intervals and the intervals at which the
algorithm is evaluated. Here m is the number of intervals at which the algorithm is evaluated.
TP = O · Ô, FP = O ′ · Ô, FN = O · Ô ′, and TN = O ′ · Ô ′ where the symbol “·” represents the dot
product between two vectors, and O ′ and Ô ′ represents the complement of O and Ô respectively.
In other words, a detection algorithm specifies the intervals based on a detection criterion.
Similarly, to measure performance, it is necessary to know the ground truth anomalous events.
The detailed pseudo-code for the algorithm’s performance measure is presented in Algorithm 3.
Next, we introduce a detection criterion based on the dynamics of the formation of communities
and the interaction of engineers across and within them.
4.3.7 Proposed Algorithm
The proposed algorithm defines detection signatures based on deviations from the regular process
of community interaction. To do so, we explore whether variations in the number of edges across
communities (with respect to the total number) are indicators of anomalous events. This is done by
comparing edges in the user graph with respect to a community partition reference over aggregate
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm-Performance (Ê, E, n̄)
1: Ô ← zeros(n̄)
2: for ê ∈ Ê do
3: Ôê ← {}
4: for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n̄} do
5: Ôê ← Ôê ∪1Bt (ê)
6: end for
7: Ô ← Ô OR Ôê (element wise)
8: end for
9: O ← zeros(n̄)
10: for e ∈ E do
11: Oe ← {}
12: for t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n̄} do
13: Oe ← Oe ∪1Bt (e)
14: end for
15: O ← O OR Oe (element wise)
16: end for
17: O ′ ← NOT (O)
18: Ô ′ ← NOT (Ô)
19: TP ← O · Ô
20: FP ← O ′ · Ô
21: FN ← O · Ô ′
22: TN ← O ′ · Ô ′
23: return (TP, FP, FN, TN)
data.



















The proposed detection algorithm requires the following assumption:
(A1) The initial cumulative graph segment Gm0 can be naturally divided in non-overlapping com-
munities, i.e., groups of nodes that can be grouped into subsets such that each set of nodes is
densely connected internally and in which nodes belong to a single group [Newman, 2004].
Let the set T = {m0 +m,m0 + 2m, . . . , n̄m} captures the time intervals at which the algorithm
will be applied. Note that for k ∈ T , the series {Gm (k)} forms a set of non-overlapping cumulative
graph segments. The proposed algorithm pinpoints anomalous events by measuring the proportions




 , i.e., we want to identify the set Ê based on the diversification of community edges. Figure 4.4
shows a characterization of that situation.
Alice Bob Carol Dave Eve Frank







Figure 4.4: Malicious activity as identified in the bipartite graph. The top panel represents an
unusual interaction between Bob and Eve with component “E.” The bottom panel represents the
corresponding one mode projection graph with the anomalous edge crossing communities.
To do so, let C(Gm0 ) = {0, 1, . . . , c} be a set of unique community identifiers where c + 1
is the total number of detected communities in the initial cumulative graph segment Gm0 . The
community to which engineer i ∈ Vm (k) ∩ Vm0 is assigned (with respect to Gm0 ) is given by
ci(k) : i → C(Gm0 ). We computed the community partition of the initial cumulative graph segment
using the Infomap algorithm [Rosvall and Bergstrom, 2008]. Following similar ideas as in [Weng
et al., 2013], let the set of inter-community edges be I(Gm (k)) = {(u, v) : ωuv(k) > 0∧ (cu(k)∩
cv(k)) = ∅} and intra-community edges be I(Gm (k)) = {(u, v) : ωuv(k) > 0∧ (cu(k)∩ cv(k)) =


















In particular, we are interested in identifying time intervals k, where cm (k) − cm(k) is below
median-3σ or above median+3σ. The median is used instead of the mean because this measure
(over the entire period of study) cannot be assumed follow a normal distribution since appropriate
hypothesis testing demonstrates that the normal distribution is not a good candidate to model the
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generation of the empirical observations. We used the interquartile range to estimate σ as it has
been studied by others, e.g., [Koutra et al., 2013]. The detailed pseudo-code for this algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Event-Detection (G, m0, m)
1: Compute community partition of Gm0
2: Y ← {}  Array of intra−inter ratio samples
3: for k in {m0 +m,m0 + 2m, . . . , n̄m} do
4: Build Gm (k) =
⊕k
k′=k−m+1 G(k ′)
5: Compute I(Gm (k))
6: Compute I(Gm (k))
7: Calculate cm

(k) and cm (k) using eqs. 4.1 and 4.2
8: Y ← Y ∪ {cm (k) − cm(k)}
9: end for
10: median ← F̂−1Y (0.50)  F̂ means the empirical CDF
11: δ ← F̂−1Y (0.75) − F̂−1Y (0.25)  The interquartile range
12: Ê ← {}
13: for k in {m0 +m,m0 + 2m, . . . , n̄m} do
14: if Y(k) <= (median − 3σ) or Y(k) >= (median + 3σ) then




In order to compare the performance of the algorithms, we replace the computation of cm (k) −
cm

(k) by the respective graph topological property, e.g., nodes, edges, connected components,
average degree, maximum degree, or maximum weight with respect to Gm (k).
4.3.8 Dataset
IBM Rational ClearCase (hereafter ClearCase) is an enterprise-grade software configuration man-
agement system. Among its main features, it provides version control functionalities to large- and
medium-size organizations allowing them to track software projects with thousands of develop-
ers. As of the date of this writing, ClearCase has a market share of about 2.5% among software
configuration management competitors with 55% of their customers in the U.S. [iDatalabs, 2017].
The ClearCase dataset analyzed in this chapter comprises the complete activity between engi-
neers and components in a major computer software enterprise. Components are software packages
that encapsulate a set of related functions and store metadata allowing version control. In particu-
lar, we used data that spans 22 years from May 4, 1992 to March 23, 2014. We extracted the data
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from the source code base management database. Instances with no reference to the engineer or
component name were not taken into account in this analysis. These comprised a negligible per-
centage of instances, i.e., on the order of 8×10−6. (Thus the number of interactions in this dataset
that were not captured in our graph mining method is sufficiently small that manual examination
for insider activity would be quite feasible.)
Using this dataset, we built bipartite graphs to capture the interactions between engineers and
components. In this bipartite graph, nodes are represented exclusively by engineers and compo-
nents. Edges in the bipartite graph represent interactions, i.e., any type of activity that engineers
have with components, including: commit a file, create a file, delete a file, create a branch, tag
a branch, sync a branch, and collapse a branch. We did not differentiate between these different
interactions and treat them as the same type of edges.
The dataset comprises 10, 253 distinct engineers, 1, 729 distinct components, and 12, 577, 667
interactions during the observation period. Remember that our hypothesis is grounded on the idea
that precipitating events might lead to structural changes in the committing behavior of engineers.
With that in mind, Table 4.1 summarizes the details of the incidents used in this study, i.e., pre-
cipitating events that were announced and validated internally by the enterprise. These events
correspond to limited restructuring events and had and effect in all business units of the enterprise.
Table 4.1: Summary of precipitating events during the observation period.
Event ID Date Jobs % affected
impacted employees
1 2001-04-16 8500 22.4
2 2011-07-18 6500 9.1
3 2012-07-23 1300 1.9
4 2013-03-26 500 0.7
5 2013-08-09 4000 5.3
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4.4 Results
In this section, we present the results of the analyses on the bipartite graphs and the one-mode
projection (or user graph) of user-system interactions. In the following analysis, our unit of time
reference is the day, i.e., the scale of the variable k. To estimate the length of the window m
(the window length that we use to accumulate interactions among engineers), we relied on the
methodology proposed by [Benamara and Magnien, 2010], which estimated that the size of an
observable window for a rigorous characterization of graph properties is at least one week, i.e.,
m = 7 days. This means that we build the bipartite and one-mode projection graphs by aggregating
data over non-overlapping windows of 7 days (every week starting on Monday).
We compare the results of the proposed event detector framework to random chance. The
purpose of this comparison is to ensure that the phenomena we identify are not a result of noise or
simply the result of having stochastic data. We then compare our approach with metrics that are
based on the volume of interactions. That is, we test if the proposed approach identifies insider
risk more accurately than those that identify employees by frequency or intensity of access. Sheer
counts of access are a core component of risk-based or accounting-based insider threat approaches.
The model proposed here is more accurate and more precise. The model also offers fewer false
negatives (i.e., higher recall).
We used the same visualization conventions for every plot. The blue solid lines show the raw
data. Recall that the raw data corresponds to the empirical measures for each graph topological
property. Dashed black lines represent the dates of the precipitating events listed in Table 4.1 with
their corresponding label in a circle.
The results of these show that the precipitating events cannot be distinguished from other events
using simple graph-based statistics. Our assumption is that although individual events, such as eco-
nomic stress, may result in an individual becoming an insider threat, only systematic organizational
changes should be correlated with large-scale increases in insider threat behaviors.
In the following two sections we report basic graph properties. The purpose of this is to illus-
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trate that naive application of graph mining on bipartite graphs without inclusion of community
dynamics is an inadequate indicator of insider threats.
4.4.1 Bipartite Graph Properties Series
We report measures related to the number of nodes, edges, connected components, average degree,
maximum degree, and maximum weight for the bipartite graphs. The specific properties that we
measured from these graphs are listed here for the reader. Note that edges only capture interactions
between engineers and components. The number of nodes is |V(k)|, which is the total number of
engineers and components. The degree of node i is di(k), i.e., its number of neighbors. The
degree of a node is either the number of components that are touched by a single engineer or
the number of engineers that touch a component. The set of edges of the graph G(k) is E(k) is
the total number of unique component/engineer interactions. The number of edges is |E(k)| =
∑
i∈V(k) di(k)/2, which means this represents total number of interactions in the bipartite graph,
i.e., system activity. A connected component is a subgraph in which any two nodes are connected
to each other by paths. This means subgraphs can be the result of connections or similarities
in connections between engineers and/or components so that any two vertices are connected by
any path of interactions. The average degree of graph G(k) is 2× |E(k)|/|V(k)|. This means the
average number of interactions that nodes have reflects the fact that there are two entities in an
interaction. The maximum degree of graph G(k) is the maximum number of neighbors in the
graph, i.e., max{di(k), ∀i ∈ V(k)}. This is the maximum number of interactions among the nodes
(either with engineers or components). The maximum weight of a graph G(k) is the maximum
weight among the edges in the graph, i.e., max{ωij(k), ∀i, j ∈ V(k)}. This means the maximum
weight value among the interactions, i.e., the interaction with the higher intensity.
Figure 4.5 (top) shows the observed number of nodes (i.e., engineers and components) in the
bipartite graphs. Figure 4.5 (middle) shows the number of unique edges representing the number
of interactions between engineers and/or components. Figure 4.5 (bottom) shows the number
of connected components in the bipartite graphs. There is a constant increase in the number of
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nodes since approximately 2002 because there is an increase of both engineers and components.
The tendency starts to decrease after approximately 2010 as other version control systems were
adopted. Thus, after 2010, the data are a large sample rather than a comprehensive dataset. This
tendency is also reflected in the number of edges of the bipartite graphs, which is correlated with the
number of nodes [Leskovec et al., 2005]. The movement of some core technologies to a different
versioning system is reinforced by the continuous increase in the number of connected components
in the bipartite graph, which indicates a less integrated core of components.
Similarly, Figure 4.6 shows the time series of average degree, maximum degree, and maximum
weight for the bipartite graphs. Note that under the presence of spikes in the measured signal, they





















































Figure 4.5: Time series of the number of nodes (top panel), edges (middle panel), and connected
components (bottom panel) for the bipartite graphs.
4.4.2 One-Mode Projection Graph Properties series
Here, we report results on the same properties as we did for the bipartite graphs, i.e., nodes, edges,
components, average degree, maximum degree, and maximum weight. Note that, in this case,
edges occur when two engineers have interact with the same component (i.e., same code repository)



























































Figure 4.6: Time series of the avg. degree (top panel), max. degree (middle panel), and max.
weight (bottom panel) for the bipartite graphs.
number of engineers in the one-mode projection graph. The degree of node i is di (k), i.e., its
number of neighbors. This means the number of other engineers connected to i. The set of edges




i (k)/2. This means
the total number of interactions in the one-mode projection graph. A connected component is a
subgraph in which any two nodes are connected to each other by paths. This meas subgraphs
made of engineers in which any two vertices are connected, i.e., engineers that work in related
components. The average degree of graph G(k) is 2× |E(k)|/|H(k)|. This means the average
number of activity of engineers in the graph. The maximum degree of graph G(k) is the maximum
number of neighbors in the graph, i.e., max{di(k), ∀i ∈ H(k)}. This means the degree of the node
with more interactions. The maximum weight of a graph G(k) is the maximum weight of edges
in the graph, i.e., max{ωij(k), ∀i, j ∈ H(k)}. This means the weight of the interaction with
maximum strength.
Figure 4.7 (top) shows the observed number of nodes (i.e., engineers in the user graph). Fig-
ure 4.7 (middle) shows the number of unique edges representing the number of interactions be-
tween engineers. Figure 4.7 (bottom) shows the number of connected components in the one-mode
projection graphs. In general, for the number of nodes and edges, there is an increase in these mea-
69
surements after roughly 2002. The tendency starts to decrease after approximately 2010 when
other version control systems began to be adopted. Thus, after 2010, the data are a large sample
rather than a comprehensive dataset. The movement of some core technologies to a different ver-
sioning system is reinforced by the continuous increase in the number of connected components in
the one-mode projection graph, which indicates a less integrated core of components.
Similarly, Figure 4.8 shows the time series of average degree, maximum degree, and maximum
weight respectively. Although there are several spikes for these measurements, we present an





















































Figure 4.7: Time series of the number of nodes (top panel), edges (middle panel), and connected
components (bottom panel) for the one-mode projection graphs.
4.4.3 Algorithm Evaluation
We applied the proposed algorithm for anomaly event detection by leveraging on the structural
properties of the one-mode projection graphs. Note that one-mode projection graphs are derived
from the original user-system interactions or bipartite graphs, so we compare the results of our
proposed method with those properties that are measured in the equivalent one-mode projections.
Our criteria for selection of anomalous time intervals is based on the idea of detecting observations




























































Figure 4.8: Time series of the avg. degree (top panel), max. degree (middle panel), and max.
weight (bottom panel) for the one-mode projection graphs.
graph is generated) as we specify in Algorithm 4. Following similar visualization conventions that
we used for the one mode projection graphs, in the following figures, the black horizontal line
represents the median from the empirical observations. Each horizontal red band represents one
standard deviation (the intensity of the bands is proportional to the distance with respect to the
median). Remember that the standard deviation is estimated using the interquartile range of the
distribution of these measurements. We estimated m0, i.e., the length of the initial cumulative one-
mode graph segment, by computing arg maxm0 |C(G
m0
 )|. That is achieved by the end of 2002, and
it is the reason we report the following properties since January 1st, 2003.
Figure 4.9 shows the time series of nodes, edges, and connected components after the period of
characterization of communities, i.e., the period of time comprehended between May 4, 1992 and
December 31, 2002. As can be seen, even when there are some fluctuations in these measurements,
the majority of the observations lay up to three standard deviations away from the median. This
means that few time intervals were reported as anomalous during the observation period by relying
in these properties.
We also performed similar experiments for the remaining graph-based properties, i.e., average
degree, maximum degree, and maximum weight. In particular, Figure 4.10 summarizes these
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findings. For both average degree and maximum degree, the algorithm did not report suspicious
time intervals given that the signal does not exceed ±3 standard deviations from the median. For
the signal corresponding to the maximum weight, various spikes surprise the limits for detection.
Figure 4.11 shows the behavior for the proposed metric. Details on how this metric is derived
are found in Equations 4.1 and 4.2. In particular, there are some spikes that exceed the threshold
used by the algorithm and are close enough to the release of the precipitating events. These spikes
suggest a drop in the number of edges between members of the same communities (conversely an
increase in the number of edges between members of different communities) which, based on our

















































Figure 4.9: Time series of the number of nodes (top panel), edges (middle panel), and components
for the one-mode projection graphs (bottom panel).
4.4.4 Algorithm Performance
We compare the performance of the proposed algorithm with the performance of a random algo-
rithm. In particular, let the output of the random algorithm be R̂ = (R̂1, . . . , R̂n̄)
i.i.d.
∼ Bernoulli(0.5).


























































Figure 4.10: Time series of the avg. degree (top panel), max. degree (middle panel), and max.










































Figure 4.11: Time series of the intra- minus inter-community edge ratio for the one-mode projec-
tion graphs.
Performance for all the proposed algorithms is compared based on accuracy, precision, recall,
and F1 score. These measurements were estimated using the TP, FP, FN, and TN derived from
Algorithm 3.
Accuracy is the most basic measure of performance for classification. It quantifies the propor-
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tion of correctly predicted positive and negative instances (i.e., time intervals classified as anoma-
lous or not that were correctly classified). It is quantified as accuracy = TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN .
Precision quantifies the proportion of positive predictions that have been correctly classified.
This means that if a considerable number of time intervals are erroneously classified as anomalous,
then the algorithm has low precision. In other words, it is a measure of classification exactness. It
is quantified as precision = TPTP+FP .
Recall quantifies the proportion of actual anomalous intervals that have been predicted as pos-
itive. This means that if an insignificant number of time intervals are classified as anomalous but
they are not, then the algorithm has low recall. In other words, it is a measure of classification
completeness. It is quantified as recall = TPTP+FN .
The F1 score conveys the balance between precision on and recall calculated through the har-
monic mean. It is quantified as F1 score = 2precision×recallprecision+recall .
Figures 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 show the performance for different detection criteria, i.e., ran-
dom, nodes, edges, connected components, average degree, maximum degree, maximum weight
and the proposed approach under different detection resolutions. Performance in the random al-
gorithm is calculated after 1, 000 realizations its evaluation. That means that for the random al-
gorithm, we report on the mean and standard deviation on such measurements. As we might
expect, the performance of the proposed approach starts increasing when the detection resolution
is increased. For the maximum detection resolution that we used, i.e., 26m, the results of the
proposed approach outperforms the other measurements with a F1-score of approximately 85.7%.
Noticeably, the performance of the random algorithm is even higher than those based on graph
measurements even when taking into account the effect of the standard deviations represented by
the error lines.
Accuracy of detection methods based on the graph-based properties is high given that the ma-
jority of time intervals are not marked as anomalous based on the small number of precipitating
events (which makes this an unbalanced dataset).
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Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score
Figure 4.12: Algorithm performance for detection resolution 4m. Results of the proposed method
are comparable with the ones of the random approach.

















Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score
Figure 4.13: Algorithm performance for detection resolution 8m. Results of the proposed method
begin being better than the ones of the random approach.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have revisited the problem of insider threat event detection using graph mining
analytics. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis proposing an insider threat detection method
using temporal bipartite graphs to pinpoint malicious events. Our main contribution is the proposal
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Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score
Figure 4.14: Algorithm performance for detection resolution 16m. Results of the proposed method
begin being much better than the ones of the random approach.

















Accuracy Precision Recall F1 score
Figure 4.15: Algorithm performance for detection resolution 26m. We obtain about 92% of F1
score.
and evaluation of a generic analytical framework that builds on previous results in analysis of social
networks to identify anomalous behavior by distinguishing access requests within and beyond
a given community. We analyzed access to resources (i.e., code repositories) by employees (i.e.,
coders and engineers) using a time series of graph properties to pinpoint time intervals that identify
suspicious insider behavior. The temporal analysis framework can be used with other datasets,
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including by organizations with no interest in sharing internal logs.
One major challenge in identification of potentially malicious behavior is determining ground
truth. Although catastrophic insider events are well documented, the regular exfiltration of data by
insiders is less well documented. There is a dearth of data. To address this, we examined the inci-
dences of suspicious activity and correlated these with events known to be correlated with increases
in insider threat behaviors, specifically precipitating events. The decision criteria for identifying
these time intervals is based on quantifying changes in the way in which employees interact with
resources after precipitating events have been announced. This performance analysis framework
can be used by any organization that has experienced precipitating events in order to test it for
applicability to its own risks. Further, by altering the time period for the analysis, organizations
can make their own trade-offs as to the level of activity that will result in investigation.
From our results, it is possible to see that the proposed framework is able to identify time
intervals in which anomalous activity happens with a reasonable F1 score. We compare the per-
formance of the proposed approach with anomaly detection approaches based on a naive random
and edge density dependent statistics. Our approach outperforms these intuitive approaches giv-
ing us insights on the importance of the diversification of committing behavior on user-system
interactions as a possible indicator of insider threat.
The main assumption behind the proposed approach is that insider threat events increase fol-
lowing certain types of events. Thus, counts of potentially malicious actions correlate with the
announcement of precipitating events. Insider threat events are associated with stress or disgruntle-
ment, and these responses are often triggered in the wake of precipitating events (e.g., [Mishra and
Dhillon, 2006, Warkentin and Willison, 2009, Greitzer et al., 2009, Moore et al., 2013, Benjamin-
sen, 2017]). This abstraction allows us to test the hypothesis as to whether the diversification of
the committing behavior of users changes after the presence of a precipitating event.
We have proposed a bipartite graph framework that learns regular community behavior based
on the interactions of engineers and components, and analyzes the patterns of connections in and
between communities. We then use this to examine a time period that includes major precipitating
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events. As a result, the ground truth available for the analysis implemented here is the rate of
insider risk in the organization after precipitating events. The validation of the model would be
clear increases in the number of interactions across communities after precipitating events, and
few increases without these.
Precision and recall together measure how often a threat is correctly identified and how often
the non-malicious is correctly identified, i.e., no false positive or false negatives. This correctness
is a significant challenge in detecting insider threats. Individual organizational tolerance for false
positives versus false negatives may differ. Figures 4.12–4.15 show that this trade-off can be
changed by altering the detection resolution for the analysis.
Our approach makes a well-grounded assumption about the overall rate of insider threats and
examines aggregate detection after precipitating events. Alternative approaches use artificial data
with anomalies generated based on scenarios and confidential data. Another alternative is using
qualitative research and directly leveraging known cases. By definition, the artificial data and
case studies can only address the insider threats that have been detected using other methods.
A third approach examines private datasets which includes potential malicious insider behavior.
Our results use a private dataset subject and temporal analysis to illustrate that insider behavior
increases are correlated with what are known to be precipitating events.
Of the three methods to address suspicious insider behavior, reproducibility is a particular
strength of artificial data and is a particular challenge to the third approach (i.e., the one used
here). The challenge to the second (case studies) and third (confidential data) approaches are
of reproduction and validation. To address these challenges, we will release the scripts used to
implement this model on or before publication of this analysis. With the publication of our model
as implemented, in addition to the description here, our analysis can be reproduced using any
organization’s private data. One goal in publishing this work is to encourage other researchers to
use the model on the data available to them.
One requirement for this approach is adequate data to create the one-mode projection of the
interactions between engineers from the bipartite graph of engineers and components. The current
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dataset covers more than two decades of interactions with engineers and version control systems.
The requirements for the minimal training dataset is an open question. With logging provided by
version control systems, software organizations have adequate data. However, other organizations
with different types of data may struggle to find the optimal input. Another question is the optimal
size of a community or subgraph [Dong et al., 2012]. This is a parameter that will vary between
organizations.
One possible weakness to this approach is that an organization with a systematic insider threat
problem may be unable to use this as detection. Training for community detection requires the
insider’s behavior to be anomalous. For example, organizations with high levels of turnover may
consistently see behavior that would be anomalous in another organization, one with has higher
retention or a more careful workforce.
Our approach identifies behaviors as opposed to focusing on the motivation of an individual. As
a result, the particular strength of this method is identification of a significant number of suspicious
behaviors across the entire employee population. A weakness is that an employee who becomes
slowly malicious and increases suspicious behaviors over time may be able to train the model of
that organization not to recognize his behavior as anomalous. This attack would be mitigated by
the characterization of others in organization (who cannot be controlled by the insider). As with all
insider threat detection systems, any employee who has access sufficient to manipulate the input
and output of the model itself can defeat the analysis.
It might also be the case that our assumptions are incorrect. It may be the case also that
precipitating events are not the only triggers to this type of activity. If insider threats are a result
or response to specific events, other specific events including employee dismissal, dispute with
employers, perceived injustices, family problems, coercion, or new opportunities—as has been
highlighted in [Nurse et al., 2014]—should be considered when evaluating the proposed approach.
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5 Macroeconomics of Routing Anomalies1
“Yes, we have to divide up our time like that, between our politics and our equations.
But to me our equations are far more important, for politics are only a matter of
present concern. A mathematical equation stands forever.”
— Albert Einstein
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate why some countries are more likely to originate routing anomalies
than others. To do so, we analyzed reported routing anomalies and macroeconomic indicators over
a four-year period. There are well-documented hijacks resulting from errors, for profit, or for na-
tional security and national intelligence purposes. Any individual hijack could be an accident, a
crime, or an attack. We report on an empirical investigation into the macroeconomics of routing
anomalies that addresses these three explanations. If BGP anomalies are a result of limited techni-
cal competence, then countries with low levels of education and expertise may be over-represented.
If BGP anomalies are a crime, used by criminals for profit, then economic theories and analytical
approaches from criminology should be able to provide at least partial answers to this question.
Alternatively, if BGP hijacks are primarily used by national intelligence agencies to attack either
internal dissidents or other countries, then the presence of conflict would be an indicator.
Our analysis built on previous macroeconomic work in online crime using the factors that
have been found to be significant in predicting malware, spam, and crowdsourced criminal labor
(e.g. CAPTCHA solving). For crime, our data analysis evaluated if variables associated with
1The content of this chapter was initially proposed as a conference abstract [Moriano et al., 2016] and
then published as a journal article [Moriano et al., 2017c] in collaboration with Soumya Achar and L. Jean
Camp. Pablo Moriano is the primary researcher on both works and made all the analysis and figures therein.
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(i) routine activity theory (fixed broadband subscribers, secure Internet servers—those that use
SSL/TLS protocol for encryption and decryption to protect data from unauthorized interception),
(ii) economic deprivation theory (GDP per capita by PPP), or (iii) structural theory (governance
and education) were significant over multiple years. We found that two of the three theories were
significant. Specifically, secure Internet servers, and density of fixed broadband subscribers were
significant, supporting routine activity theory. Governance indicators were significant, supporting
a structural theory of crime. Education alone was not found to be significant. Our findings suggest
that strength of guardianship and weakness of governance do correspond to initiation of routing
anomalies, supporting the possibility that these are driven by crime. In addition to these findings
from regression analysis, clustering indicates that there are two groups of countries, one of highly
developed and one of less developed nations. Cluster analysis showed some indication that civil
war and surveillance may be correlated with hijacks. So while we cannot reject the possibility
that these hijacks are a function of lower technical expertise, we also found no evidence for that
argument. We found empirical evidence that some hijacks may be for profit.
5.2 Problem
Routing security is a complex technical, social, and economic problem. A given route anomaly
may be an accident, a for-profit crime, or an intelligence operation. Understanding the economics
and political dynamics of this threat can inform effective defenses. Solutions that mitigate risk
from one possible source should not exacerbate the other. For example, a lack of expertise as a
source of anomalies cannot be dismissed as an explanation out of hand. If so, security solutions
that increase the complexity of network operations may perversely increase rather than decrease
anomalies. Alternatively, trust models that are optimized to address for-profit crime may increase
opportunities for intelligence operations.
This chapter presents an empirical analysis to better understand the nature of routing anomalies.
We began with three hypotheses: anomalies result from (1) a lack of technical expertise, from
(2) criminal activity, or from (3) national intelligence operations. We determined the factors that
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would indicate expertise, criminality, and active intelligence, then operationalized these with linear
regression and unsupervised clustering. We then identified correlations to reject (or not) these three
possible explanations for anomalies. Using empirical data, we could not reject the second or third
hypothesis. Although we found evidence of correlation with the second and third, this is not, of
course, causation.
In a nutshell, the nature and distribution of control-plane anomalies are rife with open ques-
tions, and some of these are political and economic questions which can inform the design of
security solutions. Here we address the question of the role of ecrime and politics in BGP anoma-
lies using macroeconomic analysis and unsupervised learning.
5.3 Methods
We performed a longitudinal cross-country empirical analysis of the macroeconomic factors that
correlate with the number of IP prefixes associated with potentially malicious control-plane events.
That is, we focused on the originators and not the targets of BGP control-plane incidents.
The research presented here is based on 322,466 incidents that were identified not only as
anomalies but also as possible hijacks by Argus [Shi et al., 2012]. This data may include false
positives. A false positive, in this case, is the identification of a routing event as anomalous when
it is not. Possible sources of false positives include route flapping, organizational changes, or
unusual but not malicious responses to changes in the control-plane from outages or congestion.
Our investigation is based on the argument that the possibility of BGP attacks systematically being
used for profit and for surveillance cannot be dismissed. BGP control-plane attacks as a tool
for ecrime or espionage has implications for investments, policy, possible targets, and possible
solutions.
We used macroeconomic variables that have been found to be relevant to global analyses of
ecrime, grounded in traditional theories of crime [Pratt and Cullen, 2005], as well as prior research
focused on understanding the economic incentives behind malware [Garg et al., 2013]. We then
used standard regression techniques, specifically multiple linear regression using ordinary least
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squares, to examine these theoretically important independent variables. As a dependent variable,
we considered the number of hijacked IP prefixes that originated in a particular country using the
data set provided by Argus. We analyzed data over a nearly four-year period, from 2011 to 2014.
5.3.1 Data Sources
5.3.1.1 Independent Variables
The independent variables used in this research are based in traditional theories of crime, in par-
ticular: (i) routine activity theory, (ii) economic deprivation, and (iii) social support (also known
as altruism theory). These variables have been instrumented using publicly available data from the
World Bank.2 Although there is a dispute over the way some of these measures are implemented,
biases in these measures are likely consistent across countries and over time.
The World Bank provides a consistent and systematic measure of country-level macroeco-
nomic variables, and has been used widely in economic, criminology, and jurisprudence research
[Ika et al., 2012]. Equally important, the World Bank provides uniform and consistently avail-
able measures that are likely to be reproduced by other researchers. We grouped the independent
variables into factors and described them in detail below (see Table 5.1).
The routine activity theory of crime states that the probability of a crime is a function of mo-
tivated offenders, available targets, and lack of guardianship [Felson and Cohen, 1980]. The first
independent factor is availability of users, i.e., a larger population of Internet users is more likely
to produce more hijack attacks. This means that we make no assumptions about the distribution
of motivation between categories or classes of users but rather assume that with more users there
is a larger pool of people who could be motivated to commit online crime. To determine if this
is a significant variable, we considered the number of fixed broadband Internet subscribers (FBIS)
in a given country. We normalize the number for comparisons across countries by evaluating the
number of fixed Internet broadband subscribers per 100,000 people (FBISper100).
2Available for public download at http://data.worldbank.org/
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A second independent factor is guardianship. Guardianship has been modeled in other works
as community oversight. High guardianship indicates that the community has and enforces norms
of non-criminal and safe behaviors. In the case of online crime, this can be indicated by private
investments in the existing information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure. We
operationalized this factor using the measure of secure Internet servers (SIS) and SIS per million
people (SISperM) to account for the differences in population. The World Bank defines SIS as
“servers using encrypting technology in Internet transactions.”
Economic deprivation theory suggests that crime is driven by blocked legitimate opportunities
or economic deprivation [Blau and Blau, 1982]. This is the third independent factor in our analysis,
and the only factor we examine for the economic deprivation theory of crime. Certainly, a lack of
economic opportunity encourages individuals to perform criminal activities if these are profitable.
To measure this factor, we consider the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by purchasing
power parity (PPP). Simultaneously, GDP per capita by PPP (GDP PPP) indicates the relative
deprivation with respect to other countries given the low cost of global connectivity.
The social support or altruism theory posits that an individual lack of economic resources can
be alleviated by appropriate governance through public investments [Cullen, 1994]. This moti-
vates the inclusion of a fourth independent factor in our analysis. For ecrime, government influ-
ences take the form of subsidies or incentives for the adoption of technologies. Conceptually, when
a governance environment encourages the adoption of technologies, it also encourages increased
access to ICT technologies. Under the altruism theory of crime, this would also decrease the in-
centive for routing attacks. To capture this factor, we operationalized government support using a
subset of World Governance Indicators (WGI) [Kaufmann et al., 2011]. The subset we included
consists of (1) government effectiveness, (2) regulatory quality, (3) rule of law, and (4) control of
corruption, i.e., perception of corruption within a country. Government effectiveness captures the
perceived quality of the services, policy formulation, and the credibility of the governance. Reg-
ulatory quality refers to the perceived degree of alignment toward the development of the private
sector. Rule of law measures the degree to which the legal framework is operationalized in prac-
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tice. For example, corruption can decrease the effectiveness of the legal framework. Control of
corruption measures the misuse of public power for private gain.
Finally, recall that one possible explanation of routing anomalies is a lack of technical compe-
tence. This is the fifth and final independent factor. Superior governance in the specific domain of
ICTs would be indicated by high levels of local expertise. Local expertise and ability in computing
is commonly identified in macroeconomic analysis by higher levels of exports in those industries.
To measure local skills, we used the percentage of exports of computers, communications, and
other services (CCS) as the corresponding macroeconomic variable. This measure is intended to
quantify the degree to which a country has developed ICT markets. A larger ICT market implies
more personnel who are trained in basic security practices. In fact, hijacking routes requires a
minimum level of expertise in security and minimum technological requirements to perform, par-
ticularly in comparison with simple email confidence scams such as advance fee fraud. In contrast,
creating a route leak requires a lack of expertise or due care. We recognize that guardianship and
competence interact, and address this in our analysis.
Table 5.1: Five-dimensional regression model variables.
Model factor Variable name Acronym
Availability (AVA) Fixed broadband Internet subscribers FBIS
Fixed broadband Internet subscribers FBISper100
(per 100 people)
Security of ICT Secure Internet servers SIS
infrastructure (SEC) Secure Internet servers SISperM
(per one million)
Economic resources GDP per capita by PPP GDP PPP
or affordability (ECO)
Governance of legal World Governance Indicators WGI
framework (LEG)
Security skills or Computer, comm., and other services CCS
education (EDU) (% exports)
5.3.1.2 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable corresponds to the number of unique affected IPv4 prefixes by country
(based on the origin of the malicious prefix), i.e., each event corresponds to a prefix being rerouted.
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We depended upon the Argus data set for the identification of anomalies. For the purpose of
collecting routing anomalous events, we compiled data over the 43 months from June 2011 to
December 2014 from the Argus3 API, as of December 20, 2015 [Shi et al., 2012, Xiang et al.,
2011].
Argus defines three categories of anomalies. Specifically, the data we used relies on the output
of the Anomaly Monitoring Module (AMM). The AMM detects (1) origin, (2) adjacency, and (3)
policy anomalies. An origin anomaly is detected when an AS is advertising a prefix that it does
not own. To identify origin anomalies, Argus maintains a database that tracks the expected origin
of prefixes. An adjacency anomaly occurs when there is a path which has two AS numbers that are
not normally seen to be connected. This could be considered a bad or an unlikely hop. To detect
adjacency anomalies, the AMM monitors changes in AS-path segments. Given the exponential
number of possible combinations of segments in the updates, the AMM only verifies neighboring
pairs in an AS-path. To detect policy anomalies, the AMM takes into account the type of commer-
cial relationship between ASes. Specifically, customers are not expected to announce routes from
their providers. A bad segment of three hops means a policy anomaly. Note that by considering
these three types of anomalies, the AMM is able to detect a wide range of hijacks and other events.
Based both on Argus’ description of their practices and the sheer number of events reported, we
can assume flapping is filtered out. (Flapping occurs when a route oscillates between two or more
possible paths that are themselves relatively stable.) We do acknowledge that some BGP alarms
might be due to benign BGP engineering practice or misconfiguration, including events specifically
classified as anomalous in this data. The common characteristic of the incidents examined below
is that the IP prefixes and ASes are used to divert Internet traffic.
The hijacks reported by Argus are based on a mixed strategy between control- and data-plane
methods, i.e., it correlates control-plane anomalies and data reachability to improve detection ac-
curacy. This strategy enables Argus to distinguish hijacks from other types of anomalies. In the
subsequent analysis, we did not consider the effects of the false positives detected by the Argus
3Available for public download at http://argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/
86
system. That is, we assumed that each anomaly identified by Argus was, in fact, identified cor-
rectly.
5.3.1.3 Data Preprocessing
In our work, we focused only on origin anomalies. Origin anomalies occur when there are multiple
announcements of an IP prefix and Argus judges one of these as malicious. Thus, each event used
in the data set corresponds to a unique prefix being rerouted. If there was an attack that resulted in
multiple prefixes being rerouted, then that would appear in the data as two attacks.
Our data set excludes large-scale and easily-identifiable routing anomalous events to prevent
these black swan events from biasing the results.4 So, had we included the 179,000 prefixes an-
nounced by Malaysia [Toonk, 2015a], the Chinese announcement of millions of addresses [Hiran
et al., 2013], route leaks [Toonk, 2012], or large-scale outages [Dainotti et al., 2011] this would
have biased the results. Instead, our data set of “events” or “incidents” consists of those incidences
identified by Argus as origin anomalies that were not large-scale events but focused on a single
prefix. If the same prefix is announced again in a different timestamp, it was counted as a different
event. In addition, the size of the prefix does not have any effect in the counting process, i.e, we
did not distinguish between the announcement of a /18 from that of a /24 of event prefixes but
treat them equally.
Our macroeconomic analyses required correlating an AS with a jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of
the event is defined as the country from which the bogus route was announced. The mapping of IP
addresses and ASes to country has been widely used in industry [Microsoft, 2011, Anti-Phishing
Working Group (APWG), 2015, Cisco Systems, 2015] and academic macroeconomic research,
e.g. [van Eeten et al., 2010]. Geolocation is another related active research area, and improvements
in geolocation could enhance this analysis. Here our approach to location is grounded in concurrent
4In the context of this research, a large-scale routing anomalous event is an incident that compromised
thousands of IP prefixes in a single announcement. It constitutes an example of a black swan. A black swan
is a highly improbable and high-impact event, such as the Lehman Brothers collapse in the U.S. or Malaysia
announcing 179,000 prefixes.
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industry practice and related research [Quan et al., 2014].
We inferred the mapping between ASes and country membership from a data set provided by
the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [CAIDA, 2015]. The geoloca-
tion data was also investigated over the fall of 2015 with multiple downloads of regional Internet
registry (RIR) data. One goal in implementing downloads was to avoid the “phony, yet plausible,
AS origins” that are used for ecrime. A false claim to an IP prefix would have to remain stable for
a long time to pollute our data. There also would have to be a significant number of these to bias
the results of our analysis.
Most of these anomalies in the Argus database are short-lived, on the matter of seconds. Pre-
vious anecdotal discussions [Madory, 2015a] described cases that appear to be both intelligence
activities and criminal activities. Like the Bitcoin miner attack, apparently criminal incidents are
short-lived. Other than anecdotes, we have no basis for asserting that a short-lived hijack is a
crime while a long-lived hijack is evidence of international intelligence activity. Given that there is
clearly malicious activity that occurs in short bursts, we included all the data in our analysis rather
than creating an arbitrary threshold.
5.3.2 Statistical Model
Equation 5.1 summarizes the behavior that we captured.
A = β0 +β1 × AVA +β2 × SEC +β3 × ECO
+ β4 × LEG +β5 × EDU + ε (5.1)
In Equation 5.1, A refers to the number of hijacked prefixes (i.e., the dependent variable). Every
independent variable is captured by the factors AVA, SEC, ECO, LEG, and EDU respectively as we
defined in Table 5.1. The terms β0, . . . ,β5 are the regression coefficients of the model. In addition,
ε is the error term. Equation 5.1 was evaluated using multiple linear regression with ordinary
least squares (OLS). In an effort to validate the OLS assumptions, we examined the model for the
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(absence) of multicollinearity5 and heteroskedasticity6.
To address the absence of multicollinearity in the predictors, we calculated the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) per year and in the aggregate data. We found that the four indicators of WGI
are highly correlated, i.e., government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption have VIF > 5 [Zuur et al., 2010]. Thus, in the subsequent analysis, we combined all of
these indicators into a single score by adding them up. We called this new variable WGI. For the
remaining predictors, the VIF values did not indicate that multicollinearity is an issue, i.e., FBIS,
FBISper100, SIS, SISperM, GDP PPP and CCS have VIF < 5.
We examined the distribution of the residuals of the model to check the absence of heteroskedas-
ticity. We tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test under the null hypothesis that the residu-
als were normally distributed. For the model described by Equation 5.1, the test for the distribution
of the residuals produced a p-value of 0.464. This suggests that we failed to reject the null hypoth-
esis that residuals are normally distributed. In other words, there is not enough evidence in favor
of heteroskedastic errors, and the condition is satisfied. To avoid the regression being affected
by particular outliers, we log transformed independent variables with a long-tail distribution. We
determined these variables by examining their distributions in box plots and identifying outliers.
The independent variables that were log transformed were (1) GDP PPP, (2) FBIS, (3) SIS, and (4)
SISperM.
Similarly, given that the OLS regression makes additional assumptions, we explored the dis-
tribution of the dependent variable. In particular, OLS assumes that the dependent variable is
continuous and normally distributed. In doing so, we tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk
test per year and in the aggregate. We found that the normality assumption was not satisfied, in
other words, the p-value ≈ 0. This indicated that the dependent variable is unlikely to be nor-
5Multicollinearity is observed when two or more independent variables are highly correlated, i.e., at
least one of the independent variables can be expressed as a linear combination of the rest to a statistically
significant degree. For collinear independent variables, the results of the OLS regression may be misleading.
6Heteroskedasticity is observed when the residuals (errors) of a model are not normally distributed.
A test of absence of heteroskedasticity determines the regression model’s ability to predict values of a
dependent variable over all its range. For heteroscedastic residuals regression results should not be trusted.
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mally distributed. Thus, the dependent variable was log transformed to satisfy the assumptions
underlying the linear regression.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Anomaly Time Series
The total number of IP prefixes that were impinged by an anomaly for each year during the obser-
vation period is 54,087, 90,607, 105,600 and 72,172 for 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively.
The data have a surprising level of variance. In particular, there is an increase of 67.5% between
2011 and 2012, an increase of 16.5% between 2012 and 2013, and a decrease of 31.7% between
2013 and 2014. This suggests that although the number of affected prefixes has been growing since
2011, it suddenly dropped at some point in 2014.
To further investigate the decrease in the number of hijacks in 2014, we analyzed the daily time
series of anomalies. Fig. 5.1 shows the number of reported events during the observation period,
i.e., the number of hijacked IP prefixes. The dashed line represents the unweighted LOESS fit. The
shaded area corresponds to the 95% confidence interval of the regression model. It is worth noting
that the data have very high variance. In particular, the number of hijacks spans four orders of
magnitude. This means that reporting the average number of events is highly influenced by outliers
and can be misleading. To take into account this constraint, we applied a non-parametric regression
method—unweighted LOESS—to perform local regression and derive a non-linear fitted smooth
curve (the dashed one) that captures the trends in the time series. We also plot the 95% confidence
interval of the regression line in the shaded area. Although the smooth curve does not reveal a
significant trend, it is possible to infer that in 2014, there were two periods in which there are not
records of incidents. These periods correspond to the days between January 3 to April 22 and May
22 to July 29. We iterated the analysis to confirm this empirically. The decrease in the number of
incidents in 2014 is likely a result of some downtime because there appears to simply be missing
data. Only Argus could confirm this; however, it offers one possible explanation. We cannot reject
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the explanation that hijacks have become more difficult to detect, but we find it unlikely. The rate



































Figure 5.1: Daily number of anomalies. The dashed line represents the unweighted LOESS fit.
The blue band corresponds to the 95% confidence interval of the unweighted LOESS fit.
5.4.2 Anomaly Distribution
To take into account the origin of the bad routes, we mapped the AS origin of the bad route to
the country corresponding to the one in which the AS is registered (based on a CAIDA data set)
[CAIDA, 2015]. We then measured the corresponding number of incidents that were reported in
any given country. Fig. 5.2 shows the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF)7
of the number of incidents per country during the observation period. The distribution is heavy-
tailed suggesting that the majority of the reported hijack incidents originated from a small set of
countries.
We determined the distribution that best fit the data by estimating parameters for different
possible distributions and evaluating the goodness of fit. Specifically, we examined the best fit
7For a random variable X, the CCDF is the probability that X will take a value greater than a fixed value
x, i.e., Pr(X > x).
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parameters for the empirical distribution by using the maximum likelihood among a set of power-
law, log-normal, and exponential parametric distribution candidates. They are very well known
to be a good fit for heavy-tailed distributions. We followed the procedure explained in [Clauset
et al., 2009]. Second, we calculated the goodness-of-fit for the proposed distributions by using
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test [Massey, 1951]. The KS test evaluates the hypothesis that
two samples of data are drawn from the same distribution. In this case, we tested if the observed
distribution was statistically significantly different from the best fit of the parametric model. In
particular, we computed the proportion of times that the test failed to reject the hypothesis that
the distribution of compiled data and the synthetic data are drawn from the same distribution for
a significance level of 0.05. In tests of 104 synthetic distributions, the analysis of the synthetic
data under the power law model failed to reject the null hypothesis in 99% of the cases, followed
by log-normal at 98%, and exponential at 0%. From this analysis, we ruled out the exponential
distribution as a potential candidate.
The dashed line in Fig. 5.2 shows the CCDF of the best power law model for the aggregate
date, including all observations between 2011 and 2014. The estimated parameters of the power
law distribution are α = 2.13 for the scaling exponent and xmin = 958 for the threshold at which
the power law begins.8 Although the best fit is given by the power law distribution followed by a
log-normal distribution, there was not enough evidence to entirely rule out the option of the log-
normal distribution. Moreover, there are still some deviations from the dashed line in the tail, i.e.,
for countries with a large number of hijacks.
To determine how these distributions changed over time (and the possible transition from one
distribution to another), we applied the KS test to determine if the distribution of hijacks per coun-
try changed from one year to the next through 2011 to 2014. We found that there were no compar-
isons where we were able to reject the hypothesis that the distributions were the same (p-value 
0.05). Fig. 5.2 illustrates this fact by showing that the CCDF over the period of study is visually
8Remember that a random variable X that follows a power law distribution has a probability density

















Figure 5.2: CCDF of anomalies originated per country.
To further study the behavior of the countries that are the origin of the majority of the anoma-
lies, we plot the number of anomalies per country for countries that are in the upper 2.5% tail of
the anomaly distribution during a particular year. Specifically, Fig. 5.3 shows the changes for the
countries that are the origin of the majority of the anomalies. This shows the number of reported
anomalies per year for those countries that are in the upper 2.5% tail of the anomaly distribution
for a specific year. Interestingly, the U.S. is the country to which the majority of the anomalies are
attributed throughout the observation period. Brazil and India appear in three of the four years dur-
ing the observation period, although their relative ranks change. Russia and Turkey appear twice,
and China and Romania each show up once.
5.4.3 Regression Analysis
We ran a multiple linear regression for the aggregate data during the observation period using the
entire set of measures from 2011 to 2014. Remember that the target variable is the number of
hijacked prefixes in a particular country i.e., OLS was applied to Equation 5.1. Table 5.2 shows the


































Figure 5.3: Anomalies per year for countries that are in the upper 2.5% tail of the anomaly distri-
bution.
heteroskedasticity into account. The linear regression quantifies the individual relative importance
of a single feature when considering the effect of the others constant.
There are three statistically significant factors, nominally, SIS, WGI, and FBIS, in order of
decreasing importance. We did not count as a separate predictor SISperM because this is a nor-
malized measure of SIS (an indirect measure). The coefficients of the OLS suggest that although
there is a positive association between SIS and FBIS with the number of hijacked prefixes (i.e.,
countries with higher SIS and FBIS are more likely to produce more incidents), the association
with WGI was negative (i.e., countries with poor governmental practices are more likely to pro-
duce more incidents). This analysis also suggests that our hypothesized macroeconomic factors
explained a significant amount of variance in the number of incidents originating in different coun-
tries (approximately 75.3% with p-value ≈ 0).
We further explored the relationship between the number of anomalies and the number of SIS.
Fig. 5.4 shows that there is a power relationship between the two variables (given by the linear
tendency in a log-log plot) for both the aggregate data and for each of the individual years. For the
aggregate, the association between the two variables (in the log scale) has a Pearson correlation
coefficient of 0.79, which confirmed the idea of a strong association between the two variables.
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Table 5.2: OLS regression estimates.
Variable Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -1.7231 0.7913 -2.18 0.0300∗
log(FBIS) 0.1700 0.0545 3.12 0.0019∗∗
FBISper100 -0.0052 0.0096 -0.54 0.5882
log(SIS) 0.7561 0.0654 11.57 ≈ 0∗∗∗
log(SISperM) -0.1758 0.0677 -2.60 0.0098∗∗
log(GDP PPP) -0.0090 0.1145 -0.08 0.9372
WGI -0.1222 0.0326 -3.75 0.0002∗∗∗
CCS 0.0035 0.0024 1.47 0.1429
Signif. codes: ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Residual standard error: 1045 on 408 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.7576, Adjusted R-squared: 0.7534
F-statistic: 182.1 on 7 and 408 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Fig. 5.4 also reinforces the results of the regression analysis. In other words, it suggests that coun-
tries with a high number of SIS are also the countries with a high reported number of anomalies.
In this plot, we highlighted the country with the highest density of secure servers and the larger























Figure 5.4: Anomalies vs. SIS per year per country.
The top five countries in terms of the number of SIS during the observation period remained
the same: U.S., U.K., South Korea, Japan, and Germany. The U.S. reported half a million, with
the others reporting on the order of hundreds of thousands. As we might expect from the positive
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association revealed in Fig. 5.4, the U.S. is the country with the highest number of SIS and the
highest number of anomalies (see Fig. 5.3). Japan is the other country that reveals a similar pattern
with respect to a positive association between the number of SIS and control-plane anomalies. On
the other hand, Germany, South Korea, and the United Kingdom report a high number of SIS, but


























Figure 5.5: Distribution of the number of SIS per year for countries that are in the upper 2.5% tail
of the SIS distribution.
We then investigated the association between the number of SIS and WGI. Fig. 5.6 shows the
relationship between these two variables for every country during the observation period. Note that
we only considered the number of SIS and WGI because they were the most significant predictors
in the regression, i.e., we did not explore the effect of FBIS. Although there is a positive association
between SIS and the number of hijacked prefixes, and a negative one between WGI and the number
of hijacked prefixes (see Table 5.2), the relationship between these two independent variables is
exponential in the WGI (given by the linear tendency in the log-linear plot) both for the aggregate
data and for each of the individual years. The correlation for the aggregated data has a Pearson
correlation coefficient of 0.68. This fact reinforces the idea of a strong association between the two
variables. It also suggests that, given the data, it is more likely that countries with poor indices of
governance also have a smaller number of SIS and vice versa. But more importantly, any change
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in the WGI of a country is exponentially amplified and reflected in the number of SIS. It appears
that small changes in the perception of governmental practices result in significant changes in the
















Figure 5.6: SIS vs. WGI for all countries over all years.
5.4.4 Cluster Analysis
For the cluster analysis, we first normalized the anomalies per country by the total number of
ASes that belong to that country during a certain year. This transformation allowed us to have
a fair metric to evaluate the likelihood of a country being the origin of the anomalies based on
their technological resources. Fig. 5.7 illustrates the differences in the anomaly/ASes ratio across
the SIS and WGI plane for 2011. A higher intensity (i.e., darkness) in the data points represents
a higher anomaly/ASes ratio at the country level. The plot also depicts the contour of the two-
dimensional density estimation of the distribution of the data points. For those unfamiliar with
unsupervised learning, a description of the use of unsupervised learning to categorize data can be
found in [Hastie et al., 2016, Chapter 14].
We did not implement an aggregate cluster analysis for the entire period because of the appar-
ently missing data as shown in Fig. 5.1. We have implemented cluster analysis for 2012 and 2013
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finding the same clusters and same outliers despite the changes in rank shown in Fig. 5.4. The
only difference is that Somalia was not an outlier in 2013. All graphs were remarkable for their
similarity. The following discussion of cluster analysis applies to 2011-2013, with data missing in
2014, and 2015 subject to further analysis.
Fig. 5.7 shows that there are two main clusters based on this distribution. The first cluster corre-
sponds to countries with high WGI and more than 103 SIS, i.e., the first quadrant. Not surprisingly,
the majority of the countries in this cluster are developed countries. The U.S. and South Korea are
outliers of this cluster and are labeled in the plot. Although the U.S. has a better WGI indicator and
a larger number of SIS than South Korea; South Korea has a higher ratio of anomaly/ASes (which
is represented by a darker point). Recall the U.S. and South Korea are outliers in all our cluster
analyses. South Korea similarly has a higher ratio of hijack/ASes for all years.
The second cluster represents mostly countries with low WGI and less than 103 SIS, i.e., the
third quadrant. The majority of countries in this cluster are developing countries. Comoros has
been labeled in the plot with the highest ratio of anomaly/ASes during 2011 despite democratic
elections of presidents who rejected violent extremism and the first peaceful transfer of power in
2010. In 2011, Comoros saw the return of the United Nations, the Peace Corps after 20 years,
and such basic governance activities as setting up the first national parks. Terrorism warnings for
travel in Comoros are low, and there are rare incidents of mass violence. Thus, this may be an
anomaly, a result of low Internet penetration, or an echo of the irregularities of the 2010 election.
Alternatively, and the argument the authors find most compelling is that Comoros is a geographical
anomaly. The island is a nexus of global fiber traffic despite a small number of ASes. For Comoros,
the sheer density of connectivity has no correspondence to number of ASes.
Somalia is an outlier of this cluster in 2011 and 2012. Somalia was not an outlier in 2013
despite a continued lack of effective central government, prevalence of violent extremists, and a
civil dispute over the state of Somaliland. It may be worth noting that Somalians have recently
























Figure 5.7: Anomaly/ASes ratio in the SIS versus WGI plane for 2011.
5.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this work is to use macroeconomics, unsupervised learning, and theories of crime
to find correlations with control-plane anomalies. The motivation of this work is to investigate
if solutions to control-plane anomalies should consider incompetence, crime, and national intel-
ligence activities as possible sources. Information about the purpose of attacks can inform the
design of defenses. For example, a solution that creates additional complexity for network engi-
neers may increase anomalies caused by failures in human expertise. Alternatively, any solutions
which embed national governments as roots of trust may be less than ideal if nation states are the
source of these events. Our results reject incompetence as a systematic cause, but we cannot reject
crime and national intelligence activities as possible explanations.
We have analyzed the routing anomalies identified by Argus and mapped to the jurisdiction of
origin. We have evaluated the statistical significance of macroeconomic indicators corresponding
to three theories of ecrime and those that correspond to likely technical expertise for each juris-
diction. This study has as a primary focus an empirical understanding of the variance of anomaly
production at the cross-country level. Some limitations need to be taken into account before fur-
ther discussing the results. The model relied on multiple linear regression through OLS, but OLS
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cannot identify the underlying mechanisms for the regression estimates. We also do not know why
variables appear more predictive in some countries than in others. The results suggested by the
statistical model are based on correlation, which is not an indicator of causality. In that respect,
the aggregation and analysis of more features can partially but not wholly improve the understand-
ing of causes in future research. We have offered technical competence, theories of ecrime, and
governmental action as candidates for explanations of these correlations. These theories are well-
grounded in the literature, motivating their selection, yet the results are in no way deterministic.
We identified some patterns of interest in the data beyond statistical significance that could
be partially explained by macroeconomic indicators. First, the overall results indicate that the
concentration of anomalies originated in the U.S. is consistently the highest. This suggests that a
solution that is deployed in the U.S. may have a disproportionate impact in the reduction of routing
anomalies. It also indicates that policies which apply only in the U.S. may be effective despite the
global nature of the Internet. The potential for high impact of technology and policy solutions is
reified by observation of the two highlighted clusters. Second, we observed significant incidence of
anomaly production in countries with poor governance practices and limited investment in security.
Among these countries with a striking rate of anomaly production and poor government indicators,
Syria is the only country that is highlighted during the entire observation period.
Focusing further on the cluster of countries with poor governmental practices, we identify that
indicators of conflict occur more strongly than indicators of poverty, i.e., it is not all about eco-
nomic deprivation or lack of technical expertise. This is revealed as we track the evolution of the
WGI for countries in this cluster. Moreover, as we have shown in the analysis, the four dimen-
sions of governance are not independent of one another [Kaufmann et al., 2011]. In other words,
although these variables measure different aspects of governance, they tend to be closely inter-
related in a particular country. This is an important consideration because the original formulation
of the WGI leverages other dimensions of governance such as voice and accountability, political
stability, and absence of violence. This implies that the WGI indicator that we presented in this
study is capturing some component of conflict in the highlighted countries. In other words, WGI
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can indicate surveillance of a nation’s own people.
We found that the distribution of the number of anomalies is well-modeled by either a power
law or log-normal distribution. As has been pointed out by [Clauset et al., 2009], in terms of data
generation, it is arguably more reasonable to assume that the data are created by a log-normal
process because of the distribution of ASes globally and within countries. The type of mecha-
nisms that can be expected to produce these heavy-tailed distributions identifies that power law
and log-normal distributions are quite naturally associated [Mitzenmacher, 2004]. In particular,
the generative mechanism behind hijacks has been attributed to a multiplicative process in this
case, this means the more ASes, the more we expect anomalies. This observation has also been
discussed by [Edwards et al., 2015]. Applicably, a multiplicative process is one that can be char-
acterized by Gibrat’s rule of proportionate growth stating that the proportional rate of growth of a
firm is independent of its absolute size [Samuels, 1965]. Thus, we can apply the analogy to model
the size of the countries based on economic, guardianship, and availability factors. It is reasonable
to expect the number of hijacks generated in a given country to be proportional to that country’s
macroeconomic indicators.
Overall, our analysis offers surprises in terms of the role of macroeconomic indicators in
anomalies. Much, however, remains to be done. For example, it will be interesting to investigate
whether consistent patterns in terms of anomaly production are observable at the level of ASes and
ISPs. This would allow us to better understand the microeconomic factors that are responsible for
the variance of anomaly production around the globe.
Given that the statistical model relies on assumptions concerning the generation of observed
data, the conclusions are also based on the quality of data that we have. It might be the case that
the data is incomplete or prone to false positives. Thus, additional analyses on other data sources
should be compared with the results here. If this analysis proves predictive over multiple years
such that changes in the independent variables are leading indicators in changes of anomalies, then
we could have some basis to claim causation.
Our analysis of BGP routing anomalies lends insight into hijacks as a geographical, eco-
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nomic, political, and technical challenge. We focused on the analysis of longitudinal cross-country
macroeconomic data and its relationship with the frequency of produced routing anomalies. To do
so, we collected a data set about BGP incidents from June 2011 to December 2014 and combined
this with data from the World Bank. We provided statistical characterizations of the distribution of
hijacks over the past four years. The higher–level research question is, whether these are crimes,
and if so, can we characterize these empirically as attacks? The specific hypotheses we address
focus on determining the economic factors that explain the variance in the number of hijacks orig-
inating from different countries.
There appears to be a high and consistently increasing number of BGP incidents, specifically
those that are potential hijacks. If we assume that the lack of data for 2014 is just that—a lack
of data—and not a lack of incidents, we can expect hundreds of thousands more incidents in the
coming years. Although there are false positives, these incidents are not route leaks and cannot be
reasonably assumed to be the result of simple technical incompetence. In fact, our analysis found
no systematic evidence that these anomalies are a result of incompetence measured by exports of
information and communications technologies. (We have no expectation that this would hold for
route leaks, which we did not explore.) Other than errors, two remaining explanations are crime
and national intelligence. Both of these can be quite difficult to observe. They can also be difficult
to distinguish. We found evidence for both possibilities.
To answer the question if BGP attacks are crimes, we use the tools of criminology informed
by previous work in empirical analyses of ecrime. Specifically, we built on previous macroeco-
nomic work in online crime using the factors that have been found to be significant in predicting
malware, spam, and crowdsourced criminal labor (e.g. CAPTCHA solving). We created a model
and evaluated data over time to determine if variables associated with routine activity theory (se-
cure Internet servers, fixed broadband Internet subscribers), economic deprivation theory (GDP
per capita by PPP), or structural theory (governance and education) were significant over multiple
years. We found that one variable for two of the three theories was significant. Specifically, secure
Internet servers and density of fixed broadband Internet subscribers were significant, supporting
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routine activity theory. Governance indicators were significant, supporting a structural theory of
crime.
We found evidence for the possibility that BGP anomalies (including hijacks) are a new method
of ecrime, one that is detected tens of thousands of times each month. If BGP hijacks are a com-
mon ecrime vector and follow the patterns of other online crime, the misdirection and filtering of
information may be commoditized and become an industry.
A further cluster analysis showed mixed evidence for crime and national intelligence. South
Korea and the U.S. are known for being targeted by specific types of ecrime. South Korea is notable
for its high level of virtual goods and thus is a target for virtual theft. The U.S. is consistently highly
ranked as being the most popular target and the most popular source of common online crime, such
as phishing and spam. The U.S. maintains its role as an outlier in this analysis; however, South
Korea has a greater density of anomalies per AS. Although South Korea is itself characterized
by high levels of governmental transparency and competence, it remains technically at war with
North Korea, as there is no peace agreement. North Korea has been indicated in virtual as well
as physical attacks against South Korean nationals. Similarly, although the U.S. is transparent,
wealthy, and competent by global measures, the U.S. has not only never recognized North Korea
as a nation, it also is actively involved in warfare in Afghanistan as well as having a wide range
of additional military engagements. Given the extremely large investment in national intelligence
and national defense as well as the current involvement in conflicts overseas by the U.S., plus the
situation with respect to North Korea, their presence in anomalies can also be seen as supporting
the national intelligence explanation.
For the other cluster, that of nations with low numbers of secure Internet servers, the increase
in density of anomalies per operating autonomous systems shows a striking overlap with nations
with civil disputes over the time period studied. The relatively small number of countries prevents
meaningful statistical analysis of these few nations, but the overlap between national conflict and
anomalies is striking.
In summary, our findings provide statistical evidence for one of the three proposed explanations
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for anomalies: crime. We found weaker evidence in terms of governance and clustering for a
second explanation: national intelligence. We found no evidence for incompetence per se.
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6 Characterizing Routing Anomalies Through Graph Mining
“We must be careful not to believe things simply because we want them to be true. No
one can fool you as easily as you can fool yourself.”
— Richard P. Feynman
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we address the challenge of early identification of routing anomalies using an
anomaly detection approach. In particular, we conduct a case-based systematic analysis of the
changes in the topology of AS-level graphs that are associated with three very well-known large-
scale incidents. The three cases we address were easily identified following the large-scale dis-
ruption but not before. We show that before the incidents there are changes in the topology of the
graphs but there are not statistically significant. Here the results suggest that further research is
needed to support the idea of using AS-level graphs for early identification of routing anomalies.
6.2 Problem
The Internet—one of the most beautiful man-made complex systems—has shown to be under
constant evolution [Zhang et al., 2008, Edwards et al., 2012]. The Internet is composed of ASes
which are autonomous entities with their own routing policy and administrated by a single entity.
ASes exchange traffic between them by means of BGP [Rekhter et al., 2006]. The interchange of
routes between ASes allows them to know the global routing status of the Internet at any time. This
dynamic system can be represented by temporal graphs in which the nodes are the ASes and the
BGP peering relationships between them are the links. There is extensive literature studying the
structure of the Internet at the AS-level for specific time snapshots [Faloutsos et al., 1999, Albert
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et al., 2000, Zhou and Mondragón, 2004]. More recent work also focuses on the dynamics of the
topology of the Internet [Zhang et al., 2008, Edwards et al., 2012]. However, to our knowledge,
there are no quantitative studies in the literature that systematically evaluated the effect that large-
scale routing anomalous events have in the topology of the Internet at the AS-level.
The purpose of this chapter is to quantitatively study the topology of the Internet when real-
world anomalies have been injected into the system. Anomaly detection techniques rely on con-
ducting measures on the control-plane level (using BGP feeds) or data-plane level (by exploring
reachability of IP addresses in suspicious announced routes), or a combination of both. Anomaly
detection schemes do not require changes in the protocol itself. They primarily are used in de-
tecting anomalies based on passive or active measurements, i.e., to alert operators to mitigate
threats [Shi et al., 2012, Khare et al., 2012, Zhang et al., 2010]. However, in many of the anomaly
detection schemes, the prefix measurements are precomputed and not dynamic. This implies that
their underlying mechanisms need to be recomputed if there is a change in the observed routing
infrastructure.
Anomaly detection techniques have been shown to be able to identify anomalies under certain
conditions. However, it is still an open issue to understand and characterize the occurrence of
anomalous events on the Internet using the information extracted from the reachability graphs built
from BGP announcements. Here we seek to contribute to the understanding and characterization of
routing incidents through the use of methods from other fields. Specifically, we use graph mining
from the study of human social networks to detect these anomalies. Not only is a graph-theoretical
approach suitable for the connection of ASes, this approach can incorporate the dynamic behavior
of the observed routing infrastructure.
For that purpose, we conduct a case-based systematic analysis of the changes at the topological
level of the AS graphs that are associated with three very well-known anomalous events. The three
cases we address were easily identified following the large-scale disruption but not before.
Our methodology is grounded in building the AS-level graphs and analyzing the metadata that
is involved with well known incidents. Our work is differentiated from the work in [Kruegel
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et al., 2003, Gaertler and Patrignani, 2004] in that we use dynamic update information from the
RouteViews project (with granularity every 15 minutes) to reconstruct the network topology at the
AS-level and study the robustness of network topological properties, before, during, and after the
incident. This approach aims for differentiation between normal behavior at the network level and
disruption or anomalous changes during the incidents. From this analysis we expect that topolog-
ical signatures from the AS-level graph representation can be used to infer when an anomalous
routing event is happening before widespread disruption.
6.3 Methods
Every AS originates the prefixes that have been allocated to it. All ASes can announce prefixes
as well as paths. ASes build a graph of interactions with others ASes based on information about
reachable paths to IP prefixes. The reachability of these paths is determined through BGP an-
nouncements that ASes receive from their neighbors. Gateway routers in the ASes use route up-
dates to modify their routing tables, and these determine how to direct traffic. It has been shown
that routing decisions depend mainly on path length (i.e., the number of hops to reach the des-
tination prefix); secondarily on the cost of directing traffic through a specific neighbor based on
previously established business contracts; and then on diverse tertiary criteria [Goldberg, 2014].
The resulting graph is a dynamic system based on protocol incentives and economic constraints
with continuous addition and deletion of nodes and edges [Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2007].
Using the graph of ASes, we performed a longitudinal empirical analysis of the network topo-
logical measures that correlate with the occurrence of three major BGP disruptions. For each event,
we reconstructed the evolving network topology around the date and time of these incidents. This
procedure is done to identify statistically significant changes in the graph topology.
6.3.1 Data Sources
In this section, we detail the data sources (along with their preprocessing) that were used to perform
the analysis which follows. We start by describing the data used for the construction of (i) the
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database of the large-scale routing anomalous events (to establish the ground truth); (ii) the AS-
level data; (iii) the description of the AS-level graph representation; and then end with (iv) the
definition of the graph topological properties measured in the Internet graphs.
6.3.1.1 Routing Anomalous Events
We considered the AS-level graphs for very well-known cases of routing anomalous events that
led to large-scale disruptions during the last few years. In particular, we performed an analysis of
(i) an Indonesian ISP hijack that covered much of the world; (ii) an Malaysian ISP that generated
global collateral damage by leaking prefixes to large-scale providers; and (iii) an Indian ISP that
hijacked prefixes of other important Internet players. Note that these anomalous events have been
studied and corroborated from different sources. We describe more details about these incidents
below. Events are listed in chronological order.
An Indonesian ISP hijacks the world
On April 2, 2014, starting at 18:26 UTC, Indosat (one of the largest telecommunications providers
in Indonesia) announced more than 320 000 IP prefixes belonging to other networks. In fact, In-
dosat announced roughly two-thirds of the entire Internet address space [Zmijewski, 2014]. A large
fraction of the hijacked prefixes belonged to Akamai, which is one of the larger Content Delivery
Networks. This event lasted for several hours until approximately 21:15 UTC. Traffic continued to
be delivered; however, the path of the traffic was significantly perturbed.
Global collateral damage of the Telecom Malaysia leak
On June 12, 2015, starting at 08:43 UTC, Telecom Malaysia announced about 179 000 IP pre-
fixes to Level 3 (the largest crossing AS) [Toonk, 2015a]. Level 3 accepted these announcements
and then propagated the routes to their peers and customers around the word. Because Telecom
Malaysia is a customer of Level 3, the routes announced by Telecom Malaysia were identified as a
preferred delivery route for Level 3. At around 10:40 UTC, there were slowly observed improve-
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ments, and by 11:15 UTC the errors in the RIB began to be resolved. Note this was a leak, so the
data were not delivered after being transmitted to Telecom Malaysia.
Large-scale BGP hijack in India
On November 6, 2015, starting at 05:52 UTC, Bharti Airtel Ltd., claimed the ownership of about
16 123 IP prefixes. These prefixes corresponded to more than 2000 unique ASes [Toonk, 2015b].
This event became widespread because two large ASes (e.g., Cogent Communications and GlobeNet
Cabos Submarinos S.A.) accepted and propagated these routes to their peers and customers. Legit-
imate owners of the prefixes included Akamai, Tata Communications, and Apple Inc. This event
lasted until approximately 14:40 UTC.
We summarize the details of the incidents used in this study in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Summary of large-scale routing incidents.
Incident Date Start time End time Duration
Indosat 2014-04-02 18:26 UTC 21:15 UTC ≈ 2.9 h
Telecom Malaysia 2015-06-12 08:43 UTC 11:15 UTC ≈ 2.7 h
Bharti Airtel Ltd. 2015-11-06 05:52 UTC 14:40 UTC ≈ 8.9 h
6.3.1.2 BGP Data
We collected BGP measurement data using BGPStream1. BGPStream provides an open-source
software framework for the analysis of historical and real-time BGP data [Orsini et al., 2016]. To
do so, BGPStream extracts data directly from route collectors. A route collector is a host running
a collector process. The collector emulates a router that establishes BGP peering seasons with real
BGP routers. These collection points are known as vantage points (VPs, hereafter).
A BGP router maintains its reachability information in the Routing Information Base (RIB).
Together, the VPs ideally provide a list of paths between Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs)
of every reachable network. The collection points aggregate data including update messages that
1Available at https://bgpstream.caida.org/
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reflect routes being added or deleted from the RIB. Update messages contain fine granular infor-
mation about routing dynamics [Mazloum et al., 2014], i.e., changes in the paths. By sampling
changes in the routing table of the VPs, collectors can reconstruct RIBs from their peering routers.
This constitutes a partial view of the Internet at the AS-level, i.e., an undirected graph in which
vertices are ASes and the edges are routing links between them.
There are two popular projects running route collectors processes, RouteViews [Meyer, 2004]
and RIPE RIS [RIPE NCC, 2011]. They make dumps available in public archives. At the time
of this writing, they operate 19 and 17 collectors, respectively, which peer with hundreds of VPs
respectively [Gregori et al., 2012]. RouteViews and RIPE RIS collect a RIB dump every two hours
and eight hours, and update dumps every 15 and five minutes, respectively.
BGPStream allows the setup of different parameters in the data collection process. In partic-
ular, it is possible to manipulate the start and end date of data collection, and the specific project
running route collector processes, among other variables. We collected approximately two days of
observations around the start date of each of the incidents in Table 6.1—to gather observations be-
fore, during, and after the selected events. The purpose of collecting data over this time period is to
be able to distinguish between regular and anomalous behavior. In this analysis, we only collected
BGP measurements from the RouteViews project. Previous research has shown that there is a con-
siderable overlap between the measurements from RouteViews and RIPE RIS projects [Chen et al.,
2009]. Thus, it is not expected that by adding observations from RIPE RIS, we are augmenting the
resolution of the observed graphs.
6.3.1.3 AS-Level Graph Representation
We aggregated every possible path in the RIBs among collectors (at a certain time) to build snap-
shots of the Internet topology. The resulting graph topology was constructed from observed paths
derived from BGP updates. For repeated paths among the different collectors, we only consid-
ered one instance of the path. Specifically we modeled the AS-level topologies as graphs with the
following considerations.
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Consider the sequence of n intervals A = {A1,A2, . . . ,An} = {At}nt=1, where
1. At = [at,a ′t) for all t < n and An = [an,a ′n] for t = n; and
2. at < a ′t = at+1 for all t;
An interval represents a fixed-length unit of time, i.e., the granularity at which BGP updates dumps
are collected. In this case, it is 15 minutes, based on the data available from the RouteViews project.
Note that dump times are synchronized among the collectors for each experiment discussed in this
paper. Condition (1) implies that all intervals are left-closed and right-open (except the last one
which includes a ′n). That is, if events at time t are part of one sequence, then only events later than
t are part of the next sequence. It guarantees that the sequence of intervals is disjoint. Condition
(2) implies that intervals are non-empty. Note that a ′t and at+1 represent the time instants of
a transition between intervals. For any interval At, the right endpoint a ′t corresponds to the left
endpoint of the interval At+1. Together with Condition (1), Condition (2) guarantees that the union
of all intervals
⋃n
t=1 At = [a1,a ′n] is a closed interval.
In addition, we let H = {1, 2, . . . ,N} be the set of nodes (e.g., set of ASes). Then, V(t) ⊆ H is
the subset of nodes which interact (i.e., which have an identified path during interval At = [at,a ′t)).
Let E(t) = {eij(t) : i, j ∈ H} be an adjacency matrix of edges eij(t) that captures the existence of
a routing link between node i and node j during interval At. Let the graph G(t) = (V(t),E(t))
represents an undirected graph that captures all interactions that occur from endpoints at to a ′t,
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,n}. The total number of nodes of nodes in G(t) is N(t) = |V(t)|. The sequence
{G(t)}nt=1 denotes the graph series G.
Let Pij(t) be a set of paths between nodes i and j at time interval t. Each path pij(t) ∈ Pij(t) is
a sequence of edges made from nodes from V(t) that forms an undirected path that starts at i and
finishes at j. For example, {(i1, i2), (i2, i3), . . . , (ik−1, ik)} is a path where i1 = i and ik = j, and
each node in the sequence i1, . . . , ik is distinct. Let p∗ij(t) be the shortest (geodesic) path between
nodes i and j at time interval t. Let d∗ij(t) be the length of the shortest path between nodes i and j,
i.e., |p∗ij(t)|.
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Finally, let qi(t) represent the set of neighbors of node i at time t, i.e., qi(t) = {j : eij(t) ∈ E(t)}.
Then, the degree of node i is |qi(t)| and the total number of edges of G(t) is E(t) =
∑
i∈V(t) |qi(t)|.
Using these conditions and this approach, we constructed graphs as each time period. That
allowed us to measure the topological properties of the graph as the anomalies were introduced to
the network, diffused, and then removed.
6.3.1.4 Topological Properties
We measured a set of graph topological properties to study their correlation with very well-known
cases of large-scale Internet disruptions. The selected topological measures are the most relevant
for the understanding of the structure and function of the Internet according to [Edwards et al.,
2012, Haddadi et al., 2008]. We grouped these properties in three different categories: global
structure, path length, and community structure measures.
Table 6.2 summarizes each topological category and their relationships with the structure and
function of the Internet. We discuss the details about these categories below.
Table 6.2: Summary of graph topological properties and its relationship with Internet’s perfor-
mance.
Property Internet effect
Global structure ASes connectivity (importance)
Average path length Routing efficiency
Clustering Peering structure (alternate routes)
Global structure
The global structure of a graph has been used to characterize the state of a graph in a certain
snapshot. In the context of the Internet, it has been shown that these measures are relevant to
understand ISP regulation [Hofmeyr et al., 2013] and the robustness of the Internet [Doyle et al.,
2005].
Number of nodes: This measure corresponds to the number of unique nodes in the graph at a
certain time. In this chapter, we have reported the number of nodes as N(t).
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Number of edges: This measure corresponds to the number of unique edges in the graph at a
certain time. In this chapter, we have reported the number of edges as E(t).
Maximum degree: The degree of a node is the number of edges attached to it. In this chapter, we
report the maximum degree across the nodes in the graph as max{|qi(t)| ∀i ∈ V(t)}.
Path length
The average path length relates to the number of hops between nodes for every possible pair. In the
context of the Internet, it is an important property to study because it relates to the efficient routing
of packets. Although it is known that not all packets travel through the shortest path given com-
mercial agreements, routing efficiency is ultimately influenced by shortest path measures. Here,
we used the average path length, i.e., the mean of the shortest paths between each pair of nodes in
the graph. The shortest path between two nodes belonging to different components is said to be





Community measures relate to the likelihood of finding a group of nodes that are able to form
substructures. In the context of the Internet, it has been shown that community structure is key
to understand the tiered structure of the Internet [Yang and Leskovec, 2014] and its resilience to
both random or targeted removal of nodes [Doyle et al., 2005]. We defined each of the community
structure measures used below.
Average clustering coefficient: The local clustering coefficient of a node i ∈ V(t) quantifies
how close its neighbors are to be connected as well. In particular, the local clustering of node
i is defined as γi(t) =
2|ejk: j,k∈qi(t), ejk=1|
|qi(t)|(|qi(t)|−1)
. In this paper, we reported on the average clustering




Components: A component is a subgraph in which any two pair of nodes are connected to each
other by at least a path. In this paper, we reported on the average size of the components.
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Within each category, we have also made use of group techniques on the vertices to decompose
the graphs into shells—informed by previous empirical observations about the actual structure of
the Internet [Alvarez-Hamelin et al., 2008]. In particular, we tangentially applied k-shell decom-
position to analyze properties from each of the previous described categories.
k-shell decomposition
The k-shell decomposition fragments a graph between core and crust subgraphs respectively. The
k-shell of a node (also called coreness) is a measure of the centrality of the node with respect to its
neighbors. This decomposition technique is an iterative process. It starts from degree k = 1, and in
every step, nodes with similar degree are removed until the nucleus of the graph is revealed—the
maximal k that keeps N(t) larger than zero. The details about this process at time instant t are
described below.
Step 1: Compute the adjacency matrix E(t) and identify nodes with degree k = 1, i.e., {i ∈ V(t) :
|qi(t)| = 1}.
Step 2: Remove all nodes with degree equals to k, i.e., {i ∈ V(k) : |qi(k)| = k}. This results in a
pruned adjacency matrix E ′(t).
Step 3: Compute the degree of each node from the remaining set of nodes. If there are nodes with
degree equals to k, step 2 is repeated—producing a new adjacency matrix E ′(t). Otherwise, return
to step 1 with an increased value of k = k+ 1 and E(t) = E ′(t).
At any given time t, the k-shell is made of all removed nodes (and their respective edges) in a
given degree (step) k. The k-shell decomposition reveals hierarchies of ASes. The subgraph that
is generated from the accumulation of all removed nodes, i.e., in all previous k− 1 shells, is called
the k-crust [Lahav et al., 2016]. In the context of the Internet, the k-crust reveals the periphery
of the AS-level graph. The subgraph that is formed from the remaining graph at any given step
t is called the k-core—the maximum subgraph with minimum degree at least k. In general, the
nucleus (the k-core graph with the largest possible k) of the Internet has been studied with the aim
of understanding the evolution of the Internet [Zhang et al., 2008]. It is worth noting that at the
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end of every k step, new k-shell, k-crust, and k-core subgraphs are produced. More details on this
decomposition method can be found in [Pittel et al., 1996].
Figure 6.1 shows the representation of an Internet map at the AS-level—as of the end of the
second week of May 2017. The visualization algorithm uses weekly updated data from the Route-
Views project. A node’s annotations correspond to the country at which ASes are registered. The
AS that is tagged in Figure 6.1 corresponds to Indiana University (ASN 87)—based on the origin
IP address at which this figure was generated. In addition, the left scale represents the degree of
the nodes (node sizes are scaled with respect to their degree). The right scale represents the k-shell
index of the nodes (hotter colors represent ASes that are more towards the core). This map is
generated according to the algorithm described in [Alvarez-Hamelin et al., 2005]. I include the
Figure 6.1: Graphical representation of the AS-level graph.
schematic illustrating the hypothesis that we test in Figure 6.2 again from Section 1.
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Figure 6.2: A schematic representation of the graph under k-shell decomposition for different
values of shell ks. The AS-level graph under normal conditions is on the left and the same topology
when a BGP hijack is committed is on the right. The hijacker is highlighted with the black hat.
6.4 Results
Our results indicate that the anomalous routing events are correlated to some extent with changes
in some properties in the graph topology generated from the BGP measurements. The main idea
is to examine the structure of the network before, during, and after the three large-scale anomalies.
Topological changes in the network at the AS-level will allow us to test the hypothesis as to whether
dynamic transitions in the network structure can be used as a detection signature of anomalous
Internet routing events.
We report the results based on the analysis of three large-scale routing incidents using BGP
updates from BGPStream. In this section, we have summarized the properties of each reported
time series based on the category to which these belong and the corresponding anomalous routing
incident. Remember that we focus on properties that are related to the structure and the function of
the Internet. These properties produce a single deterministic number when evaluated and are not
distributions.
We used the same visualization conventions for every plot. First, we used open circles when
plotting the raw data. Recall the raw data corresponds to the empirical measures for each graph
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topological property. Second, we used moving average to smooth out short-term fluctuations and
highlight long-term trends in the time series. Solid lines represent the moving average when using
a centered window of 10 observations around each data point. We use a small number for the length
of the rolling window to avoid smoothing the signal aggressively and not being able to pinpoint
the anomalies. Third, we computed the moving standard deviation using similar parameters as
used for the moving average. We highlighted the region comprehended between ± one standard
deviation for each data point in faint red, i.e., the band of statistically significance. Finally, we
highlighted in yellow the beginning and end times of each of the incidents described in Table 6.1.
We marked minor ticks in the time axis to represent intervals of 15 minutes, i.e., the time between
consecutive BGP updates from the RouteViews project.
6.4.1 Global Structure Measures
An Indonesian ISP hijacking the world
Here, we report on the results of centrality measures which illustrate the prominence of ASes.
Figure 6.3 shows the maximum degree of each graph snapshot during the observation period.
From this plot, it is possible to infer that the only significant changes in this measure are for the
graphs captured at April 2, 2014, at 12:00 and April 3, 2014, at 6:00. These discontinuities are
consistent with the ones illustrated in Figures A.1 and A.2 (see Appendix A.1).
Figure 6.4 shows the number of nodes at various k-levels of crust graphs, i.e., k = 1, 10, and the
maximum k possible—the one that encloses the biggest crust of the Internet. As we might expect,
it is not possible to observe significant changes regarding the total number of nodes in this time
series. This suggest that the periphery graph keeps almost the same with respect to the number of
ASes.
Global collateral damage of Telecom Malaysia leak
For this incident, Figure 6.5 shows the maximum degree. As can be seen, the only significant
variations for this property occurs for observations derived at June 11, 2015, at 10:00, and 18:00;
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Figure 6.3: Maximum degree Indonesia event.
Figure 6.4: Nodes per crust Indonesia event.
June 15, 2014, at 00:00, and 18:00; and June 13, 2015, at 00:00, and 8:00. Similarly, for the crust
graphs, we computed the number of nodes as is shown in Figure 6.6. We did not observe significant
variations in the number of nodes that is in the largest crust.
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Figure 6.5: Maximum degree Malaysia event.
Figure 6.6: Nodes per crust Malaysia event.
Large scale BGP hijack in India
For the Indian incident, we tracked of the same properties we did for the Indonesian and Malaysian
incidents. In particular, Figure 6.7 shows the maximum degree for each graph snapshot during the
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observation period. As in the previous cases, there are some discontinuities in the time series.
The discontinuities are evident in November 5, 2015, at 10:00, 12:00, 14:00, 16:00, 18:00, 20:00,
22:00; and November 6, 2015, at 00:00, 02:00, 04:00, and 06:00. In particular, the discontinuity
on November 6, 2015 at 4:00 is more stronger. This suggests that the node with most connections
in the graph suddenly decreases its degree—which is remarkable given that it happens almost two
hours before the anomaly was reported by other BGP monitoring projects, e.g., BGPmon.net and
Dyn Research. Similarly, Figure 6.8 shows the number of nodes in the crust subgraphs. This
measure does not reveal significant changes during the observation period.
Figure 6.7: Maximum degree India event.
6.4.2 Path Length
An Indonesian ISP hijacking the world
Figure 6.9 shows the average path length for each graph snapshot during the Indonesia incident,
i.e., for different values of k in the crust. In particular, we observed that the average path length
seems to be altered based on the value of k being analyzed. However, there are no observations
120
Figure 6.8: Nodes per crust India event.
outside the band of statistically significance. For a value of k = 10 this measure tends to decrease
in agreement with the discontinuities noticed in Figure A.1, for a bigger crust graph—the whole
graph without the nucleus of the network—this measure tends to increase. This is an important ob-
servation given that these properties are directly related with the routing efficiency and the number
of alternative routes to reach different networks. This might be expected in the case of a disruption
of service observed in these types of events.
Global collateral damage of Telecom Malaysia leak
Figure 6.10 shows the average path length measure over different crust subgraphs for the Malaysia
incident. As for the Indonesian incident, relative changes in this measure over the crust depends
on the k value being analyzed, i.e., the average path length decreased for a value of k = 10, but it
increased for the the largest generated subgraph. Note however that these variations are not outside
the band of statistically significance.
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Figure 6.9: Average path length in the crust Indonesia event.
Figure 6.10: Average path length in the crust Malaysia event.
Large scale BGP hijack in India
Similar to Figures 6.9 and 6.10, Figure 6.11 shows a changing pattern in the average path length
depending on the crust being analyzed. These changes correlated with the abrupt discontinuities
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illustrated in Figure 6.7, but not outside the band of statistically significance.
Figure 6.11: Average path length in the crust India event.
6.4.3 Community Structure
An Indonesian ISP hijacking the world
Community structure measures provide a sense of how clustered are nodes in a graph. This is
relevant when studying how disruption in the grouping between ASes can be an indicator of an
anomalous event. Figure A.10 shows the average clustering coefficient of the graph snapshots
during the period of study. This measure seems to be stable during the observation period except
for the discontinuities around the same time as we observed before in the centrality and average
path length measurements.
We then looked at the average clustering coefficient in the core and crust subgraphs for different
values of k in Figures A.11 and 6.12. It is worth nothing that—in advance—of the reported times
of the incidents, it is possible to observe some disruptions in the clustering measure for both core
and crust subgraphs. More interestingly, Figure 6.13 shows the average size of the components for
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the crust subgraphs. There are abrupt changes in the mean size of these components during the
observation period, suggesting reallocation of ASes across the multiple shells. Note however that
these observations are not outside the band of statistically significance.
Figure 6.12: Clustering per crust Indonesia event.
Global collateral damage of Telecom Malaysia leak
For the Malaysian incident, Figure A.12, shows the average clustering coefficient for the whole
graph—with no k-shell decomposition applied yet. Discontinuities in the signal are observed in
correspondence with the same behavior exhibited for other structural properties measured at the
general graph, e.g., Figure A.4. We also studied the patterns in the number of nodes in the core
and crust subgraphs. Figures A.13 and 6.14 shows the variability in these patterns. They seem
to coincide with previous illustrated discontinuities for the whole graph snapshots. Figure 6.15
shows the mean number of nodes in the graph components of the crust subgraphs. Variations in
this property are not as much evident as for the case of the Indonesian incident.
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Figure 6.13: Average size components crust Indonesia event.
Figure 6.14: Clustering per crust Malaysia event.
Large scale BGP hijack in India
Finally, for the Indian incident, we report similar metrics in the clustering measurements as for
previous anomalous events. Figure A.14 shows the time series of the average clustering coefficient.
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Figure 6.15: Average size components crust Malaysia event.
In general, the signal has discontinuities in accordance with centrality measures plots. Figures A.15
and 6.16 capture the same property for core and crust subgraphs. It is of interest that for both—
core and crust—measurements, there is a significant reduction in the clustering even under the
presence of discontinuities as noticed in the case of centrality measures. Finally, the time series in
Figure 6.17 confirms this observation—when it is observed continuous disruption in the average
size of components during the observation period.
6.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the applicability of a different approach, one that uses
graph mining to the challenge of identifying BGP anomalies. In doing this we consider inputs from
the dynamic representation of the AS-level graph. We found some value in examining the robust-
ness of AS-level graph properties in terms of early warning of incidents. A solution that focuses
on the monitoring of the dynamic evolution of the AS-level graph may help detect anomalies that
are not yet evident using traditional control- and data-plane measurements. In the k-shell decom-
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Figure 6.16: Clustering per crust India event.
Figure 6.17: Average size components crust India event.
position, we have identified a method that is a complement to the current control- and data-plane
anomaly detection approaches.
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We are not proposing a product for technology transfer nor a real-time demonstration system.
Instead this we present a promising methodological approach, identify the arguments of why it
may be applicable, and then test the approach in three case studies.
To find the most useful properties to study control-plane anomalies, we used the k-shell de-
composition of the AS-level graphs. Empirically, we noticed that both the core and the crust (for
various k-levels) of these representations change, in some cases, more dramatically than in others.
This is particularly of interest when considering the origin of the hijacks. Specifically, previous
researchers have noted that the majority and more harmful attacks are orchestrated from peripheral
ASes [Lad et al., 2007]. During the anomalous events, the incorrect routing information shifts the
AS that is the source of the anomalous information from crust to core, as revealed in the k-shell
decomposition.
We used centrality, average path length, and clustering properties in this dynamic analysis of
the AS-level graph. We characterized the network before and after the anomalies (i.e., in the
absence and presence of each anomaly). The properties of the decomposed crust and core graphs
remain relatively constant without the anomaly. Then there is a sudden change in the crust graph
immediately before each of the anomalies we examined were detected. Note however that these
changes, although before the reported incidents, are not statistically significant.
Several factors can contribute to the difference in time at which we notice changes in the
structural properties (with respect to the time announced by other researchers). First, there is a
matter of sampling involved in the generation of the graphs. We use publicly available data that
may have missing links; in particular, links between customers may be underrepresented [Oliveira
et al., 2010].
It is worth noting that the presented characterization relies exclusively on the BGP data cap-
tured by the RouteViews project. That means that the characterized AS-level graph might not
entirely represent the routing infrastructure at the moment of sampling. This is because route in-
formation does not necessarily take into account effective changes in the IP network ownership
or commercial relationships between network operators. Thus, effective network routing changes
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are not necessarily captured by the routers. This may cause a lack of precision when mapping
the AS-level graph, and thus, the characterization of structural network properties derived from
the graph. This may influence the accuracy of our construction of the graph from the AS-level
topology. In addition, the study that we perform in this paper is based on the effect of a large-scale
events. Therefore, it will be interesting to evaluate if the current approach also applies for other
hijack events in which there are fewer number of IP prefixes compromised.
Another important factor to consider is the differentiation between changes in the topological
properties when there is an incident and when there is not. The results of the research reported
in this chapter illustrate that while some incidents can be detected, the method can not reliably
distinguish the presence of an incident from its absence. Specifically, we noticed that even after the
occurrence of incidents, there are changes in the properties of clustering coefficient and path length
when we examined the graphs at different shells of the k-shell decomposition. Our explanation for
this behavior is that the dynamics of BGP updates are busier independent if there are large-scale
incidents of not. This explanation is supported by the findings in [Wang et al., 2002, Li et al.,
2007]. This is important because our analysis in this chapter relies on processing BGP update’s
data. If there are many changes in the graphs (given a high number of updates) even in regular
circumstances, then is going to be a major challenge to distinguish between benign and malicious
dynamics.
Given that the analysis relies on assumptions concerning the generation of the observed data,
the conclusions are also based on that data. Timing and scope are both issues in data compilation. It
might be the case that the data is incomplete or delayed which would impinge our analysis. These
considerations are important when trying to compare the effectiveness of the proposed approach
with the traditional ones discussed above.
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7 Bursty Announcements for Early Detection of BGP Routing Anomalies1




In this chapter, we propose a method for detecting large-scale Internet disruptions by analyzing the
burstiness of BGP announcements. Our method tests the hypothesis that in order to perturb large
parts of the Internet, before the incidents occur, the perpetrator will necessarily begin sending BGP
announcement messages in a bursty manner, i.e., they occur in groups of relatively high frequency,
followed by periods of infrequent activity. To do so, we propose an algorithm and show that for
three large-scale incidents: the Indosat hijacking event in April 2014, the Telecom Malaysia leak
in June 2015, and the Bharti Airtel Ltd, it is possible to provide early detection of them using
measures from a technically diverse set of Internet’s collector infrastructure.
7.2 Problem
The Internet, although extremely robust [Doyle et al., 2005], is notoriously vulnerable to attack
by means of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [Butler et al., 2010]. BGP exchange messages
are assumed to be trustworthy. In other words, the reachability information shared between au-
tonomous systems (ASes) is assumed to be correct without any verification. Despite the fact that
1The content of this chapter was submitted for review [Moriano et al., 2019b] at SIGCOMM in col-
laboration with Raquel Hill and L. Jean Camp. Pablo Moriano is the primary researcher and made all the
analysis and figures therein.
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the latest version of the BGP protocol was released in 2006 [Rekhter et al., 2006], there are no
inherent protection mechanisms against participants advertising false routes.
In practice, BGP lacks authentication mechanisms not only for the announcement of the origin
of IP prefixes but also the paths to that prefix. This leaves BGP vulnerable to unintended misconfig-
uration and malicious attacks [Goldberg, 2014]. The results of these disruptions include (i) traffic
blackholing and (ii) interception. In traffic blackholing, the network traffic is dropped, never reach-
ing its destination [Dyn Guest Blogs, 2008]. In traffic interception, the announcing AS reroutes
traffic for the victim IP prefix and redirects it to the original origin AS after interception [Dyn Guest
Blogs, 2013]. On this misdirected route, the traffic may be subject to eavesdropping [Arnbak and
Goldberg, 2015], traffic analysis [Sun et al., 2015], or tampering [Shaw, 2013].
Well-known examples of BGP anomalies include the China Telecom hijack in 2010 [Hiran
et al., 2013], the targeted interception of U.S. Internet traffic through Iceland and Belarus in
2013 [Peterson, 2013], and the large Indonesia ISP hijack in 2014 [Zmijewski, 2014, Toonk, 2014].
During the China incident, a routing update caused a large fraction of the world’s Internet traffic
(approximately 50,000 IP prefixes) to be redirected to China Telecom. This constitutes a very
well-known example of a blackhole. A more recent incident was initiated by Indonesia’s largest
communication provider, Indosat. This incident was even larger than the China Telecom incident.
The Indonesian ISP hijacked more than 320,000 routes. This means that Indosat laid claim to
roughly two-thirds of the Internet for almost three hours. These were all identified only the after
widespread diffusion of the incorrect routing information.
The current approaches to the challenges of routing anomalies rely on (i) cryptographic au-
thentication or (ii) anomaly detection. Cryptographic protocols include the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [Lepinski and Kent, 2012] for origin authentication, and BGPSec [Lepinski
and Sriram, 2017] which offers the ability to authenticate an entire path. These approaches are
powerful, but there has not been widespread adoption [Gill et al., 2011]. This may be because of
processor requirements, memory requirements, or a lack of incentive alignment [Hall et al., 2014].
Cryptographic solutions are also expensive. Perhaps more importantly, it has been shown that even
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with their widespread adoption, it will be not possible to avoid the occurrence of route leaks, such
as the Malaysian incident in 2015 [Toonk, 2015a, Madory, 2015b].
Anomaly detection approaches rely on measuring the control-plane (using BGP feeds) or the
data-plane (exploring reachability of IP addresses in suspicious announced routes), or a combina-
tion of both. Anomaly detection does not require changes in the protocol itself. They primarily are
used in detecting anomalies based on passive or active measurements in order to alert operators for
mitigation and response [Shi et al., 2012, Khare et al., 2012, Toonk, Zhang et al., 2010]. Anomaly
detection approaches are reactive because they identify harm after disruptive updates have polluted
some detectable threshold of ASes with fake announcements.
Here we propose a detection method that aims to identify incipient incidents before diffusion
and harm, by identifying a routing event as it emerges. Our goal is to identify events several hours
prior to the state-of-the-art detection method, BGPmon [Toonk]. To do this, we use control-plane
data collected by the RouteViews [Meyer, 2004] and served by BGPStream [Orsini et al., 2016].
The key observation in our anomaly detection method is that there are bursty BGP announce-
ments before new routes are adopted by neighbor ASes. We characterize bursty announcements
through statistical analysis of inter-arrival times. We conduct a case-based systematic analysis of
the changes of inter-arrival times that are associated with three well-known anomalous events.
7.3 Methods
To provide early indicators of large-scale disruptions, we leverage the statistic-based anomaly de-
tection method SRI NIDES used in the intrusion detection context [Javitz and Valdes, 1993]. Es-
sentially, our method considers route announcements as signals with expected patterns of behavior
and detects deviations from the expected patterns. Our focus is on inter-arrival times rather than
the specific content of the announcements themselves. Claiming illegitimate ownership of a signif-
icant fraction of the Internet requires transmitting correspondingly bursty announcements causing




We compiled BGP updates (announcements and withdrawals) using BGPStream2. Update times-
tamp accuracy is one second. BGPStream provides an open-source software framework for the
analysis of historical and real-time BGP data [Orsini et al., 2016]. To do so, BGPStream ex-
tracts data directly from route collectors. A route collector (collector, hereafter) is a host running
a collector process. The collector emulates a router that establishes BGP peering sessions with
BGP routers. These collection points are real—actual operating routers known as feeders. There
are two popular projects running route collector processes, RouteViews [Meyer, 2004] and RIPE
RIS [RIPE NCC, 2011].
At the time of this writing, RouteViews and RIPE RIS operate 22 and 23 collectors which
peer with hundreds of feeders [Gregori et al., 2012]. We acknowledge that there are other sources
of BGP data, including network operators, other route collector projects such as BGPmon [Yan
et al., 2009] (from Colorado State University3), and Packet Clearing House [House]. However,
previous research has shown that there is a considerable overlap between the measurements from
RouteViews and RIPE RIS projects [Chen et al., 2009]. In addition, as pointed out in [Gregori
et al., 2015], RouteViews provides the more complete view of the Internet in terms of IP prefix
coverage. Therefore, we only collected BGP updates from RouteViews.
7.3.1.2 Routing Anomalous Events
Our data collection is based on a subset of BGP updates that cover the time before, during, and after
selected incidents. We collected approximately seven days of observations around the start date
of each of them. The purpose of collecting data over this time period is to be able to distinguish
between regular and anomalous behavior. We consider these exceptional routing incidents because
2Available at https://bgpstream.caida.org/
3This refer to the free BGP monitoring service available at https://www.bgpmon.io/
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of their impact to the Internet, the sheer number of prefixes, and the fact that these incidents have
not previously received detailed academic analysis so that we could not know their patterns of
diffusion in advance. Details about the incidents and their respective dates and times are listed
below. Events are listed in chronological order. Note that these anomalous events have been
studied and corroborated from different sources. To summarize:
An Indonesian ISP hijacks the world. On April 2, 2014, starting at 18:26 UTC, Indosat (one of
the largest telecommunications providers in Indonesia) announced more than 320, 000 IP prefixes
belonging to other networks. Indosat announced roughly two-thirds of the entire Internet address
space [Zmijewski, 2014, Toonk, 2014]. A large fraction of the hijacked prefixes belonged to Aka-
mai, which is one of the larger Content Delivery Networks. This incident lasted approximately for
2.9 hours until 21:15 UTC. Traffic continued to be delivered; however, the path of the traffic was
significantly altered.
Global collateral damage of the Telecom Malaysia leak. On June 12, 2015, starting at 08:43
UTC, Telecom Malaysia announced about 179, 000 IP prefixes to Level 3 (the largest crossing
AS) [Toonk, 2015a, Madory, 2015b]. Level 3 accepted these announcements and then propagated
the routes to their peers and customers around the word. Because Telecom Malaysia is a customer
of Level 3, the routes announced by Telecom Malaysia were identified as a preferred delivery route
for Level 3. This event caused a significant packet loss and Internet service degradation around the
world. Level 3 suffered a significant blackout from the Asia pacific region and the rest of the world.
Note this was a leak, so the data were not delivered after being transmitted to Telecom Malaysia.
This incident lasted approximately 2.7 hours. At around 10:40 UTC there were slowly observed
improvements, and by 11:15 UTC the errors in the Routing Information Base (RIB) [Rekhter et al.,
2006] began to be resolved.
Large scale BGP hijack in India. On November 6, 2015, starting at 05:52 UTC, Bharti Airtel
Ltd., claimed the ownership of about 16, 123 IP prefixes. These addresses corresponded to more
than two thousand unique ASes [Toonk, 2015b, Murphy, 2015]. This event became widespread
because two large ASes (e.g., Cogent Communications and GlobeNet Cabos Submarinos S.A.) ac-
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cepted and propagated these routes to their peers and customers. Legitimate owners of the prefixes
included Akamai, Tata Communications, and Apple Inc. This incident lasted approximately 8.9
hours until 14:40 UTC.
7.3.2 Burstiness of Announcements
Let XA→B = {XA→B(t)}, t = 0, 1, . . . ,N be a time series of time-stamped announcements sent by
AS A and received by collector B. Let τA→B be a random variable that represents the time interval
between consecutive announcements so that τA→B takes values in {XA→B(1)−XA→B(0),XA→B(2)−
XA→B(1), . . . ,XA→B(N)−XA→B(N− 1)}. Burstiness refers to the tendency of certain events to oc-
cur in groups of relatively high frequency, i.e., short inter-arrival time intervals, followed by periods
of relatively infrequent events [Harang and Kott, 2017]. Mathematically, it can be characterized
by analyzing the inter-arrival time distribution P(τA→B). As was proposed in [Goh and Barabási,
2008], the inter-arrival distribution can be characterized by a burstiness factor defined by B = σ−μσ+μ .
Here σ and μ denote the standard deviation and mean of the inter-arrival time distribution. Note
that the burstiness has a value of −1 for σ = 0, which means regular time intervals. It has a value
of 0 for σ = μ in the case of random time intervals. Finally, it has a value of 1 for σ → ∞ and a
finite μ in the case of a highly bursty time series of announcements.
7.3.3 Detection Method
We leverage the measure of inter-arrival times as received by the collectors to compute a measure
of intensity based on the burstiness of announcements. This measure was originally used in the
context of intrusion detection in [Javitz and Valdes, 1993]. Let QA→B be the number of announce-
ments sent by AS A and received by collector B exponentially weighted. This means that more
current announcements have a greater impact in its computation, i.e., short inter-arrival times. The
value of QA→B is computed using the recursive formula
QA→B(t) = 1+ 2−rΔQA→B(t− 1). (7.1)
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Here r is the decay factor and Δ = XA→B(t) − XA→B(t − 1) is the inter-arrival time between
consecutive announcements. The decay factor r determines the half-life of QA→B(t). Large values
of r imply that the value of QA→B(t) is more influenced by more recent announcements. Smaller
values of r imply that the value of QA→B(t) will be more heavily influenced by announcements
in the distant past. Detection focuses on identifying observations in the time series of QA→B,
for which its value exceeds a threshold that is a function of the mean and standard deviation.
We use the moving average and moving standard deviation as the mean and standard deviation
estimators respectively. The parameter ω is the window length in the moving average model.
The parameter δ controls how many standard deviations are considered to report an event. The
complete pseudocode for the detection algorithm can be found in below.
Algorithm 5 Event-Detection (XA→B, r, ω, δ)
1: QA→B ← {}  Number of announcements
2: for t in XA→B do
3: QA→B ← QA→B ∪ {1+ 2−rΔQA→B(t− 1)} using eq. (7.1)
4: end for
5: Ψ ← moving average(QA→B,ω)
6: Σ ← moving std(QA→B,ω)
7: Ê ← {}
8: for t in {0, 1, . . . ,N} do
9: if QA→B(t) >= (Ψ(t) + δΣ(t)) then





In this section, we analyze the previously described BGP incidents. We analyzed the views from
several data collectors at various locations around the world. Table 7.1 shows the geographical
location and the date of the first dump of the collectors used in this study4. We analyzed BGP
announcements and withdrawals, but the withdrawals did not effect our results, perhaps in part
because the volume of withdrawals is significantly less [Wang et al., 2002, Lad et al., 2003, Desh-
pande et al., 2004]. Our results presented here include only announcements.
4Collectors’ location and date of the first dump were obtained from RouteViews and BGPStream respec-
tively.
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Table 7.1: Geographical location and date of first dump of collectors. Collectors are ordered in
alphabetical order.
Collector name Location First dump
route-views.chicago Chicago, IL, US 2016-06-28 12:00
route-views.eqix Ashburn, VA, US 2004-05-17 13:59
route-views.isc Palo Alto, CA, US 2003-11-27 02:00
route-views.jinx Johannesburg, ZA 2012-07-10 00:00
route-views.kixp Nairobi, KE 2005-10-07 15:44
route-views.linx London, GB 2004-03-16 13:45
route-views.nwax Portland, OR, US 2014-03-20 20:52
route-views.perth Perth, AU 2012-11-15 21:48
route-views.saopaulo Sao Paulo, BR 2011-03-17 16:19
route-views.sfmix San Francisco, CA, US 2015-04-14 20:00
route-views.sg Singapore, SG 2014-06-04 15:44
route-views.soxrs Belgrade, RS 2014-01-01 00:00
route-views.sydney Sydney, AU 2010-08-14 02:00
route-views.telxatl Atlanta, GA, US 2012-02-02 22:46
route-views.wide Tokyo, JP 2003-07-01 21:29
route-views2 Eugene, OR, US 2001-10-26 16:48
route-views3 Eugene, OR, US 2013-11-25 10:00
route-views4 Eugene, OR, US 2008-11-28 09:53
route-views6 Eugene, OR, US 2003-05-03 12:29
We conduct four different but complementary analyses. First, we monitor the dynamic behavior
of the number of feeders peering with each collector. To this end, we perform a longitudinal
analysis that spans over 17 years to quantify the trends in contribution of feeders to the collectors.
This analysis shows the time when some collectors started attracting or being disconnected from
some feeders—we relied on the number of routers for this. A large number of feeders produces a
robust view of Internet activity. This indicates the time-frame when collectors could construct a
representative view of Internet activity. This analysis is complementary to the works in [Gregori
et al., 2012, 2015] that focused on a single month of observations and other works [Wang et al.,
2002, Li et al., 2007, Deshpande et al., 2004, Zhang et al., 2004] that analyze a stream of BGP
updates as seen from a single collector.
Second, we show how each of the large-scale incidents is perceived from the point of view
of the different collectors. To do so, we measure the number of announcements received by the
collectors before, during, and after the incident. We study how announcements vary based on the
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number of feeders into a particular collector. We found that the incident can be viewed more clearly
from those collectors with more feeders. This is particularly true for collectors in North America
and Europe. Some collectors are unable to detect the incident because, with a small number of
feeders, the collector is unable to construct a robust view of the Internet. This is a result of the
low number of feeders peering with the collectors, as exemplified in the case of several African
countries [Gregori et al., 2017].
Third, we analyze the inter-arrival times of announcements at the collectors. We character-
ize these with a measure of burstniess used previously for studying human dynamics in [Goh and
Barabási, 2008, Barabási, 2005]. This allows us to quantify the burstiness of announcements be-
fore, during, and after the incidents. We show that ASes involved in the reported incidents exhibit
a statistically significant change in the inter-arrival pattern of their BGP announcements at the col-
lectors. We show that for early detection of BGP incidents, the volume of messages is not enough
for incident detection. In contrast, the burstiness of the announcements sent by ASes and seen for
a specific collector is a complementary discriminator to the volume of announcements and helps
identify anomalous behavior. More importantly, we show that changes in burstiness occur several
hours before the incidents were reported in practice.
Fourth, we propose a method for detecting anomalous announcements based on quantifying
the burstiness of announcements that are received by the collectors. This allows us to characterize
the distinguishing features that occur before the incidents. Given these distinguishing features, we
introduce a detection algorithm and evaluate its effectiveness using real-stream data obtained from
collectors during the incidents.
7.4.1 Feeder Contribution Analysis
To quantify the number of feeders peering with each collector, we parse RIB dumps of each collec-
tor and count the number of unique peering routers. We counted the number of unique routers on
the first day of each month at noon for 195 consecutive months from October 2001 to December
2017. This allowed us to study the evolution of the number of feeders per collector.
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Figure 7.1 shows the time series of the number of feeders based on the number of routers. We
see that, in general, that there is an increase in feeders over time. In particular, route-views.linx,
route-views.saopaulo, and route-views4 report the highest number of feeders by the end of the
observation period. Conversely, route-views.kixp, route-views.soxrs, and route-views.wide show a
significantly lower number of feeders, confirming the recent findings by Gregori et al. in [Gregori
et al., 2017].
There are also some collectors with fluctuations in this time period. In particular, the number of
peering routers seems to decrease by mid 2016 for route-views.saopaulo and route-views4. Despite
this, even more importantly, route-views4 has the highest feeder count. This is important to our
work because the capacity to detect the incidents depends on collectors having a robust view of
the Internet so that they may construct an accurate baseline. Therefore, collectors need to have a
minimum number of feeders to be able to see the incident.
Figure 7.1: Time series of the number of routers peering with collectors. Collectors are ordered in
alphabetical order. Major ticks correspond to nine-month intervals while minor ticks correspond
to one-month intervals.
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7.4.2 Collectors’ Disruption Perception
We show observations during a seven-day period around the occurrence of the incidents. These
are highlighted in the plot between the two vertical dashed lines as reported by the state-of-the-
art BGP anomaly detection system BGPmon [Toonk]. We ranked the collectors in decreasing
order by the number of feeders. We show the view from the four collectors with the highest
number of feeders. Note that the events are observable by analyzing the view of the four collectors
before the incidents were reported by leading third-party services including as Oracle Dyn and
BGPmon respectively [Zmijewski, 2014, Toonk, 2014].For the remaining collectors please refer to
Appendix B.1.
Indosat incident. Figure 7.2 shows the number of announcements received from the AS respon-
sible for the incident, i.e., AS 4761. This incident is perceived differently at each collector. The
incident is almost unnoticeable for collectors with a low number of feeders (route-views.soxrs,
route-views.perth, and route-views.kixp with 2, 3 and 3 feeders respectively). For the other collec-
tors, two things happen. First, there is a significant increase in the number of received announce-
ments. This increase is almost four orders of magnitude in the majority of the cases. Second, the
frequency at which the announcements are received is higher than other announcements that are
not close to the occurrence of the incident, i.e., around the highlighted region. This last observa-
tion implies shorter inter-arrival times in the proximity of the incident. It is worth noting that for
the collectors which received announcements, this striking behavior is perceived almost four hours
before the incident.
Telecom Malaysia incident. Figure 7.3 shows the number of announcements received by every
collector, recall the originator is AS 4788. Some collectors observe an increase in burstiness in
announcements received prior to the incident. The number of announcements increases up to four
orders of magnitude. Even more importantly, these announcements occur highly intermittently
and frequently. As in the case of the Indonesia incident, some collectors did not see the behavior
that we are describing, e.g., route-views.sorxs and route-views.kixp, with two and four feeders
respectively. Note that this pattern of behavior occurs almost three hours before the incident was
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Figure 7.2: Time series of the number of announcements from AS 4761 that collectors received
before, during, and after the Indosat incident in 2014 for the top four collectors. Major ticks
correspond to six-hour intervals while minor ticks correspond to two-hour intervals.
detected.
Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident. Figure 7.4 shows the number of AS 9498 announcements received
by the collectors. As with Indonesia and Malaysia, the incident is seen more clearly from some
collectors than from others, and from some not at all. For collectors where the incident would have
been detectable, the number of announcements increases up to five orders of magnitude. Note that
the the bursty behavior of the announcements right before the incident is less intense than in the
previous cases. Again, this burstiness is clearly noticeable several minutes before the incident was
detected on the network.
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Figure 7.3: Time series of the number of announcements from AS 4788 that collectors received
before, during, and after the Telecom Malaysia incident in 2015.
7.4.3 Inter-Arrival Time Analysis
There is both a significant increase in the number of arrivals of announcements before the incident
(see Section 7.4.2) and a dramatic increase in the frequency at which these announcements are
received by the collectors. The following analysis reveals that the inter-arrival time of announce-
ments as seen by the collectors exhibits a significant degree of burstiness. To ground the results, we
first analyze the joint distribution of activity of each AS based on the burstiness (horizontal axis)
and the number of announcements (vertical axis) during one full day of measurements around the
incident. Collectors are ranked in decreasing order by number of feeders. We provide details for
the top four collectors in this work. To assure an accurate assessment of burstiness, we only con-
sider ASes that sent more than 100 announcements during this time interval [Kim and Jo, 2016].
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Figure 7.4: Time series of the number of announcements from AS 9498 that collectors received
before, during, and after the Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident in 2015.
We marked with “squares” the ASNs of the top five ASes based on CAIDA’s customer cone size
ranking [cai, 2018], i.e., AS 3356, AS 1299, AS 174, AS 2914, AS 3257. They provide a base-
line for comparison. We mark with a “star” the ASN that was responsible for the incident. The
dark cells indicate a high concentration of ASes with a characteristic burstiness and number of
announcements.
Second, we test if the apparent effect is real or is it due to chance. In particular, we apply a
Monte Carlo test in which the null hypothesis is that ASes send announcements in a bursty manner
even during times where there is no evidence of a BGP incidents. For this analysis, we collected
time series of announcements over a full day of observations where no BGP incidents have been
detected. One hundred of these random time series were compiled for each collector for the top
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five ASes (again based on CAIDA’s customer cone size ranking) and the AS involved in each
incident. In each of these 100 time series, we compute the ASes associated burstiness. Here we
provide the results for the top four collectors based on the number of feeders, again with data and
details for the other collectors available upon request. For the remaining collectors please refer to
Appendix B.2.
Indosat incident. Figure 7.5 shows that during the incident, most of the ASes have a burstiness that
is below 0.90 (the 93th percentile) and produce fewer than 106 announcements (the 97th percentile).
There are dashed lines on these percentiles. Note that the AS represented by the star (i.e., Indosat)
has the highest burstiness. Note also that those ASes in the second quadrant (with more than
106 announcements) have a considerable number of announcements but lower burstiness (i.e., AS
27738, AS 9829, AS 53062, AS 36998, AS 29571). These ASes appear consistently among the
different collectors but were not reported to be involved in the incident. Conversely, those ASes in
the fourth quadrant show high burstiness, but the number of announcements is not significant (i.e.,
AS 7629, AS 61125, AS 9497, AS 132045). We found that those ASes are not neighbors of Indosat
(corroborated through [cai, 2018]) nor involved in the incident. This empirical finding reveals
that although the volume of announcements increases for different ASes during the incident, the
actual AS involved in the incident has a distinct burstiness pattern that starts several hours before
the incident was reported. This observation is complementary to the works in [Lad et al., 2003,
Deshpande et al., 2004] in which a significant increase in the volume of announcements is used as
a detection signature, as well as illustrating the benefit of including a measure of burstiness.
Figure 7.6 shows notched box plots comparing the burstiness calculated from different col-
lectors for the baseline ASes and the AS involved in the incident (the last one) under the null
hypothesis. Notched box plots have a contraction around the median whose height is statistically
important. When notches of the boxes overlap, there is not a statistically significant difference
between the medians. In this case, these plots illustrate that the burstiness of each of the ASes
under study are not significantly different when there is no incident. However, the observation
highlighted with the cross corresponds to the test statistic for the observations derived during the
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Figure 7.5: Joint distribution based on the the burstiness (horizontal axis) and number of announce-
ments (vertical axis) during one day interval around the Indosat incident.
interval of the incident. As can be seen, for collectors receiving announcements from the AS
involved in the incident, this observation lays outside the region of statistical indistinguishably.
This suggests that the burstiness during the incident is statistically significant different, and it is
unlikely that such values would be observed under random conditions. This argument reinforces
the argument that the volume of announcements is a necessary but not sufficient feature for early
detection of large-scale BGP incidents (see Fig. 7.5). High burstiness is a distinctive feature in
these incidents.
Telecom Malaysia incident. Figure 7.7 shows that the AS involved in the incident has a dis-
tinct characterization in the distribution, i.e., AS 4788. It has both high burstiness and number of
announcements. Most of the ASes have a burstiness that is below 0.90 (the 99th percentile) and
produce less than 106 announcements (the 99th percentile). Note that there are ASes that sent a
high number of announcements and do not have high burstiness compared to Telecom Malasya
(those in the second quadrant), e.g., AS 9892, AS 9829, AS 9583. These ASes were not involved
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Figure 7.6: Monte Carlo test for burstiness. Last column corresponds to the observations of the AS
responsible for the incident, AS 4761. The test statistic, the burstiness observed during the interval
of the attack, is marked with a cross.
with the incident nor are they neighbors of Telecom Malaysia. Conversely, the ASes in the fourth
quadrant have higher burstiness but fewer announcements compared to Telecom Malaysia, e.g.,
AS 28681, AS 10208, AS 8402, AS 45209. These are not neighbors of Telecom Malaysia but
there is no evidence of malicious updates coming from them.
Figure 7.8 shows the distribution of burstiness computed over 100 samples of random one day
intervals. The burstiness of Telecom Malaysia is highlighted with the cross. This figure shows that
the burstiness of the AS that was involved in the incident is statistically significantly larger when
compared to its own normal behavior (e.g., baseline and null comparisons).
Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident. Figure 7.9 shows that the burstiness of AS 9498 is not as high
as the burstiness of the perpetrators of the incidents in Indonesia and Malaysia. Here most of
the ASes have a burstiness that is below 0.90 (the 99th percentile) and produce fewer than 106
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Figure 7.7: Joint distribution based on the total number of announcements and their burstiness
during one day interval around the Telecom Malaysia incident.
announcements (the 99th percentile). However, for the majority of the collectors, Bharti Airtel sent
a large number of announcements that placed it in the second quadrant. However, there are other
ASes in the second quadrant, e.g., AS 262949, AS 9829, AS 36408, AS 28573, AS 21669. From
these, AS 9829 and AS 36408 are customers of AS 9498. Conversely, we find that AS 394104, AS
11139, AS 133722, and AS 42040 have high burstiness and relatively fewer announcements, but
they are not neighbors of AS 9498 nor involved with the incident.
Figure 7.10 shows the Monte Carlo test for AS 9498 and the top ranked five ASes. We observe
that the burstiness of AS 9498 is at the boundary of the distribution but not as significant as in the
Indonesia and Malaysia cases. This reflects the fact that for this incident, announcements were less
bursty. They are significant when compared with the normal behavior of AS 9498.
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Figure 7.8: Monte Carlo test for burstiness. The last column corresponds to the observations of the
AS responsible for the incident, AS 4788.
7.4.4 Anomaly Detection
The main idea of our anomaly detection method relies on profiling the expected behavior of a signal
and then detecting deviations from the expected pattern. To do so, we rely on the measure of bursti-
ness of announcements as perceived by the collectors. Analyzing the volume of announcements
can be misleading, and adding the measure of burstiness has two advantages. A high volume of
announcements may be caused by BGP session resets and other vendor specific behaviors [Wang
et al., 2002]. It enables earlier detection of anomalies and decreases the number of candidates to
be examined as potential anomalies (e.g., quadrant two in Figs. 7.5, 7.7, 7.9).
To evaluate burstiness, we compute the time series QA→B for each incident, based on equa-
tion (7.1). The solid line represents the value of QA→B(t) for each arriving unique announcement
message at time t. In accordance with previous studies in [Zhang et al., 2004, Labovitz et al.,
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Figure 7.9: Joint distribution based on the total number of announcements and their burstiness
during the one day interval around the Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident.
2000], we verify that most of inter-arrival times of announcements are less than 300 seconds (the
99th percentile for most of the collectors). We then use 300 seconds as the half-life value to cap-
ture most of routing dynamics. Then the decay factor is set to be r = 1/300. Each horizontal gray
band represents one standard deviation from the moving average using the same window length.
We use ω = 20 as the estimator for the window length because it is the lowest value that reduces
the mean square error between the empirical observations and the moving average. The darkness
of the bands indicates the distance from the means based on Algorithm 2. Observations that lay
more than two standard deviations away from the moving average are marked with stars, i.e., we
use δ = 2. Note that the values of r, ω, and δ may be tuned for detection purposes. We do that
here for the same collectors as in the previous analysis. For the remaining collectors please refer
to Appendix B.3.
Indosat incident. Figure 7.11 shows that almost four hours before the event was reported, Q4761→B
is more than two standard deviations away from the moving average. Interestingly, the data from
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Figure 7.10: Monte Carlo test for burstiness. The last column corresponds to the observations of
the AS responsible for the incident, i.e., AS 9498.
route-views.linx— the collector with the highest number of feeders— is the first to deviate from
the mean, specifically 3 h 43 min and 2 seconds before the earliest detection of the incident. The
deviations of the other collectors are later but still hours before the incident was actually detected.
Note these outliers do not show up at other dates or times of the time series.
Telecom Malaysia incident. Figure 7.12 shows the time series of QA→B for four collectors. The
value of Q4788→B is more than two standard deviations almost four hours before the incident was
reported by BGPmon. Here the collector with the more anticipated observation is route-views4,
with anomalous readings clear 3 h 51 min and 2 seconds before detection. Note also that route-
views.saopaulo reports no outliers, meaning that the perceived burstiness is not as high as for the
other collectors (see Fig. 7.7).
Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident. Figure 7.13 shows that collectors observe anomalies in advance
of the detection of the incident. However, route-views2—the collector that received the burstiest
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Figure 7.11: Q4761→B time series for the Indosat incident.
signal according to Fig. 7.9—observes these outliers only 25 min before. The lower impact may be
correlated with lessor potential for advance notice, but there is no data to assert this as a conclusion.
7.5 Conclusion
Routing anomalies caused by both misconfigurations and malicious intent have tested the resilience
of Internet core protocols [Moriano et al., 2017c]. Here, we propose an anomaly detection method
and show that it would identify three large scale anomalies significantly in advance when com-
pared with the state-of-the-art method [Toonk]. To do so, we analyze inter-arrival times of BGP
announcements leveraging the RouteViews collector infrastructure. We found that the burstiness,
along with the volume of announcements, has the potential to provide early warnings of routing
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Figure 7.12: Q4788→B time series for the Telecom Malaysia incident.
anomalies before they are evident using traditional control-plane and data-plane approaches. We
believe that the proposed method is a complement to current anomaly detection approaches.
To validate the effectiveness of the proposed method, we conducted analysis for three cases
of large-scale routing anomalies. We have evaluated the statistical significance of announcement
burstiness, before, during, and after the events. We found that the perpetrators of the incidents
have statistically significant bursty patterns that are visible from the collectors several hours before
the incidents were reported by others. We analyze the same features under the null case (of no
incidents) and corroborate that the bursty behavior is characteristic of announcements sent prior
the detection of the incidents. By relying on this key observation, we propose an algorithm to
identify when there is an incipient anomalous incident. The data and scripts used in this research
will be made available for reproducibility purposes.
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Figure 7.13: Q9498→B time series for the Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident.
The proposed method would be effective against hijacks, route leaks, and other misconfigura-
tions. Having noted the potential for our approach, we are also aware of some limitations of our
proposed work.
Real-time data availability: Our analysis is based on BGP announcements received by Route-
Views collectors. Only a subset of these collectors support real-time monitoring through BGP-
mon5. The RouteViews data used in our analysis relies on BGPStream, which has an access delay
of approximately 20 min [Sermpezis et al., 2018a]. One option for further research is to run these
experiments with a reduced number of current real-time RouteViews collectors through BGPmon.
In addition, RIPE RIS provides an API to access real-time BGP updates for a limited number of
5Here BGPmon refers to the free monitoring service develop by Colorado State University available at
https://www.bgpmon.io/
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collectors. Through sharing our scripts, we hope that individual collectors could implement this
approach and report the results in the future.
Feeder contribution: Our method treats each router contribution as equivalent. In fact, they vary
significantly in terms of IP space coverage as shown in previous research [Gregori et al., 2012,
2015].
Unknown efficacy for subtle attacks: We evaluated our method for large-scale high-impact rout-
ing incidents, both hijacks and route leaks. However, we do not investigate other attack configu-
rations that are used for more subtle attacks. This analysis excludes incidents such as when U.S.
Internet traffic was rerouted through Iceland and Belarus in 2013 [Peterson, 2013] and routing
attacks on cryptocurrencies [Apostolaki et al., 2017].
Focus on early detection but not mitigation: We propose an anomaly detection method that
allows early identification of BGP large-scale incidents. To do so, the effectiveness of our proof-
of-concept is evaluated based on its ability to detect incidents before state-of-the-art detection
methods. Yet we do not discuss mitigation strategies once the events are detected, e.g., prefix
deaggregation [Lutu et al., 2012]. Of course, these mitigation strategies can be implemented on
top of our proposed method to avoid wide diffusion of route misinformation.
Burstiness is a complement to volume measurements: Burstiness needs to be measured simul-
taneously with the volume of announcements. As confirmed by the results for the Indosat incident,
burstiness and volume of announcements must be combined to reduce false positives and to provide
early detection of the incidents.
Overhead in route collectors: Route collectors are instruments used for measurement in our
proof-of-concept. For implementation purposes, the detection method might most effectively be
implemented at the collectors. We do not expect these processes to impose significant overhead on
the collectors, but we have no actual performance measurements.
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8 Conclusions
“Education isn’t something you can finish.”
— Isaac Asimov
As stated in Chapter 1, this dissertation argues that by developing data-driven and network science
methods, we can obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the emergence of anomalies in
longitudinal security data. We created an innovative approach using previously developed methods
from other domains to identify anomalies in a variety of security problems. Here we review those
findings and provide some final remarks.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
Chapter 2 provides a general overview of graph-based anomaly detection and its application to
computer security problems. We focused on BGP and insider threat anomaly detection. This was
presented to provide the necessary grounding for the subsequent analysis in the dissertation. The
following sections summarize the contributions of each chapter in this dissertation.
8.1.1 Chapter 3: Community-Based Event Detection in Temporal Networks
• We show that the proportion of links across communities (during a particular time window) is
a detection signature for anomalies over time. We compute the community structure over the
aggregate data for a fixed period of time and monitor the number of inter- and intra-community
links to estimate the proportion of links across communities. (Section 3.3)
• We illustrate how the diversification of interactions between users (when the information spreads
across communities) offers a complementary explanation about why an event becomes an im-
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portant topic of global interest that can be used to detect them. To formalize this understanding,
we base our reasoning on the principles of diffusion of collective behavior in social networks
(i.e., complex contagion) [Weng et al., 2013, Centola and Macy, 2007]. (Section 3.3.4)
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method by analyzing the email communi-
cation network of Enron [Diesner et al., 2005] (using the events reported in [Diesner et al.,
2005, Collingsworth et al., 2009]) and the interactions between Twitter users during the Boston
Marathon bombing. (Section 3.4)
8.1.2 Chapter 4: Insider Threat Modeling
• We propose a generic temporal graph analysis framework to model the evolution of bipartite
graphs and their equivalent one-mode projection. The proposed framework is based on the idea
that the evolution of user-system interactions can be abstracted as a set of consecutive graphs—
also called a graph stream. This framework allows the ability to select the granularity of network
formation which has been found to be application dependent [Krings et al., 2012]. We use the
proposed framework to formalize a set of measurements of the observed graphs at each time
interval. (Section 4.3.2)
• We propose a generic framework to compute the performance of an event detector algorithm.
(Section 4.3.5)
• We compare the performance of the proposed method with a naive random and edge dependent
algorithms. (Section 4.4.4).
• We use graph mining to reveal that some properties of the one-mode projection of the bipartite
graph significantly change in the presence of precipitating events. To do this, we leverage more
than 22 years of data on user-system interactions in a version control system. In particular, we
show that users tend to diversify their patterns of interactions with components after a precipitat-
ing event is announced. Our results suggest that this change in user behavior can be used to infer
the existence of a threat in a timely manner so that risk mitigation is possible before the insider
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completes their actions. Our work is differentiated from the work in [Heymann and Le Grand,
2013] in three ways. First, we rely on the notion of community structure to inform the detection
process. Second, we integrate the volume of interactions between users in different communi-
ties into the event detection. Finally, we quantify the perturbations inserted in the system after
precipitating events that might lead to insider threats. Methodologically closest to our work is
an analysis of the Enron email corpus and Twitter data in [Moriano et al., 2017a]. This work
is differentiated not only by the domain (i.e., version control system) but also in that we ab-
stract interactions as a bipartite graph and compare our detection results with standard detection
approaches. (Section 4.4.2)
• Leveraging the knowledge that insider operations can be motivated by the insiders environment,
we illustrate these can be detected by the proposed method. Given the knowledge beyond com-
puter security that the are precipitating events, our results hint at the scale of the insider threats
that are not detected using current methods. (Section 4.5)
8.1.3 Chapter 5: Macroeconomics of Routing Anomalies
• We examine routing anomalies as likely due to incompetence, potential ecrime, or intelligence
operations using macroeconomics by leveraging three theories from criminology and global
measures of technology adoption. The analysis reveals that exports of technology were not
statistically significant, undermining the argument for incompetence. However, the results show
the correlations that would be expected if these incidents are crime, and motivated by profit.
This aligns with hypotheses others have derived from proprietary network data. Specifically,
we could not reject the hypotheses that hijacks can be partially explained by guardianship and
relative deprivation theories of crime. (Section 5.4.3)
• We show that civil conflict and surveillance are associated with the disproportionate origination
of routing anomalies. This supports the possibility of the use of routing anomalies for national
intelligence. (Section 5.4.4)
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8.1.4 Chapter 6: Characterizing Routing Anomalies Through Graph Mining
• We propose a generic temporal graph analysis framework to model the evolution on the Internet
at the AS-level. The proposed framework is based on the idea that the evolution of the Internet
can be abstracted as a dynamic system of consecutive graphs—also called graph stream. We use
the proposed framework to formalize a set of measurements of the observed graphs at each time
instant. (Section 6.3.1.3)
• We use graph mining to reveal that some properties of the AS-level graphs are useful for early
detection of routing incidents. In particular, we show that centrality, average path length, and
clustering measurements are subject to perturbation when they are analyzed using k-shell decom-
position, mainly to decompose graphs between the core and the periphery. Our results suggest
that topological signatures from the AS-level graph representation can be used to infer that an
anomalous routing event is happening before widespread disruption. (Section 6.3.1.4)
• We study the capabilities of the proposed approach by building AS-level graphs of three different
large-scale routing incidents, i.e., Indosat in April 2014, Telecom Malaysia in June 2015, and
Bharti Airtel Ltd. in November 2015. (Section 6.3.1.1)
• Our work is differentiated from the work in [Kruegel et al., 2003, Gaertler and Patrignani, 2004]
in that we use dynamic update information from the RouteViews project (with granularity every
15 minutes) to reconstruct the network topology at the AS-level and study the robustness of
network topological properties, before, during, and after the incident. This approach allows
for differentiation between normal behavior at the network level and disruption or anomalous
changes during the incidents. The three cases we address were easily identified following the
large-scale disruption but not before. (Section 6.4)
8.1.5 Chapter 7: Bursty Announcements for Early Detection of BGP Routing Anomalies
• We validate our conjecture that inter-arrival time patterns of BGP announcements are a useful
signature for early identification of large-scale routing incidents. We show that bursty patterns
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of announcements are noticeable before the detection of the incidents by the current state-of-
the-art detection system [Toonk]. To do so, we quantify the burstiness of BGP announcements
by observing that when there are large-scale incidents, there are groups of announcements with
short inter-arrival times followed with larger ones. We report that this observation is independent
of the volume of announcements. (Section 7.4.2)
• We describe the design of a proof-of-concept BGP anomaly detection method that only uses
data from current route collectors. We use RouteViews route collectors to compute a detection
signature of large-scale incidents based on the impact of short inter-arrival times. We discuss how
it is possible to anticipate more clearly and accurately when an incident is imminent depending
on the view of a specific collector (quantified by the number of router feeders). (Section 7.4.3)
• We report results of a longitudinal analysis of large-scale routing incidents. We evaluated the
proposed method by studying three different large-scale routing incidents, i.e., Indosat in April
2014, Telecom Malaysia in June 2015, and Bharti Airtel Ltd. in November 2015. Our ap-
proach allows for statistically significant differentiation between normal behavior and disruption
or anomalous changes during the incidents. Without the method we have developed, when the
three cases occurred they were identified only after the large-scale disruption not in the early
phases of the attack. (Section 7.3.1.2)
8.2 Future Work
Several projects that are a natural extension of the chapters in this dissertation are presented below.
They covered the spectrum from theoretical to applied research. These projects are ordered with
respect to their relationship with the content of the chapters presented in this dissertation.
8.2.1 Limits of Community-Based Event Detection
I would like to develop a set of tools and methods to computationally test how the robustness of the
community structure of temporal networks can be leveraged for anomaly detection and resilience.
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I hypothesize that the community structure of graphs provides a basis for detection of anomalies
that is not biased against the density of interactions [Moriano et al., 2017a]. I plan to use bench-
mark networks with a known community structure, such as the works in [Holland et al., 1983,
Lancichinetti et al., 2008], to test the limits of the robustness of the community structure with
respect to the random or targeted aggregation of edges. Some works have focused on the robust-
ness of the community structure under random deletion of edges [Karrer et al., 2008, Yan et al.,
2018]. However in cybersecurity an unusual volume of interactions may not necessarily represent
an anomaly but reflect seasonal behaviors. I expect that this set of computational experiments can
measure to what extent the community structure of a system is stable and when its changes are a
useful anomaly detection signature.
8.2.2 Understanding Software Quality in Developer-Component Temporal Graphs
I want to characterize the collective characteristics of software developers and their relationship
to software failures. There is evidence suggesting that the improvement of software quality re-
duces the number of security vulnerabilities. I will explore the use of new algorithms that take into
account the inner social structure of developer communities and measure organizational context
to measure the integrity of their interactions with software components. Specifically, I will apply
a range of graph and data analysis techniques to a variety of data (characteristics of individual
developers and software components, failures by components, and temporal logs of interactions)
to evaluate the efficacy of network analysis in generating probabilistic trust indicators for the re-
sulting code. The proposed analysis will enable an understanding of the necessary conditions for
addressing security vulnerabilities (such as those posed by insiders) to improve software quality.
8.2.3 Relationship Between On-Line and Off-Line Cross Country Conflicts
I would like to build statistical models to understand the variation of cyberattacks encountered
and hosted by nation-states. This project will include public data about international hostili-
ties [Wilkenfeld et al., 2010] and alliances [Palmer et al., 2015] as this reveals a rich set of interac-
160
tions between countries in terms of agreements (e.g., treaties, entente agreements, non-aggression
treaties, trade, neutrality pacts, and defense spending) that are a basis for examining the relation-
ship between offline and online conflict. In particular, I would like to investigate to what extent
offline conflict or cooperation between nations is associated with online conflictive or cooperative
international relationships. There are rich data sources about online conflict in different cyberspace
realms [Moriano et al., 2017c, Mezzour et al., 2017]. However, the interaction and causalities be-
tween these have not been analyzed using temporal graphs of interactions. I expect that changes
in the offline interactions between countries may explain phase transition in the dynamics of on-
line interactions. Empirically identifying factors behind such variation can provide a scientific
empirical basis to policy actions to reduce cybersecurity incidents among nations and their allies.
8.3 Final Remarks
Real-world relational data is omnipresent in today’s world. Interactions derived from such data can
be modeled as networks aiming to provide a better understanding of the structure and dynamics
of the underlying systems. Understanding the temporal evolution of these networks is crucial to
provide a more detailed characterization of the system’s function. Irregularities, i.e., anomalies, in
the general evolution of these networks are usually associated with undesired and often malicious
behavior.
Characterizing regular behavior is often a prerequisite to identify these anomalies. However,
variations in the volume of interactions during a system’s evolution under particular circumstances
may be the norm. Identifying stationary trends that allow us to design reliable detection algorithms
remains an open challenge. Identification of anomalous insiders typically relies on supervised
learning models that use labeled data. However, such labeled data is not easily obtainable, which
opens the door for the use of anomaly detection methods.
By creating hypotheses about the nature of attacks as part of this dissertation, we have devel-
oped anomaly detection methods that are robust against the density of interactions in a system—
they are not biased against the density of interactions in longitudinal security data. The meth-
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ods developed in this dissertation are data and network science centric, including the analysis of
the community structure and k-shell decomposition of the underlying graphs, the use of macroe-
conomic analysis, and the analysis of inter-arrival times of events to detect bursts of malicious
route updates. We illustrate the potential of the previously developed methods applied to different
real-world scenarios, including email interactions, social media, code repositories, and Internet
control-plane updates.
Collecting the appropriate data will continue to be a challenge in these endeavors. Note that for
the analysis in Chapter 3, we use a subset of emails in Enron—which comprises communications
primarily between managers—and a random sample of tweets using the Twitter streaming API. In
Chapter 4, we use logs of a proprietary control version system for a specific codebase. In Chapter 5,
we collect data about BGP anomalous incidents relying on the accurate classification of a third-
party system and publicly available indicators from the World Bank. In Chapters 6 and 7, we
use data collected and served through the BGPStream API. Whether these datasets are enough to
identify anomalies in the different security scenarios that we tackle in this dissertation is a matter
of further study. This is a difficult challenge because there are policy, privacy, and operational
issues in getting the right data.
The findings in this dissertation, however, are not opaque given these constraints. Although
data alone do not provide insights to the different problems we study, we have shown that a
hypothesis-driven approach—based on mathematical abstractions—with respect to the nature of
the attacks informs the process of selecting the more appropriate data. Through that characteriza-
tion, this dissertation examined the temporal evolution of these system and provided a more nu-
anced characterization of the interaction of normal functionality and anomalous behavior—usually
undesired and often malicious.
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A Additional Topological Properties BGP Graph Mining
In this section, we provide more details on the additional empirical measurements we computed to
test the proposed hypothesis.
A.1 Global Structure
A.1.1 An Indonesian ISP Hijacking the World
Here, we report on the results of centrality measures which illustrate the prominence of ASes.
Figure A.1 shows the number of nodes over time. From this plot, it is possible to infer that the
only significant change in this measure is for the graph that is captured at April 2, 2014, at 12:00
and April 3, 2014, at 6:00.
To better understand this behavior, we also study the dynamic transition of the number of
edges in Figure A.2. We observe that there is a considerable decrease in the number of edges for
the graphs that are built on the same snapshots—in accordance with the measure of the number of
nodes.
Figure A.3 shows the number of nodes at various k-levels of cores graphs, i.e., k = 1, 10, and
the maximum k possible—the one that encloses the nucleus of the Internet. As we might expect,
it is not possible to observe significant changes regarding the total number of nodes in this time
series. This suggests that the core remains almost the same with respect to the number of ASes.
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Figure A.1: Number of nodes Indonesia event.
Figure A.2: Number of edges Indonesia event.
A.1.2 Global Collateral Damage of Telecom Malaysia Leak
For this incident, Figures A.4, A.5 illustrate general centrality measures for the number of nodes
and edges, respectively. As can be seen, the only significant variations for these properties occur
191
Figure A.3: Nodes per core Indonesia event.
for observations derived at June 11, 2015, at 10:00, and 18:00; June 15, 2014, at 00:00, and 18:00;
and June 13, 2015, at 00:00, and 8:00. Similarly, for the core graphs, we computed the number of
nodes as is shown in Figure A.6. We did not observe significant variations for these properties.
A.1.3 Large Scale BGP Hijack in India
For the Indian incident, we tracked of the same properties we did for the Indonesian and Malaysian
incidents. In particular, Figures A.7, A.8 show the number of nodes and edges, for each graph snap-
shot during the observation period. As in the previous cases, there are some discontinuities in each
of these time series. The discontinuities are evident in November 5, 2015, at 10:00, 12:00, 14:00,
16:00, 18:00, 20:00, 22:00; and November 6, 2015, at 00:00, 02:00, 04:00, and 06:00. Figure A.9
shows the number of nodes in the core subgraphs. This measure does not reveal significant changes
during the observation period.
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Figure A.4: Number of nodes Malaysia event.
Figure A.5: Number of edges Malaysia event.
A.2 Community Structure
A.2.1 An Indonesian ISP Hijacking the World
Figure A.10 shows the average clustering coefficient of the graph snapshots during the period of
study. This measure seems to be stable during the observation period except for the discontinuities
193
Figure A.6: Nodes per core Malaysia event.
Figure A.7: Number of nodes India event.
around the same time as we observed before in the centrality and average path length measure-
ments.
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Figure A.8: Number of edges India event.
Figure A.9: Nodes per core India event.
We then looked at the average clustering coefficient in the core subgraphs for different values
of k in Figure A.11. It is worth noting that—in advance—of the reported times of the incidents, it
195
is possible to observe some disruptions in the clustering measure for the core subgraphs.
Figure A.10: Clustering coefficient Indonesia event.
Figure A.11: Clustering per core Indonesia event.
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A.2.2 Global Collateral Damage of Telecom Malaysia Leak
For the Malaysian incident, Figure A.12, shows the average clustering coefficient for the whole
graph—with no k-shell decomposition applied yet. Discontinuities in the signal are observed in
correspondence with the same behavior exhibited for other structural properties measured at the
general graph, e.g., Figure A.4. We also studied the patterns in the number of nodes in the core
subgraphs. Figure A.13 shows the variability in this pattern. It seems to coincide with previous
illustrated discontinuities for the whole graph snapshots.
Figure A.12: Clustering coefficient Malaysia event.
A.2.3 Large Scale BGP Hijack in India
Finally, for the Indian incident, we report similar metrics in the clustering measurements as for
previous anomalous events. Figure A.14 shows the time series of the average clustering coefficient.
In general, the signal has discontinuities in accordance with centrality measures plots. Figure A.15
captures the same property for core and crust subgraphs. It is of interest that for core measurements,
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Figure A.13: Clustering per core Malaysia event.
there is a significant reduction in the clustering even under the presence of discontinuities as noticed
in the case of centrality measures.
Figure A.14: Clustering coefficient India event.
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Figure A.15: Clustering per core India event.
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B Remaining Collectors BGP Burstiness Analysis
B.1 Collectors’ Disruption Perception
Figure B.1: Time series of the number of announcements from AS 4761 that collectors received
before, during, and after the Indosat incident in 2014 for the top four collectors. Major ticks
correspond to six-hour intervals while minor ticks correspond to two-hour intervals.
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Figure B.2: Time series of the number of announcements from AS 4788 that collectors received
before, during, and after the Telecom Malaysia incident in 2015.
B.2 Inter-Arrival Time Analysis
B.3 Anomaly Detection
201
Figure B.3: Time series of the number of announcements from AS 9498 that collectors received
before, during, and after the Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident in 2015.
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Figure B.4: Joint distribution based on the the burstiness (horizontal axis) and number of an-
nouncements (vertical axis) during one day interval around the Indosat incident.
203
Figure B.5: Monte Carlo test for burstiness. Last column corresponds to the observations of the
AS responsible for the incident, AS 4761. The test statistic, the burstiness observed during the
interval of the attack, is marked with a cross.
204
Figure B.6: Joint distribution based on the total number of announcements and their burstiness
during one day interval around the Telecom Malaysia incident.
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Figure B.7: Monte Carlo test for burstiness. The last column corresponds to the observations of
the AS responsible for the incident, i.e., AS 4788.
206
Figure B.8: Joint distribution based on the total number of announcements and their burstiness
during the one day interval around the Bharti Airtel Ltd. incident.
207
Figure B.9: Monte Carlo test for burstiness. The last column corresponds to the observations of
the AS responsible for the incident, i.e., AS 9498.
208
Figure B.10: Q4761→B time series for the Indosat incident.
209
Figure B.11: Q4788→B time series for the Telecom Malaysia incident.
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